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Abstract
This thesis deals with some issues in the semantics of conditionals. Two of its three
main parts are about counterfactuals (CFs).
Chapter 2 treats German CF-wishes as implicitly conditionalized, following an idea
by von Fintel & Iatridou 2017, and CF-marking on German wünschen ‘wish’as
semantically vacuous.
Chapter 3 reports an acceptability rating study on false antecedents in German
present CFs, whose distinctive mood is the Konjunktiv 2 (K2). The empirical aim
is to tease apart three different views one may entertain on the relation between
the K2 and the indicative.
Chapter 4, finally, is about two scalar particles, Mandarin jiu and German schon.
Put into a conditional consequent, they each convey what Grosz 2012 calls minimal
sufficiency. Building on jiu-accounts by Lai 1999 and Liu 2017, this interpretive
effect is ascribed to a presupposition of scalar lowness that both particles come
with.
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Abstract
Die vorliegende Dissertation befasst sich mit diversen Phänomenen der Semantik
von Konditionalsätzen. In zwei von drei Hauptteilen geht es um kontrafaktische
(CF) Konditionale:
Kapitel 2 argumentiert, einer Idee von Fintels & Iatridous 2017 folgend, dass es
sich bei CF-Wünschen um implizite CF-Konditionale handelt. Die vorgeschlagene
Analyse behandelt die CF-Markierung am Einstellungsverb wünschen als seman-
tisch leer.
Kapitel 3 berichtet eine Akzeptabilitätsstudie, die sich präsentischen CF-Konditionalen
im Deutschen annähert, mit Schwerpunkt auf der implizierten Falschheit des An-
tezedens. Gegenüber seinem indikativischen Gegenstück steht ein deutsches CF-
Konditional im Konjunktiv 2; letztlich geht es darum, den Bedeutungsbeitrag des
jeweiligen Modus näher zu bestimmen.
Kapitel 4 befasst sich schließlich mit zwei skalaren Partikeln und deren Beitrag
zu Konditionalgefügen, dem mandarinchinesischen jiu und dem deutschen schon.
In der von Lai 1999 und Liu 2017 inspirierten Analyse verorten jiu und schon ihr
einziges Argument – im konditionalen Fall das Antezedens – am unteren Ende einer
kontextuell salienten Skala.
vi
Contents
Glossary ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Theoretical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.2 Modal flavor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.3 Modal force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.4 Conditionals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.5 (Anti-)Presuppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1.6 Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Counterfactual wishing as agreement 17
2.1 On the morphology of German CF-wishes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 A semantics for wünschen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.1 wünschen vs. freuen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2 A note on indicative wishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.3 A note on want . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.4 Interim conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Counterfactual wishing as agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.1 Spelling out von Fintel & Iatridou 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.2 Option 2 > option 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.3 CF-marking on the desideratum ϕ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.4 Some more on CF-agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.1 A drawback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4.2 Patterns of CF-wishes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 On antecedent falsity in present counterfactuals 47
3.1 Theoretical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1.1 T1: no difference in presuppositional strength . . . . . . . . 49
3.1.2 MP1: the IND is vacuous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1.3 MP2: the K2 is vacuous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.1.4 Antecedent variety? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.1 Design and procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
vii
3.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.3 Discussion of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4 Mandarin jiu and German schon: early times and low antecedents 63
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 LOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2.1 Capturing earliness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.2 Capturing minimal sufficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.3 Interim conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3 Lowness as agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3.1 guang ‘alone’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3.2 zhi-yao ‘only-need’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.3 Interim conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4 Other implications triggered by jiu/schon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4.1 Additivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4.2 Inception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4.3 Interim conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5 Previous work on jiu and schon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5.1 jiu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5.2 schon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5 Conclusion 95
A Experimental items (chapter 3) 101
viii
Glossary
ASP aspect marker
AV antecedent variety, cf. section 3.1.4
C/D The Conditional/Desire Generalization (von Fintel & Iatridou 2017, 2020)
CF counterfactual
IND indicative
K1 the German Konjunktiv 1
K2 the German Konjunktiv 2 (past conjunctive)
MP Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991)
MS minimal sufficiency (Grosz 2012)
PRT particle
PSP presupposition
SoT Sequence of Tense
ix

1 Introduction
This thesis is about conditionals, understood as hypotactical constructions whose
embedded part tends to be an if -clause in English:
(1) If the sun is shining, we’ll go for a walk.
Sentences like (38-b) establish a causal relation between two eventualities. The caus-
ing eventuality is denoted by the if -clause and is often referred to as the antecedent.
Denoting a consequence of the antecedent, the main clause is often referred to as
the consequent.
There is a plethora of philosophical and semantic literature on conditionals. The
present thesis hopes to be sufficiently aware of some of them. The remainder of
this introductory chapter establishes the theoretical background minimally needed
for what comes next, and ends with a quick overview of the topics covered in what
follows.
1.1 Theoretical background
The following four subsections serve as a very brief introduction to modal semantics
that heavily draws on von Fintel & Heim 2011’s lecture notes, so readers who are
already familiar with the material may prefer to skip these sections. Section 1.1.1
introduces the notion of displacement to motivate an intensional system. 1.1.2 and
1.1.3 are respectively about two parameters along which modals may vary, namely
flavor and force. 1.1.4 is about conditionals, for obvious reasons.
The ensuing subsections seek to convey a basic understanding of some notions or
phenomena that will be crucial throughout this dissertation, (anti-)presuppositions
and agreement.
1.1.1 Displacement
Heim & Kratzer 1998’s classic introduction to formal semantics works almost en-
tirely within an extensional system: Sentence truth or falsity depend on the way
our world is at the time the sentence is uttered. von Fintel & Heim 2011 go one step
further to an intensional one. In doing so, they capture the expressive potential of
natural languages to leave the here and now behind. To do so is to either “dwell
in possibility” (to use Emily Dickinson’s words), or to talk about the past instead
of the present, or to do both at the same time. More concretely, displacement pro-
ceeds along two dimensions von Fintel & Heim 2011 refer to as temporal and modal.
Temporal displacement is exemplified by the past-tensed sentence in (2). Its truth
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does not depend on whether or not Henry is happy right now, but at some earlier
time: the time of evaluation is displaced into the past.
(2) Henry was happy.
Modal displacement is exemplified by (3). Its truth does not depend on whether or
not Henry is in fact happy, but whether or not it is possible that he is.
(3) Henry may be happy.
In formal semantics, possibilities tend to be thought of as possible worlds (or situ-
ations).1 So (3) can be paraphrased as follows. (74) is just a slightly more formal
variant of (4-a), making use of the existential operator ∃.
(4) a. In some possible world, Henry is happy.
b. ∃w [ Henry is happy in w ]
An extensional system treats sentence meaning in terms of truth or falsity. An
intensional system treats it as a proposition: sets of possible worlds. The proposition
Henry is happy is the set of worlds in which Henry is happy, or, on the view
frequently entertained by Heim & Kratzer 1998, the characteristic function of that
set. Propositions can be thought of as sets of times just as well.
These (combinable) ways of thinking of sentence meaning necessitate an enrichment
of the extensional system by two new semantic types,
(5) a. a type for times ⟨i⟩ and
b. a type for worlds ⟨s⟩.
This allows us to think of the proposition Henry is happy as a function from worlds
to a function from times to truth values:
(6) J that Henry is happy K = λw.λt. Henry is happy in w at t
How is this derived compositionally? A nice and simple way of doing this is to have
overt time and variables at LF, abstracted over higher up in the tree.2 A sentence
predicate like happy is thought of as taking a world- and a time-argument:
1This has little if anything to do with spatial displacement, a misconception that it might be easy
to trick oneself into.
2This procedure is not highly prominent in von Fintel & Heim 2011, but discussed as a possible
take on certain scope paradoxes that may arise under modal embedding. My initial exposure to
it is due to a class taught by Vera Hohaus in the summer of 2017 at the University of Tübingen.
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(7) J happy K = λw.λt.λx. x is happy in w at t
These arguments are immediately saturated in the syntax, just to be abstracted
over higher up in the tree. This mechanism creates the proposition in (6).
1⃝
λt
λw
Henry
happy w t
By default, 1⃝ will be applied to the speech time tnow as well as the actual world
@, giving us an interpretation w.r.t. our ‘here and now’.
Throughout this thesis, I will be taking for granted an LF-architecture such as the
above.3 For reasons of expository simplicity, however, trees will be rarely spelled
out as detailedly as in i⃝.
Here comes one first simplification. We are still working with the sentence in (3).
We want to focus on modal displacement, so we leave times aside, and just think of
the proposition Henry is happy as a set of worlds.
(8) λw. Henry is happy in w
What exactly does it mean for (8) to be modally displaced from @? Technically, it
means that (8) serves as a propositional argument p for an operator that performs
the displacement. To illustrate, let’s call this operator MAY, spelled out as may in
(3). When MAY applies to (8), the result is yet another proposition, whose truth or
falsity depends on a given world of evaluation w. In the case at hand, w is still @:
For the sentence to be true, it needs to be possible in @ for Henry to smile. So the
displacement doesn’t leave @ behind entirely – it remains anchored to it in some
way.
von Fintel & Heim 2011 capture this anchoring by bringing an accessibility rela-
tion R into play. R performs the displacement taking us from a given world w –
standardly @ – to a set of worlds that are what the authors aptly call ‘R-accessible
from’ w. This set of worlds specifies what the world must be like in which p holds
true. The LF below shows how this works out compositionally for (3); see also Beck
3It should be mentioned that things are not as that. Researchers like Percus 2000 and Keshet
2010 have identified important binding constraints that disallow for certain variables to be bound
by certain abstractors. The interested reader is referred to the work cited here.
3
& Hohaus 2011 for an implementation along these lines.
2⃝
λw
MAY qs,t
R w
ps,t
λw′
Henry
(is) happy w′
In order for this to work out in terms of semantic type, MAY takes two propositions,
p′ and p. p′ is the set of worlds that R brings us to.
(9) MAY(p′s,t)(ps,t) is true iff ∃w′′ [ p′(w′′) ∧ p(w′′) ]
Applied to @, ii⃝ has the following truth conditions. Given the internal composition
of q, (10-a) amounts to (10-b).
(10) J 2⃝ K is true in @ iff
a. ∃w′′ [ p′(w′′) ∧ Henry is happy in w′′ ]
b. ∃w′′ [ R(@)(w′′) ∧ Henry is happy in w′′ ]
1.1.2 Modal flavor
But in what sense is w′′ accessible from @? This is a question whose answer varies
from context to context, and it refers to what is called modal flavor. The speaker
of (3) may be taking a guess at what Henry feels like. The modal flavor is then
epistemic, based on the speaker’s knowledge, or doxastic, based on her beliefs. But
especially if we negate (3) (Henry may not be happy), other possible flavors for
may come to the surface. We may be in a weird scenario where individuals aren’t
allowed to be happy, and the flavor would be deontic (norm-related). Or the speaker
is extremely jealous at Henry’s happiness and thereby utters her desire for him not
to be happy. This would make the flavor bouletic (desire-related).
The job of R is to specify the given flavor. Flavor is context-sensitive, so R must
be as well. In the system of Heim & Kratzer 1998, this means R is interpreted by
the assignment function g. Sticking with an epistemic reading for may in (3), R is
interpreted as follows.
(11) g(R)(@)(w′) is true iff w′ is compatible with what the speaker S knows in @
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This affects the way 2⃝ is interpreted as a whole:
(12) J 2⃝ K is true in @ iff ∃w′′ [ w′′ is compatible with what S knows in @ ∧
Henry is happy in w′′ ]
In chapters 2 and 3, bouletic or doxastic flavors will play a crucial role when it
comes to counterfactual mood marking or certain desire verbs like want, wish and
glad. But the flavor will be assumed to be lexically encoded there, that is, R will
not have a crucial role to play. It does in principle have an important role to play in
conditionals, the type of construction at the very heart of the present thesis. In the
subsection after next, we will see how. But first let us look at another fundamental
distinction, apart from different modal flavors, namely modal force.
1.1.3 Modal force
Modals can be classified according to their quantificational strength. The most
coarse-grained distinction is between possibility, expressed in (13-a), and necessity,
expressed in (13-b). The latter entails the former, but not vice versa.
(13) a. Henry may be happy.
b. Henry must be happy.
As before, may and must are taken to spell out homonymous operators at LF. For
convenience, R’s world of departure is already set as @.
(14) a. MAYR(@) [ λw. Henry is happy in w ]
b. MUSTR(@) [ λw. Henry is happy in w ]
The difference between MAY and MUST is quantificational: the former quantifies
existentially, the latter universally, over possible worlds. While MAY is about some
properly restricted worlds, MUST is about all of them.
(15) a. J (14-a) K is true in @ iff ∃w [ R(@)(w) ∧ Henry is happy in w ]
b. J (14-b) K is true in @ iff ∀w [ R(@)(w) → Henry is happy in w ]
Modal logic offers an even more concise way of expressing this distinction: applied
to a proposition, the diamond-operator 3 expresses that proposition’s possibility,
the box-operator 2 its necessity. So we can rewrite (15) as (16), a notation chosen
whenever convenient in this thesis.
(16) a. J (14-a) K is true in @ iff 3R(@)(Henry is happy)
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b. J (14-b) K is true in @ iff 2R(@)(Henry is happy)
Necessity is important for conditionals, even in those that don’t contain an overt
modal. Let’s have a look.
1.1.4 Conditionals
On a classical view of conditionals, a sentence like
(17) If it’s sunny, we’ll go for a walk.
has the rather unintuitive meaning
(18) We’ll go for a walk, or it isn’t sunny.
This view is referred to as material implication. We will not enter into the pros and
cons of this approach here, but see Stalnaker 1975, von Fintel 2011 and von Fintel
& Heim 2011 for discussion.
An elegant approach widely assumed in semantics is the restrictor approach origi-
nally taken by Kratzer 1986. The appealing core assumption is that all conditionals
are explicitly or implicitly modalized: A modal takes the consequent as its argu-
ment. The antecedent p restricts that modal’s domain of quantification. Given the
above said, the modal is then doubly restricted, not only to R-accessible worlds,
but also to p-worlds. Whenever there is no overt modal, a covert necessity modal
is assumed. The LF-tree below makes this idea concrete for (17), still following
von Fintel & Heim 2011.4
3⃝
λw
MUST p
p′s,t
R w
p′′s,t
it’s sunny
q
we go for a walk
4See von Fintel 1994 for a different implementation. p is not written into the LF there, but
modifies (intersects with) the contextual restriction on the modal that would be there either way.
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The semantics implicitly assumed for MUST is essentially the same as for non-
conditional cases above. It takes two propositions p and q, and states all p-worlds
to be q-worlds. 3⃝, this works out as follows.5
(19) J 3⃝ K is true in @ iff
∀w [ p(w) → q(w) ] insert p
∀w [ R(@)(w) ∧ p′(w) → q(w) ] insert p′ & q
∀w [ R(@)(w) ∧ it’s sunny in w → we go for a walk in w ]
Little surprisingly, this isn’t the whole story yet. The worlds quantified over by
MUST need to be even further restricted to those that are closest (minimally differ-
ent from) the actual world @. This restriction originates in work by David Lewis and
Robert Stalnaker, and has repercussions in much subsequent work. The purpose is
to keep a conditional like (17) from entailing something like the following:6
(20) If it’s sunny and we are bedridden, we’ll go for a walk.
On the analysis in (19), this implausible inference is valid: q is stated to hold in all
accessible worlds in which it is sunny. This necessarily includes accessible worlds
in which it is sunny and we are bedridden. Maximal similarity ensures plausibility:
Worlds in which we go for a walk are restricted to worlds that are just like @, except
for the tiny little fact that it’s sunny in them. Our being bedridden already exceeds
this minimal deviation and is hence ruled out.
Heim 1992 attributes maximal similarity to a function SIM of type ⟨s,⟨st,st⟩⟩, whose
definition is freely varied on in (21).
(21) SIM(ws)(ps,t)(w′s) is true iff p(w′), and no other p-world resembles w more
than w′ does.
Having combined with w, SIM takes a proposition and returns another one. Here
is a way of enriching SIM with 3⃝, with p′ being the former p.
5Ippolito 2003 chooses an epistemic flavor for the kinds of conditionals she discusses.
6Lewis’ original example, brought to my attention by Daniel Margulis, is cited in von Fintel 2011
as
(i) If kangaroos had no tails but used crutches, they would topple over.
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3′⃝
λw
MUST p
st,st
SIM w
p′s,t
R w p
′′
...
q
...
The interpretation then looks as follows. What we get in the end is that in all
R-accessible sunny worlds closest to @, we go for a walk.
(22) J 3′⃝ K is true in @ iff
∀w [ p(w) → q(w) ] insert p
∀w [ SIM(@)(p′)(w) → q(w) ] insert p′
∀w [ SIM(@)(R(@) ∧ p′′)(w) → q(w) ] insert p′′ & q
∀w [ SIM(@)(R(@) ∧ it’s sunny)(w) → we go for a walk in w ]
This is rather complex. In the remainder of this thesis you will find simplified
treatments of conditional MUST that have SIM built into its semantics, giving us
something like the following.
(23) MUSTsimpler(w)(p)(q) is true iff ∀w′ [ SIMw(p)(w′) → q(w′) ]
With these preliminaries on modal semantics, let’s move on to get an impression of
the other notions relevant in this thesis.
1.1.5 (Anti-)Presuppositions
A few notes on presuppositions (PSPs) are in place, the concept of which is crucial to
all of the three chapters to come. The concept of anti-PSP will figure prominently
in chapters 2 and 4. PSP are traditionally thought of as felicity conditions that
certain lexical items endow their surrounding sentence with, and formally modelled
as definedness conditions on sentence truth. Take a classic example from Saul
Kripke, cited in von Fintel 1998.
(24) Tonight, John is having dinner in New York, too.
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This sentence is infelicitous unless prior context has established someone else to be
having dinner in NY tonight. This infelicity is due to an additive presupposition
triggered by too.
A classic test to identify a sentence’s PSP is to embed the sentence under something
that affects its assertion. PSPs project (remain intact) under embedding. Three
easy ways to embed a sentence are to negate it, form a question out of it, or make
it an if -clause. In (25), each of this is done to (24).
(25) a. It’s not true that John is having dinner in NY tonight, too.
b. Is John having dinner in NY tonight, too?
c. If John is having dinner in NY tonight, too, I will certainly join in.
The sentences in (25) no longer imply John to be having dinner in NY tonight, but
they sure still imply someone else to be: That’s because the additivity of too is
presupposed rather than asserted.
It is wellknown that projective content does not always have to be contextually pre-
established. Not every sentence is as infelicitous as (24) if uttered ‘out of the blue’.
Another example in von Fintel 2008, Robert Stalnaker’s (26), does not require
the hearer H to know in advance that the speaker S owns a cat. H can easily
accommodate this piece of information, that is, spontaneously make it part of his
background assumptions.
(26) I have to pick up my cat at the veterinarian.
Differences in ease of accommodation show that projective content is actually a
heterogeneous class (Tonhauser et al. 2013). The definition of PSP as a felicity
condition is actually too strict to allow for accommodation; this suggests PSPs to
form only a subpart of projective content. Such intricate distinctions are largely
left aside in this thesis, which simplifyingly treats nearly everything that projects
as presupposed.
But only nearly, since it will be crucial to draw a line between PSPs and another
kind of projective content: inferences sometimes referred to as anti-PSPs, pragmatic
inferences drawn at the level of PSP whose existence was first considered by Heim
1991. The underlying conversational maxim is to Maximize Presupposition (MP):
that is, to presuppose as much as possible. Since its birth, the theory has seen many
refinements in work by Sauerland 2008a, Chemla 2008, or Rouillard & B. Schwarz
2018, to name just a few.
The original motivation in Heim 1991 comes from a contrast between the definite
and the indefinite article. Chemla 2008 illustrates the point as follows.
9
(27) John has interviewed {the / #a} father of the victim.
The definite implies, arguably presupposes, there to be a unique father in the con-
text. The indefinite is odd because it implies there to be more than one, which
clashes with the default assumption that every being only has one (biological) fa-
ther.7 Heim considers this additive inference not to be presupposed, but to arise as
a pragmatic inference that the hearer draws because a does not presuppose unique-
ness like the does; it even presupposes nothing at all, as indicated by the subscript
Ø in (28). As a result, the definite entails the indefinite, but not vice versa. The
two articles compete on a scale of presuppositional strength, which Sauerland 2008a
represents as follows:
(28) {aØ, the}
The implication of anti-uniqueness is now drawn based on MP, a conversational
principle which Sauerland 2008a phrases as in (29).
(29) Maximize Presupposition (informal)
Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible!
Given this maxim, a hearer coming across the indefinite NP a father of the victim
is encouraged to infer that the speaker didn’t consider it possible to use its definite
competitor the father of the victim, and is hence inclined to draw the conclusion
that the speaker believes the victim to have more than one father.
This line of reasoning is so far analogous to the way scalar implicatures tend to be
understood in a Gricean framework. A classic example for a scalar implicature is
(30), a free variation on one given by Chemla 2008.
(30) Elaine saw some of her students today.
; Elaine saw some but not all of her students today
The relevant competition for (30) is between some and all. The latter strengthens
(30) if inserted for the former.
(31) {some, all}
On a Gricean view of scalar implicatures, they are rooted in a conversational Maxim
of Quantity, which MP is inspired by. To sharpen the similarity with (29), one might
freely paraphrase this maxim as in (32).
7Thanks to Lilian Gonzalez (pc) for discussion.
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(32) Maxim of quantity
≈ Make your contribution as informative as possible!
A speaker S uttering (30) and abiding by (32) will be inferred to believe that Elaine
didn’t see all of her students – granted S can safely be assumed to be opinionated
about whether or not she saw all of them. This assumption, which Chemla 2008
follows other researchers in calling Competence, is freely stated in (33). Alternatives
are thought of as entire sentences here.
(33) Competence
Speaker S is opinionated about p, the proposition she would have implied if
she had chosen a stronger alternative: 2DOX,S(p) ∨ 2DOX,S(¬p).
(33) is crucial in deriving the scalar implicature (30) gives rise to. In its absence, the
inference would be much weaker, because S could just as well be uncertain about
whether or not all came.
Chemla 2008 adopts this very reasoning for an anti-PSP such as the one for the
indefinite in (27). This is semiformally reconstructed below. Let the definite pre-
suppose the victim to have a unique father, abbreviated as ∃!f. Negated belief has
the weak disjunctive form in (34-a), with disbelief and uncertainty as active possi-
bilities. Competence allows for this to be strengthened to (34-b) via deletion of the
uncertainty-disjunct.8
(34) ¬2DOX,S(∃!f)
a. 2DOX,S¬(∃!f) ∨ [ 3DOX,S¬(∃!f) ∧ 3DOX,S(∃!f) ]
b. 2DOX,S¬(∃!f) ∨ [ 3DOX,S¬(∃!f) ∧ 3DOX,S(∃!f) ]
A question addressed in some of the MP-literature is how far the analogy between
anti-PSPs and scalar implicatures goes. Rouillard & B. Schwarz 2018 cast doubt on
reductionist attempts treating MP as a special variant of the maxim of quantity.
Experimental data by Bade & F. Schwarz 2019 point into a similar direction in
that they suggest different processing patterns for anti-PSPs than for scalar impli-
catures.
Another point of discussion is the scope of MP within the landscape of existing
PSP-triggers. Backed by experimental data, Bade 2016, 2018 argues MP to make
only a subset of triggers obligatory when licensed; others like additive too are argued
8In addition to Competence, Chemla 2008 takes another assumption he calls Authority to be
crucial for the derivation of anti-PSPs. This pertains to the hearer’s readiness to accept as true
what the speaker presupposes. For lack of immediate relevance, this aspect is neglected in this
thesis.
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to follow from the need to cancel a scalar implicature the sentence would otherwise
give rise to.
For certain cases at least, MP remains an elegant and lexically economical way
of capturing certain implications. The list of potential scales of presuppositional
strength has grown over the years, including the following candidates from Sauer-
land 2002, 2008a.
(35) a. {believeØ, know}
b. {all, both}
c. {presentØ, past} Sauerland 2002
This thesis adds more potential scales to the picture.
1.1.6 Agreement
Agreement sits right at the interface between syntax and semantics. It can infor-
mally be described as a harmony between two or more morphemes in a sentence
in certain categories, called features in the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995).
At least one of these morphemes is not semantically interpreted, as if the meaning
contributed by a specific element were systematically scattered across the sentence
it appears in. (36-a) displays simple subject-verb agreement in person and num-
ber. (36-b) and (36-c), both of which are more or less freely adopted from work by
Hedde Zeijlstra, are an English case of Sequence of Tense (SoT), and an Italian one
of negative concord, respectively.
(36) a. She[3rd,sg] like-s[3rd,sg] cats.
b. John said[past] Mary was[past] delighted.
c. Gianni
Gianni
non[neg]
not[neg]
ha
have
telefonato
called
a
to
nessuno[neg].
nobody[neg]
‘John didn’t call anyone.’
A very basic distinction drawn by the Minimalist Program is the one between in-
terpretable features, [iF]s, and uninterpretable ones, [uF]s. The presence of a given
[iF] is due to the semantics of its carrier. A given [uF] merely reflects a match-
ing [iF] somewhere else in the sentence, ensuring syntactic consistency; the [uF]
itself doesn’t enter semantic interpretation, which is to say it deletes at LF. So
on a slightly refined view of (36-a), the subject carries a bundle of [iF]s specified
for number and person, the verbal ending the matching [uF]s. Since number and
person are viewed as ϕ-features, (36-a) can be rendered as follows.
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(37) She[iϕ] like-s[uϕ] cats.
An [iF] need not be spelled out overtly, but it sure needs to be present in the
structure, following Brody 1997’s Principle of radical interpretability. In (36-b), for
example, [iPAST] is ascribed to a silent operator, and to neither of the two visible
morphemes; see Kauf & Zeijlstra 2018 for a recent SoT-proposal.
Agreement offers a neat way to make sense of salient, if not uniquely available
readings that a simple 1:1-mapping between form and meaning fails to capture.
The readings agreement enables us to exclude range from harmless redundancy to
the plain opposite of what a sentence actually means. The details of how agreement
works are subject to lively debate. Pesetsky & Torrego 2007, for example, suggest
a more fine-grained classification of features going beyond the simple dichotomy
between [iF] and [uF]. And as for the structural preconditions for agreement to
happen, Zeijlstra 2012, argues against the traditional assumption that a [uF] needs
to c-command a matching [iF], suggesting the exact opposite to obtain. Such details
will be largely left aside here.
1.2 Overview
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with a special kind of
conditional: counterfactuals (CFs) like (38-a), to be distinguished from its indicative
counterpart in (38-b).
(38) a. If the sun were shining, we would go for a walk.
; it is neither true that the sun is shining nor that we will go for a
walk
b. If the sun is shining, we will go for a walk.
; it is both possible that the sun is shining and that we will go for a
walk
Such minimal pairs and the concomitant change in implications may motivate the
generalization that indicative antecedents and consequents are typically held possi-
ble by the speaker, while their CF-counterparts are typically held false – or unlikely
at the very least.
Since Anderson 1951, this falsity has been argued to be defeasible, casting doubt
on the term ‘CF’ to refer to the verbal morphology involved in (38-a) (von Fintel
& Iatridou 2017). One particularly striking case in which CF-marking doesn’t im-
ply its surrounding sentence to be false is in what Iatridou 2000 calls CF-wishing,
exemplified by German (39). The desire predicate wünschen ‘wish’ is CF-marked,
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but the desire is implied to be far from absent (von Fintel & Iatridou 2008, 2017).
(39) Ich
I
wünsch-te,
wish-CF
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene!
shine-CF
‘I wish the sun were shining!’
The question addressed by chapter 2 is what CF-marking on wünschen does. Fol-
lowing an idea by von Fintel & Iatridou 2017, CF-wishes will be analyzed as hidden
CF-conditionals.
Chapter 3 zooms in on the antecedent falsity (term used by Leahy 2018) seen
in (38-a): the implication that the sun is not shining. Since the object language
is German, and German CFs employ the Konjunktiv 2 (K2), the question is how
the latter comes to convey the sun not to be shining in (40-a), in contrast to its
indicative (IND) counterpart (40-b).9
(40) a. Wenn
if
gerade
now
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene,
shine-K2
gingen
go-K2
wir
we
spazieren.
walk
b. Wenn
if
gerade
now
die
the
Sonne
sun
scheint,
shine-IND
gehen
go-IND
wir
we
spazieren.
walk
The chapter reports an acceptability rating study aimed at comparing three pos-
sible theories on the relationship between the K2 and the IND. One of the three
takes each mood to come with a PSP of its own; two of them are couched in an
MP-framework and treat only one of the two as presuppositional.
Chapter 4, finally, leaves counterfactuality behind and presents a unifying account
of two scalar particles, Mandarin jiu and German schon, which sometimes translate
as ‘already’. Placed in a conditional consequent as in (41), their interpretive effect
is one of minimal sufficiency (Grosz 2012): The antecedent (a hearer-smile) is
conveyed to come with a minimal cost, i.e., to be easy to put into action.
(41) a. Ni
you
xiao,
smile
wo
I
jiu
jiu
kaixin.
happy
b. Wenn
if
du
you
lächelst,
smile
bin
I
ich
am
schon
schon
glücklich.
happy; it takes as little as your smile to make me happy
The chapter follows previous jiu-accounts, notably Lai 1999’s and Liu 2017’s, in
9Note that the sentences in (40) are adverbially enforced to be strictly present-oriented. Present-
orientation matters for antecedent falsity (Iatridou 2000, Ashwini Deo pc).
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ascribing this easiness to a more abstract scalar lowness either denoted or indirectly
reflected by the two particles. The analysis is shown to also capture their temporal
uses, in which they convey earliness.
15

2 Counterfactual wishing as agreement10
This chapter deals with a special type of counterfactual (CF) construction, namely
CF-wishes like German (42). This sentence exemplifies a phenomenon that can be
found in many other languages as well (von Fintel & Iatridou 2008, 2017, henceforth
vF&I): CF-marking on a desire verb, wünschen in this case, does not imply the
speaker (more generally, the wisher) to have no desire for what the embedded clause
ϕ denotes, quite the contrary; what it implies instead is the wisher’s disbelief in
ϕ.11
(42) Ich
I
wünsch-te,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene
shine-CF
].
]
‘I wish the sun would shine.’
̸; absent desire for ϕ
; desire for & disbelief in ϕ
InWimmer 2019, I followed vF&I 2017 in taking (42) to be an implicit CF-conditional
whose missing antecedent denotes ϕ’s doxastic possibility. When we encounter a
CF-wish, we only see (or hear) the overt consequent.
(43) [missing if I held ϕ possible (which I don’t), ] I would wish that ϕ12
Taking for granted that CF-marking is indicative of a corresponding CF-operator
somewhere at LF, there are at least two options of spelling out the idea in (43).
On option 1 in (44-a), CF-marking on both the antecedent p and the consequent q
10The bulk of this chapter is published in the proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung [SuB] 24 (Wim-
mer 2020). Among those I am indebted to, special thanks go to abstract reviewers for the 54th
annual meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society [CLS] 54 and SuB 24, as well as Lilian Gonzalez
and Vera Thomas for proofreading the manuscript. All remaining shortcomings are, of course,
my own. This project is inspired by a course on the linguistics of desire co-taught by Kai von
Fintel and Sabine Iatridou in the fall of 2017, which I had the chance to attend. Their recent
paper (von Fintel & Iatridou 2020) contains an important objection to the way CF-wishes are
treated in this chapter, see footnote 12 and brief discussion in this chapter’s conclusion.
11It doesn’t take CF-marking on ϕ for this implication to arise, given its persistence under infini-
tival complementation:
(i) Ich
I
wünsch-te,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
die
the
Sonne
sun
scheinen
shine
zu
to
sehen
see-INF
].
]; preference for & disbelief in ϕ Wimmer 2019
This tells us that CF-marking on wünsch is in fact the only source of the disbelief-implication.
12I owe the which I don’t part to Konstantin Sachs. vF&I 2020 explicitly turn against a conditional
analysis along the lines of (43): It falsely predicts a CF-wish like (42) to be felicitous even when
the speaker has no actual desire for ϕ.
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is taken literally, to the effect that p and q each have a CF-operator of their own
attached to them at LF. An option disfavoring such a morphosemantic equivalence
takes only CF-marking on p to be semantically contentful, and q’s implied falsity
to be a defeasible by-product of what the CF-operator does to p. As a result, only
p, but not also q, has a CF-operator attached to it at LF, (44-b). This makes
CF-marking on q semantically vacuous, and plausibly subject to agreement.
(44) a. [ if [ CF p ] ] CF′ q option 1
b. [ if [ CF p ] ] Ø q option 2
Option 2 is supported by the existence of so-called concessive conditionals: Both p
and q are CF-marked, but only p is implied to be false.
(45) (Even) if you were mean, I would still be your friend
; you are not mean
̸; I am not your friend
In this chapter, option 2 is argued to be the preferable take on CF-wishes like (42)
as well. On this view, CF-marking on wünschen is entirely vacuous, and merely
agrees with a CF-operator attached to the missing antecedent. This is to refine
my earlier account in Wimmer 2019, where I treated CF-wishes along the lines of
option 1; this account still falsely predicts the desire for ϕ not to obtain.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 looks at the morphology of German
CF-wishes. Section 2 gives a simple semantics for wünschen inspired by Heim 1992,
but with the twist that wünschen presuppositionally competes with freuen. Section
3, the main part of the chapter, derives the disbelief-implication of CF-wishes in
the way foreshadowed above. Section 4 concludes.
2.1 On the morphology of German CF-wishes
This section looks at the morphological make-up of German CF-wishes. These
resemble CF-conditionals in some ways, and differ from them in others. More
concretely: There is CF-marking on both wünschen ‘wish’ and its finite complement
just as there is CF-marking on both the consequent and the antecedent of a CF-
conditional. But CF-morphology needs to directly attach to wünschen (Sode 2017).
This rules out the periphrastic conjunctive with würde ‘would’, a highly frequent
way of expressing counterfactuality in German.
The first thing to observe is that CF-marking on wünschen is both sufficient and
necessary for CF-marking on the finite complement it embeds, henceforth referred
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to as ϕ. There is no CF-marking on wünschen without CF-marking on ϕ (46-a).
There isn’t CF-marking on ϕ without CF-marking on wünschen either (46-b).
(46) a. Ich
I
wünsch-te
wish-CF
mir,
myself
dass
that
die
the
Sonne
sun
*scheint.
shine*-IND
b. Ich
I
wünsche
wish-IND
mir,
myself
dass
that
die
the
Sonne
sun
*schiene.
shine*-CF
This obligatory agreement is reminiscent of the one between antecedents and con-
sequents in CF-conditionals:13
(47) Wenn
if
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene,
shine-CF
*blühen/blüh-ten
bloom*-IND/CF
die
the
Kirschen.
cherries
(47) Wenn
if
die
the
Sonne
sun
scheint,
shine-IND
blühen/blüh-ten
bloom-IND/*-CF
die
the
Kirschen.
cherries
German CF-conditionals and -wishes come a little bit apart when it comes to what
kind of CF-marking shows up where. It is wellknown that CF-marking comes
in different shapes not only between, but even within languages. German has
the Konjunktiv 2 at its disposal, a mood type that is also characterized as past
conjunctive. It may come in either of two variant: Its synthetic variant directly
attaches to the verbal stem; the periphrastic alternative leaves the verbal stem
untouched, and attaches to an auxiliary werden ‘will’ to form würde ‘would’ instead.
More often than not, both variants lead to the same result, leaving aside that
synthetic CF-marking generally belongs to a higher register, and that the synthetic
conjunctive is preferred with copulae (auxiliaries) such as sein ‘be’. This equivalence
can be seen in (48), a variation on similar data in Grønn & von Stechow 2009: In
a German CF-conditional, p and q may converge (48-a), but also deviate (48-b), in
terms of the kind of CF-marking they carry.
(48) a. (i) Wenn
if
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene,
shine-CF
ginge
go-CF
ich
I
spazieren.
walk
(ii) Wenn
if
die
the
Sonne
sun
scheinen
shine
würde,
will-CF
würde
will-CF
ich
I
spazieren
walk
gehen.
go
13It is also reminiscent of the phenomenon known as Sequence of Tense (SoT): Past-inflection on
a verb of saying usually coincides with past-inflection on that verb’s finite complement ϕ, at
least as long as ϕ’s temporal extension is not supposed to overlap with the speech time:
(i) John said [ϕ Mary was ill ] Zeijlstra 2012: 503
While agreement seems to be at work in both SoT-constructions and CF-conditionals, Schulz
2014 argues the latter to be irreducible to the former. More on this in section 2.3.4.
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b. (i) Wenn
if
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene,
shine-CF
würde
will-CF
ich
I
spazieren
walk
gehen.
go
(ii) Wenn
if
die
the
Sonne
sun
scheinen
shine
würde,
will-CF
ginge
go-CF
ich
I
spazieren.
walk
Sode 2017 observes German CF-wishes not to be as unrestricted as German CF-
conditionals. This, in turn, violates a crosslinguistic pattern identified by Iatridou
2000, referred to as the Conditional/Desire Generalization (C/D) by vF&I 2017,
2020: In a given language with overtly marked CF-conditionals and -wishes, there
is an equivalence in CF-marking between (a) the desire verb WANT and the CF-
consequent q, and (ii) WANT’s complement ϕ and the CF-antecedent p. Here is a
free rephrasal of the C/D:14
(49) The Conditional/Desire Generalization ≈vF&I 2017, 2020
In a given language with CF-conditionals like (49-a), CF-wishes tend to look
like (49-b).
a. [ if p-CFp ] q-CFq
b. … WANT-CFq [ ϕ-CFp ]
The C/D is partly based on Romance data, and we may take Italian as an il-
lustration. (50-a) is an Italian CF-conditional, (50-b) an Italian CF-wish, with
CF-marking on the desire verb volere ‘want’. CFp is past imperfective, CFq is con-
ditional mood. In line with the C/D, volere is in the conditional mood, hence carries
CFq, and the complement of volere is in the past imperfective, hence carries CFp.15
(50) a. Se
if
ci
there
fosse
is-CFp
il
the
sole,
sun,
fiorir-ebbero
flourish-CFq
le
the
cilegie.
cherries
‘If the sun was shining, the cherries would be flourishing.’
b. Vorrei
I-want-CFq
che
that
ci
there
fosse
is-CFp
il
the
sole.
sun
‘I wish the sun was shining.’
We saw in (48) that in German, CF-marking on q may be either periphrastic or
synthetic. From the C/D, we would expect CF-wishes with CF-marking on wün-
schen to come in both shapes as well. This conclusion is proven wrong by (51-a),
14The C/D’s antecedent-part is foreshadowed in Heim 1992, who takes CF-marking on ϕ and p
to be both vacuous. One may see the C/D as a morphological equivalence w.r.t. what sits
structurally high and what sits low. One may be inclined to see a chiasmic pattern in (49): The
morphological sequences of the CF-conditional and the CF-wish seem to mirror each other. But
to the extent that antecedents may be right-dislocated, this chiasmus may give way to sequential
parallelism.
15Thanks to Giuliano Armenante for providing the data points in (50).
20
which varies on an example by Sode 2017: With periphrastic CF-marking on wün-
schen, no CF-wish is conveyed; CF-marking does what one would expect it to do,
target the desire instead of the belief in what is being desired. A CF-wish arises
only with synthetic CF-marking on wünschen (51-b), partly disobeying the C/D.
German does obey the C/D in that the complement of wünschen may be marked
in either of the two ways p can be marked in (48).16
(51) a. Ich
I
würde
will-CF
wünschen,
wish
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene.
shine-CF
‘I would wish the sun was shining.’ ≈Sode 2017
b. Ich
I
wünsch-te,
wish-CF
die
the
Sonne
sun
{würde
{will-CF
scheinen
shine
/
/
schiene}.
shine-CF}
To which extent do the morphological observations in this section foreshadow the
semantics to be developed in section 2.3? Remember from the introduction that a
German CF-wish (52-a) is taken to be an implicit CF-conditional like (52-b) whose
overt part is actually a CF-consequent qCF preceded by a missing CF-antecedent
pCF:
(52) a. I wünsch-CF ϕ-CF
b. [missing if p-CFp ] I wish-CFq that ϕ-CF
The C/D likens the embedding part of a CF-wish to a qCF, and the embedded part
ϕ to a pCF. Now (52-b) follows the qCF-part, taking aside the restriction seen in
(51) for a moment; the parallel is even clearer in languages that fully obey the C/D.
(52-b) does not follow the pCF-part in that it treats ϕ and the missing p-CFp as
distinct entities. So the morphosemantic equivalence remains only partial on the
present account.
That being said, let us turn to the semantic side of things. Paving the way to the
analysis of CF-wishes, the following section establishes a semantics for wünschen.
16Sode 2017’s contrast repeats itself in cases of CF-marked sollen ‘shall’ and other modals (vF&I
2008, Matthewson & Truckenbrodt 2018): strong necessity is weakened under synthetic marking
(i-a), and CF-displaced under periphrastic marking, ignoring the deviance of (i-b).
(i) a. Du
you
solltest
shall-CF
dich
yourself
langsam
slowly
auf
on
den
the
Weg
way
machen.
make
b. ??
??
Du
you
würdest
will-CF
dich
yourself
langsam
slowly
auf
on
den
the
Weg
way
machen
make
sollen.
shall
(intended:) ‘You should get going.’
The fact that the contrast emerges in both (51) and (i) weakly suggests it to be systematic in
nature (cf. vF&I 2008 reporting pc with Noam Chomsky in fn 31).
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2.2 A semantics for wünschen
The main goal of this section is to provide a plausible semantics for wünschen. On
the semantics proposed in subsection 2.2.1, strongly inspired by Heim 1992 and
subsequent work, wünschen presupposes its clausal complement to be doxastically
possible, and competes with sich freuen ‘be glad’ in presuppositional strength. The
doxastic (or existential) PSP will be crucial in deriving the disbelief-implication of
CF-wishes in the section to follow. Subsection 2.2.2 takes a closer look at IND-
wishing, and subsection 2.2.3 tries to locate English want on a tripartite scale of
presuppositional strength, again based on Heim 1992.
2.2.1 wünschen vs. freuen
This subsection ascribes one part of an implication triggered by wünschen to Heim
1991’s Maximize Presupposition (MP). If wünschen is in the indicative (IND), it
implies uncertainty regarding (the truth) of what is being wished for: At least
in German, it is slightly infelicitous to wish for something held to be true or false.
This can be seen when IND-wishing is put in a context that either verifies or falsifies
what is being wished for. (53) is odd if uttered by the speaker (a) at the sight of
her cherry tree in bloom (verifying) or (b) under the awareness that her cherry tree
has perished for good (falsifying).
(53) Ich
I
wünsch-e
wish-IND
mir,
myself
dass
that
mein
my
Kirschbaum
cherrytree
blüht.
bloom
‘I wish for my cherry tree to bloom.’
; preference for & uncertainty about cherryblooming
The oddity of IND-wishing in a verifying environment is further evidenced by the
following variation of Iatridou 2000’s I have what I want:
(54) ?
?
Ich
I
habe,
have
was
what
ich
I
mir
myself
wünsche.
wish-IND
Gladness, by contrast, clearly implies speaker-certainty about (or belief in) the
desideratum. This holds no less for German freuen ‘be glad’ than for English glad
(Heim 1992).
(55) Ich
I
freue
rejoice
mich,
myself
dass
that
die
the
Kirschen
cherries
blühen.
bloom
‘I am glad that the cherries are blooming.’
; preference for & certainty about cherryblooming
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One may take this contrast between wünschen and freuen to be based on presuppo-
sitional competition: wünschen presupposes the speaker S to hold the desideratum
possible, and anti-presupposes S to be uncertain about it, capturing the implication
in (53). This anti-presupposition (anti-PSP) arises via competition with freuen.17
A crucial insight in Heim 1992 is that want, glad and wish all share the same
bouletic assertion, very roughly, an attitude holder x’s preference for a proposition
ϕ (the desideratum) to be true rather than false. The difference between the three
predicates lies in their doxastic PSPs. The same can be reasonably assumed for
wünschen and freuen. Heim 1992’s glad presupposes x’s belief in ϕ (2ϕ). wünschen,
by contrast, arguably presupposes x to hold p possible (3ϕ).
(56) a. wünschen(p)(x) presupposes 3DOX,x(ϕ) x holds ϕ possible
b. freuen(p)(x) presupposes 2DOX,x(ϕ) x believes that ϕ
So wünschen and freuen are truthconditionally equivalent, but the latter is presup-
positionally stronger than the former. This allows the two predicates to be ranked
differently on a scale of presuppositional strength, with freuen being the stronger,
wünschen the weaker competitor.18
(57) {wünschen3, freuen2}
Given (57), wünschen anti-presupposes the PSP of freuen, x’s belief in p, not to be
met. This gives us x’s uncertainty about p: x neither believes p to be true nor false.
(58) Via competition with freuen(ϕ)(x), wünschen(ϕ)(x) anti-presupposes
3DOX,x(ϕ) ∧ ¬2DOX,x(ϕ)
= 3DOX,x(ϕ) ∧ 3DOX,x(¬ϕ)
17Thinking of wünschen as presupposing the desideratum to be possible is another departure from
Wimmer 2019, where I took uncertainty to be presupposed, not anti-presupposed, following
Heim 1992 and Rubinstein 2017. Thanks to an anonymous SuB 24 reviewer for suggesting this
appealing simplification.
18The hypothesized entailment between freuen and wünschen predicts the latter to be strengthen-
able to the former. Here is an attempt – albeit one that doesn’t sound too good to Sigrid Beck
(pc):
(i) Ich
I
wünsche
wish
mir
myself
nicht
not
nur,
only
dass
that
morgen
tomorrow
die
the
Sonne
sun
scheint;
shines
ich
I
freue
rejoyce
mich
myself
sogar,
even
dass
that
sie
it
scheint!
shines
‘I don’t just wish for the sun to shine tomorrow; I am even glad it’s going to shine!’
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2.2.2 A note on indicative wishing
The existential PSP for wünschen in (56-a) is going to be crucial in section 2.3,
which derives the disbelief-implication of CF-wishes. But this PSP was assigned
based on an example in the IND. German CF- and IND-wishing appear in slightly
different syntactic settings, which raises the question whether this PSP can safely
be ascribed to both of them.19 The IND-variant tends to combine with a dative
reflexive sich ‘oneself’ (59-a-i) and wants its clausal complement to be headed by
dass ‘that’ (59-a-ii); the CF-variant allows for both the reflexive and that, but
requires neither (59-b).20
(59) a. (i) Ich
I
wünsche
wish
?(mir),
?(myself)
dass
that
morgen
tmrw
die
the
Sonne
sun
scheint.
shines
(ii) ?
?
Ich
I
wünsche
wish
mir,
myself
morgen
tmrw
scheint
shines
die
the
Sonne.
sun
b. (i) Ich
I
wünschte
wish-CF
(mir),
(myself)
morgen
tmrw
schiene
shine-CF
die
the
Sonne.
sun
(ii) Ich
I
wünschte
wish-CF
(mir),
(myself)
dass
that
morgen
tmrw
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene.
shine-CF
In the highly informal discussion to follow, clausal complementation, while interest-
ing in its own right, is left aside; its modest purpose is a preliminary answer to the
question if wünschen has the existential PSP with and without the reflexive.
It’s not that IND-wünschen always co-occurs with a reflexive. Its preference in
(59-a-i) may have to do with the pragmatic effect that would arise in its absence:
‘Irreflexive’ wünschen, aside from sounding archaic, has an imperative flavor to it,
less clearly so a declarative one, and resembles the variant of English wish that takes
infinitival complements.21 ‘Reflexive’ wünschen, by contrast, sounds somewhat ‘fa-
talistic’, as Irene Heim (pc) put it; it’s as if the wisher is cherishing her desire
19Thanks to an anonymous SuB 24 reviewer for pressing this point.
20Thanks to Robin Hörnig for his intuitions on the syntax of CF-wishing.
21This variant tends to be seen as a polite variant of want (thanks to Ron Paulus for checking
with me in 2017). This is supported by (i-a), a line from a song by the Comedian Harmonists
brought to my attention by Sarah Zobel (pc). It uses wollen ‘want’ to convey a CF-wish, and
is equivalent with its wünschen-variant in (i-b).
(i) a. Ich
I
woll-t’,
want-CF
ich
I
wär’
be-CF
ein
a
Huhn,
chicken
…
b. Ich
I
wünsch-t’,
wish-CF
ich
I
wär’
be-CF
ein
a
Huhn,
chicken
…
; preference for & disbelief in being a chicken
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rather than putting it into action. This makes the reflexive variant a good and the
irreflexive one a bad fit to express a desire for sunshine: Nobody can directly affect
tomorrow’s weather, so a request along these lines is doomed to fail.22
Taking these subtle differences aside, the existential PSP can be reasonably upheld
for irreflexive wünschen: (60) suggests its use to be fairly inconsistent under the
(explicit) awareness that what one desires is false.
(60) a. I know for a fact that unicorns don’t exist, but:
b. ?
?
Ich
I
wünsche
wish
jetzt
now
eines
one
zu
to
reiten.
ride
‘I wish to ride one now.’
If the possibility of the desideratum is a felicity condition for the request put forth by
means of irreflexive wishing, this explains why CF-wishing doesn’t have the slightest
imperative flavor to it: Since a CF-wish implies disbelief in the desideratum, the
imperative flavor is blocked to begin with.
2.2.3 A note on want
This subsection briefly considers a way of extending the MP-view of wünschen put
forth in subsection 2.2.1 to English want, based on a heavily simplified construal of
Heim 1992’s account of that verb’s relation to glad and wish. The potential appeal
of the following sketch lies in a slightly more economical semantics for want than
assumed by prominent accounts in the wake of Heim’s (von Fintel 1999, Villalta
2008, Rubinstein 2017). On those accounts, want(ϕ)(x) presupposes x’s uncertainty
wrt ϕ. On the present account, it presupposes nothing, an assumption shared with
Grano & Phillips-Brown 2020.
One of Heim’s basic ideas is that want, wish and glad each assert an individual
x’s preference for a proposition ϕ, and deviate only in x’s presupposed belief-state
regarding ϕ. want presupposes x to be uncertain about ϕ: “the subject does not
believe [ϕ] nor its negation” (Heim 1992: 198). This means that x’s belief-worlds
22Fatalism might also be what makes the reflexive variant of (i-a) odd: Getting sleep is not entirely
unaffected by one’s actions. The modalized complement in (i-b) emphasizes that part one cannot
control for, making the reflexive preferable again.
(i) a. Ich
I
wünsche
wish
(?mir)
(?myself)
zu
to
schlafen.
sleep
b. Ich
I
wünsche
wish
?(mir)
?(myself)
schlafen
sleep
zu
to
können.
can
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are divided into ϕ- and ¬ϕ-worlds.23 Put semi-formally:
(61) want≈Heim 1992(ϕ)(x) is true iff x prefers ϕ rather than ¬ϕ;
defined iff 3DOX,x(ϕ) ∧ 3DOX,x(¬ϕ) uncertainty
The analysis is supported by Heim’s observation that it is odd to say either of the
following if one has been sick:
(62) a. I want to have been sick.
b. I want not to have been sick.
The analysis is challengeable on grounds of Heim 1992’s (63-a) and Iatridou 2000’s
(63-b).
(63) a. (John hired a babysitter because) he wants to go to the movies tonight.
b. I have what I want.
In these examples, the attitude holder believes in what she wants, in violation of the
hypothesized uncertainty-requirement. But Heim 1992 discusses ways of bringing
(63-a) under her analysis.
On Heim’s view, glad(ϕ)(x) presupposes x’s belief in ϕ (ϕ to be true in all of x’s
belief-worlds), and wish(ϕ)(x) presupposes x’s disbelief in ϕ (ϕ to be false in all of
x’s belief-worlds):
(64) {glad/wish}(ϕ)(x) are each true iff x prefers ϕ rather than ¬ϕ;
a. glad(ϕ)(x) is defined iff 2DOX,x(ϕ) belief
b. wish(ϕ)(x) is defined iff 2DOX,x(¬ϕ) disbelief
Subsection 2.2.1 evoked presuppositional competition between wünschen and freuen
‘glad’, with the former as the weaker competitor. I would like to consider the option
that want also occupies the bottom on a scale of presuppositional strength, with glad
and wish as its stronger competitors. The latter two keep presupposing what they
do in (64). Unlike Heim’s want in (61), but also unlike wünschen, want presupposes
nothing (Ø).
(65) {wantØ, glad2, wish2¬}
23Heim’s motivation for presupposed uncertainty is that her analysis predicts x’s belief in ϕ to
suffice for x to truthfully claim that she wants ϕ to be the case. The bipartition of x’s belief-
worlds follows indirectly from a felicity condition coming from the similarity-function SIM taken
to be involved in the semantics of conditionals; Heim’s want has SIM in its truth conditions
because they are implicitly conditionalized.
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Given (65), the use of want anti-presupposes the negation of what glad and wish
each presuppose: x neither believes (vs. glad) nor disbelieves (vs. wish) in ϕ, and
is hence uncertain about whether or not ϕ.
(66) Via competition with glad(ϕ)(x) and wish(ϕ)(x), want(ϕ)(x) anti-presupposes
¬(2DOX,x(ϕ)) ∧ ¬(2DOX,x(¬ϕ))
= 3DOX,x(¬ϕ) ∧ 3DOX,x(ϕ)
If this is on the right track, then wünschen is still stronger than non-presuppositional
want in virtue of presupposing p to be possible. The challenging data in (63) are no
longer predicted to violate a PSP, but seen as cases in which an anti-PSP is kept
from arising.
In order for such an MP-account to work, we need truthconditional equivalence
between the three desire predicates. On Heim 1992’s account, this equivalence is
ensured. But later work has cast doubt on this equivalence; the truth-conditions of
want, wish and glad seem to deviate in subtle ways unaccounted for under Heim’s
analysis. If this precondition fails to be met, an MP-account of want fails as well.
Grano & Phillips-Brown 2020 (henceforth: G&PB) consider such an account, and
tend to reject it. They do so on the basis of data in which want is at least as good
as glad or wish even though the PSPs of the latter two is contextually licensed,
which makes their insertion obligatory according to MP. I address some of G&PB’s
points below.
As for potential competition between want and wish, G&PB use Heim 1992’s
(67-a) to show that want and wish may be interchangeable when it comes to ex-
pressing an unrealistic desire:
(67) a. I want this weekend to last forever (but of course I know it will be over
in a few hours).
b. I wish this weekend would last forever.
Under MP, an unrealistic desire should necessitate wish as the stronger competitor,
but (67-a) and (67-b) are equally fine.
What makes want fine in Heim’s (67-a)? Heim herself suggests the speaker might be
ignoring her rational side for a moment, making herself believe an eternal weekend
to be in fact possible. Before addressing what (67-a) means for the present account,
let us briefly consider settings in which wish is clearly preferred over want. Relevant
examples are given in (68); see vF&I 2017 as well as G&PB for similar observations.
The temporal orientation of the desire becomes crucial at this point, because the
evaluation time of the complement either strictly overlaps or precedes the time of
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the desire.
(68) a. [Jerry, knowing Elaine is writing a letter:]
I wish Elaine was playing the guitar right now.
b. [Jerry, knowing Elaine didn’t touch her guitar last night:]
I wish Elaine had played the guitar last night.
As has been noted by the aforementioned authors, there is no way to replace the
sentences in (68) using want instead of wish.
(69) a. #I want her to be playing the guitar right now.
b. #I want her to have played the guitar last night.
In Heim’s felicitous want-sentence (67-a), the time of the complement is clearly in
the future. So if the speaker is indeed just ignoring her rational side, what may
allow her to do so is the inherent openness of the future. No matter how unlikely
a future event is (and thus, how irrational it is to put hope into its coming about),
there always remains a slight chance for it to come true. This chance might be what
the speaker in (67-a) is clinging to. The present and past-tensed complements in
(69) leave no room for things to turn out differently: Their falsity is settled once
and for all. As a consequence, it takes wish to express a desire for a present or past
eventuality whose falsity the speaker has sufficient evidence for.24
As for want vs. glad, G&PB consider the sentences in (70), with (70-a) varying
on Heim 1992’s (63-a) and (70-b) on an example by Iatridou 2000. In both cases,
we have a past-tensed main clause and a present-tensed because-clause alternatively
hosting glad and want. While the want-variant works, the glad-variant is infelicitous
even though its ‘factive’ PSP is licensed (in (70-b) by the main clause). MP would
predict things to be the other way around.
(70) a. John hired a babysitter because he {wants to/??is glad that he’ll} go
to the movies tonight.
b. I live in Bolivia because I {want to/??am glad that I} live in Bolivia.
In seeking to maintain presuppositional competition between the two predicates, it
24It should be noted that the anteriority of the complement does not in and of itself seem to
block want. According to Heim 1992, the following works in a situation in which I don’t know
if Gabriela won (the Wimbledon final that has already taken place).
(i) I want Gabriela to have won.
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is crucial to explain why glad’s assumed belief-PSP leads to oddness in the cases
under consideration. Once we know how this comes about, we also know why pref-
erence is given to want, the weaker competitor.
The glad-variant of (70-a) is an unsuccessful attempt to motivate the action de-
scribed by the main clause. John has a desire to go to the movies. For him, a
step to make that desire come true is to hire a babysitter. The glad-variant implies
(presupposes) John to take his moviegoing as a fact. This has the interpretive ef-
fect that when he hired the babysitter, he already considered himself to have what
he desired. With the desire fulfilled, there is no real drive to act towards that
desire’s fulfillment anymore, so the glad-variant fails to motivate the hiring. The
PSP-less want-variant doesn’t face this problem. John is not implied (presupposed)
to already have what he desires, so the motivational drive behind the action is still
implied to persist.
(70-b) presents a trickier case. If the because-clause is intended to motivate the
speaker’s past choice to move to Bolivia, it is quite clear that her present gladness
to live there has no explanatory force. But tense complicates matters here: It takes
wonder why want is present-, and not past-tensed. One might argue the past to be
avoided to block a cessation implicature that the speaker no longer has a desire to
live in Bolivia.
A possibly even more serious concern regarding truthconditional equivalence be-
tween want, glad and wish comes from Villalta 2008, whose work was brought to
my attention by Sigrid Beck. Villalta shows glad to be appropriate when the context
provides an even more desirable alternative than the one denoted by the comple-
ment, just as long as there is one that’s less desirable. want, by contrast, picks out
the best alternative. Here is a free reconstruction of Villalta’s scenario; I added
wish in (71-c).
(71) There is an upcoming picnic. Sofía brings dessert. She may either bring
chocolate cake or apple pie or ice cream. Victoria likes chocolate cake best,
and prefers apple pie over ice cream.
a. [The picnic hasn’t happened yet]
# Victoria wants Sofía to bring an apple pie.
b. [It turned out to be apple pie]
Victoria is glad that Sofía brought an apple pie (and not ice cream).
c. [It turned out to be ice cream]
Victoria wishes Sofía had brought an apple pie (and not ice cream).
Villalta concludes want to denote a preference for all alternatives in the context,
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and glad for some of them. This truthconditional difference in quantificational
force seems to set want apart from wish as well. If this is correct, want, taken to be
presuppositionally weaker in this subsection, is truthconditionally stronger than its
assumed competitors. This raises concern regarding presuppositional competition
between want, wish and glad.
There is less reason to see presuppositional competition between wünschen and
freuen in danger. In Villalta’s scenario where the second best among three alterna-
tives ended up coming true, froh sein ≈ ‘be glad’ seems slightly more appropriate
than freuen in expressing a certain relief that things didn’t end as bad as they could
have.
(72) a. (?)Victoria
(?)V
freut
rejoyces
sich,
herself
dass
that
Sofía
S
(wenigstens)
(at-least)
einen
an
Apfelkuchen
apple-pie
gebracht
brought
hat.
has
b. Victoria
V
ist
is
froh,
glad
dass
that
Sofía
S
(wenigstens)
(at-least)
einen
an
Apfelkuchen
apple-pie
gebracht
brought
hat.
has
2.2.4 Interim conclusion
This section has endowed wünschen with a doxastic PSP that will be crucial for the
remainder of this chapter: The attitude holder holds the desideratum ϕ to be pos-
sible, 3ϕ. Implied uncertainty was treated as an MP-effect due to presuppositional
competition with freuen, taken to come with a belief-PSP 2ϕ. An MP-account on
which English want has both glad and wish as its stronger competitors was seen
to face challenges. The subtle distinctions between desire predicates remain an
intriguing area of research.
2.3 Counterfactual wishing as agreement
We noted CF-wishing to come with a disbelief-implication regarding the desidera-
tum ϕ, with the desire for ϕ left intact:
(73) Ich
I
wünsch-te,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene
shine-CF
].
]
̸; absent preference for ϕ
; preference for & disbelief in ϕ
This section derives the disbelief-implication in pretty much the same way as I did
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in Wimmer 2019, where I followed vF&I 2017 in treating sentences like (73) as
implicit CF-conditionals. More concretely, vF&I propose a sentence like (73) to be
preceded by a missing antecedent.
(74) (73) reads: [missing if I held ϕ possible, ] I would wish that ϕ
In other words, the missing antecedent has an existential modal in it:25
(75) [missing if 3ϕ ] I would wish that ϕ
Crucially, the missing antecedent accommodates the PSP triggered by wünschen in
the overt clause. As vF&I 2017 point out, accommodation of presupposed content
into a silent CF-antecedent is not an unprecedented assumption to make. Kasper
1992 deals with examples such as the following:26
(76) [mother talking to her son, who failed an exam:]
Your brother Peter wouldn’t have failed the exam. Kasper 1992: 309
According to Kasper, (76) is an implicit CF-conditional whose antecedent is a PSP
triggered in the overt clause. “Failing an exam presupposes having taken it.” (vF&I
2017: 47). This PSP is what defines the interpretation of (76).
(77) (76) reads: [missing if your brother Peter had taken the exam, ] he wouldn’t
have failed it
It seems that CF-wishing triggers such accommodation per default. The analysis
implied by the corresponding paraphrase in (74) is spelled out in what follows. In
slight deviation from Wimmer 2019, the persistence of the desire under CF-marking
is derived assuming agreement: CF-marking on wünschen is treated as semantically
vacuous. Since it is by assumption a special kind of CF-conditional we are dealing
with, there is reason to hope the agreement pattern assumed to be at work in (73)
to apply to CF-conditionals more generally.
25If ϕ is itself modalized, we have modal stacking in the missing antecedent:
(i) a. 1) I wish I could be of help.
2) [missing if 3(3(I am of help)), ] I would wish that (3(I am of help))
b. 1) I wish I didn’t have to leave.
2) [missing if 3(¬2(I leave)), ] I would wish that (¬2(I leave))
26Thanks to Eva Csipak and Chris Barker for referring me to Kasper’s paper.
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2.3.1 Spelling out von Fintel & Iatridou 2017
This chapter’s introduction distinguished between two possible ways of analyzing
the implicit conditional. On option 1, both CF-morphemes in an (overt) CF-
conditional are meaningful. On option 2, only the CF-morpheme on p is – to
be precise: only p has a corresponding CF-operator attached to it.
(78) a. [ if [ CF p ] ] CF′ q option 1
b. [ if [ CF p ] ] Ø q option 2
In the following, the core example (73) will be treated along option 2: At LF, there
is only one CF-operator displacing p; the visible CF-morpheme on wünschen just
agrees with that single CF-operator. p is silent in the case at hand; our sentence
is not overtly conditionalized after all. It is in subsection 2.3.2 that I will motivate
why option 2 is preferable to option 1 as previously pursued in Wimmer 2019.
Following option 2, the sentence in (73) has an LF like (79). This is only a first
basic version, to be refined as we go along. The missing antecedent is a contextual
variable C7. At least for the time being, CF-marking on ϕ will be ignored; this is
an issue to be picked up in subsection 2.3.3.
(79) [ if [ CF C7 ] ] [ Ø I wish ϕ ]
LF for (73), first version
The disbelief-implication arises from the interplay between CF and C7. The contex-
tual assignment function g from Heim & Kratzer 1998 interprets this variable (its
numerical index 7) as the doxastic PSP that wünschen triggers in the overt clause
under the analysis proposed in the previous section: The speaker S holds ϕ possible.
(80) g(7) = 3DOX,S(ϕ)
One would expect that (80), while being the default, can in principle be overridden,
cf. Kasper 1992 on (76). A way to test is is to make the missing antecedent p
explicit. This is what is attempted in (81). The three if -clauses in (81-a) spell out
C7 as an (unintegrated) CF-p, the consequent q being the CF-wish in (81-b) in each
case: a desire for sunshine. Only (81-a-i) spells out (80), the other two don’t. In
(81-a-ii) suggests S to prefer rain over sunshine. On (81-a-iii), the sun is already
shining, making it pointless to wish for it to shine. At least in (81-a-ii), CF-marking
on wünschen coincides with an absent desire for once.27
27One may or may not like these examples, and I leave it open whether they all work or not.
One drawback the present account faces is that CF-wishes usually have an exclamative flavor
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(81) a. (i) Wenn
if
ich
I
es
it
noch
still
für
for
möglich
possible
hielte:
hold-CF
‘If I still held it possible:’
(ii) Wenn
if
der
the
Regen
rain
nicht
not
so
so
schön
nice
wäre:
be-CF
‘If the rain weren’t so nice:’
(iii) Wenn
if
die
the
Sonne
sun
nicht
not
bereits
already
schiene:
shine-CF
‘If the sun weren’t already shining:’
b. Ich
I
wünschte,
wish-CF
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene.
shine-CF
While (80) is the default interpretation of C7, the ϕ-component of (80) varies more
easily. What ϕ is may be open before it is uttered. But it may also be discourse-
salient, as in the following exchange between person A and B. A’s question makes
salient the proposition p that B has time. When hearing B’s reply, A may mentally
insert p for ϕ right upon hearing wünschte. This explains why B could have just
answered with the elliptical I wish! in English.28
(82) a. A asks B: Do you have time? B replies:
b. Ich
I
wünschte,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
ich
I
hätte
have-CF
welche
some
].
]
‘I wish.’
In Wimmer 2019 I argued CF-wishing to combine a PSP’s accommodation with its
denial. Accommodation means that under the default interpretation of C7 in (80),
the LF in (79) doesn’t presuppose 3ϕ, which it would in absence of the missing
antecedent. The point can be made with (83) from Sauerland 2008a:
(83) If it was raining, John would know that it’s raining. ̸; it’s raining
If the main clause weren’t preceded by the antecedent in (83), it would presuppose
that it is in fact raining, given the factive PSP commonly ascribed to know. The
reason that no such PSP arises in (83) is that it is locally accommodated (satisfied)
by the antecedent.
(84) John knows that it’s raining ; it’s in fact raining
to them. The CF-wish in (81-b) loses this flavor even if preceded by (81-a-i), which under the
present view just spells out what we would have at LF either way.
28The present analysis carries over to English wish under vF&I’s 2008, 2017 view that wish is
covertly CF-marked WANT.
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To show what happens in more detail, the LF in (79) needs to be refined, and its
ingredients to be defined. On a standard view on conditionals, antecedents restrict
a universal quantifier over possible worlds, represented as 2 in (85).
(85) [ 2 [ CF C7 ] ] I wish ϕ
LF for (73), second version
On a not too uncommon semantics for 2, it takes a world w, two propositions p
and q, and asserts q to be true in all p-worlds that are closest (maximally similar)
to w, (86-a). This closeness-condition is implemented via a variant of Heim 1992’s
similarity-function SIM in (86-b).
(86) a. 2w(p)(q) is true iff ∀w′ [ SIMw(p)(w′) → q(w′) ]
b. SIM(w)(p)(w′) is true iff p(w′), and no other world w′′ such that p(w′′)
resembles w more than w′ does.
For ease of exposition, I am going to assume an obviously oversimplified semantics
for the CF-operator: Being truthconditionally vacuous, all it does is to trigger the
PSP that its prejacent p is false in the evaluation world w.29
(87) CFw(p) = p; defined iff ¬p(w).
With the ingredients in place, we can now move on to the final LF below. This LF
also visualizes the assumed agreement relationship, on which the CF-operator and
the visible CF-marking on wünschen share a subjunctive feature [SUBJ]. The opera-
tor carries the interpretable [iSUBJ], CF-marking on wünschen the uninterpretable
[uSUBJ].30
29Thanks to Vera Hohaus for suggesting this simplification. Of course, things are more subtle
than (87) suggests, also in light of the wellknown fact that CF-inferences can be defeasible.
Furthermore, they may be doxastic (or epistemic) in nature, so CF(p) can be taken to presuppose
an attitude holder’s disbelief in p (Grosz 2012).
30A more detailed LF probably wouldn’t have 2 and the CF-operator directly combine with @,
but with a world argument w bound by the same λ-operator on top. It would be only now that
@ came into play, serving as the argument to the resulting function from worlds to truth values.
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XP
2 @ p
CF[iSUBJ] @
C7 ⟨s,t⟩
q
λw
I
wünsch- w
-CF[uSUBJ]
ϕ
the sun shine-CF[uSUBJ]
Given the semantics assumed for wünschen, an isolated interpretation of the conse-
quent q yields the following. q comes with the doxastic PSP that ϕ is held possible
by the speaker S. At the truthconditional level, we have S’s preference for ϕ to hold
rather than not to hold.
(88) J q K(w) is true iff S prefers ϕ over ¬ϕ in w; defined iff 3DOX,S,w(ϕ).
It is the PSP in (88) as which C7 is interpreted:
(89) J C7 Kg(w) is true iff
(g(7))(w)
= 3DOX,S,w(ϕ)
What happens inside the constituent labeled p is crucial. C7 has a CF-operator
attached to it. This operator as defined above presupposes the proposition it com-
bines with to be false, leaving its truthconditions untouched. Given the meaning
assigned to C7, p hence presupposes S to hold ϕ impossible (to disbelieve in ϕ).
(90) J p K(w) is true iff (g(7))(w) is; defined iff
¬(g(7))(@)
= ¬[ λw. 3DOX,S,w(ϕ) ](@)
= ¬3DOX,S,@(ϕ).
At the truthconditional level, we get that all p-worlds closest to @ are q-worlds,
which in our case means: In all worlds that deviate from the actual world in nothing
but S’s holding ϕ possible in them, S prefers ϕ to hold rather than not to hold.
Given that p’s truth conditions are q’s PSP, the latter is accommodated and doesn’t
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project beyond the clause as a whole (91-a).31 But not only is q’s PSP kept from
projecting (filtered): It is even denied at a presuppositional level (91-b). That’s
because the PSP triggered by the CF-operator in p projects out of the sentence as
a whole, endowing it with the disbelief-implication we set out to explain.32
(91) J XP K(@) is true iff 2@(p)(q)
= ∀w′ [ SIM@(p)(w′) → q(w′) ]
= ∀w′ [ SIM@(g(7))(w′) → q(w′) ]
= ∀w′ [ SIM@(3DOX,S(ϕ))(w′) → q(w′) ]
= ∀w′ [ (3DOX,S,w′(ϕ), and no other world w′′ such that 3DOX,S,w′′(ϕ) resem-
bles @ more than w′ does) → (S prefers ϕ over ¬ϕ in w′) ];
defined iff
a. 3DOX,S,@(ϕ)
b. ¬3DOX,S,@(ϕ). cf. (90)
The preference for ϕ in the consequent doesn’t have to be wishing for ϕ. It can also
be gladness that ϕ is the case – or would be, to be exact. The original CF-wish in
(73) can have a reading where S wishes the sun to be shining at the speech time.
In (92), gerade ‘right now’ adverbially enforces this reading. In the situation S is
longing to be in, she believes the sun to be shining (2ϕ), and she is hence glad that
it is.
(92) Ich
I
wünschte,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene
shine-CF
gerade
right-now
]!
]
What figures as wishing may also be gladness when ϕ is shifted into the past as
in (93). On a plausible reading for (93), S longs to be in a situation in which she
correctly remembers the sun to have shone the day before, so again we have belief
in, and gladness about, ϕ.
(93) Ich
I
wünschte,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
die
the
Sonne
sun
hätte
have-CF
geschienen
shone
]!
]
How can we read something as glad that figures as wish? The contrastive analysis
31Accommodation precedes the anti-presuppositional inference ascribed to wünschen in 2.2.2,
namely speaker-uncertainty about ϕ. If uncertainty defined the interpretation of C7, we would
run into trouble accounting for the disbelief-implication, as I did in Wimmer 2019: Negated
uncertainty is vague between belief and disbelief.
32As far as I can see, the truthconditional indifference as to S’s desire in (91) would be lost if the
conditional as a whole were exhaustified, yielding only if I held ϕ possible would I wish that ϕ.
If this were so, S’s preference for ϕ would be limited to p-worlds. The CF-operator presupposes
@ to be not among the p-worlds, so there could be no preference for ϕ in @.
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pursued for wünschen and freuen ‘be glad’ in section 2.2.2 may shed some light on
this matter: On that analysis, freuen, presupposing 2ϕ, entails wünschen, presup-
posing just 3ϕ. So if we run into CF-marked wünschen, this arguably reads as ‘I
would at least wish for, if not even be glad that, ϕ’.
2.3.2 Option 2 > option 1
Up to this point, German CF-wishes, taken to be implicit CF-conditionals, were
treated along the lines of option 2 in (94-b). We could have chosen option 1 (94-a),
taking CF-marking on wünschen literally. This is the line of approach I pursued in
Wimmer 2019.
(94) a. [ if [ CF p ] ] CF′ q option 1
b. [ if [ CF p ] ] Ø q option 2
Why exactly is option 2 preferable to option 1? This becomes clearer if we treat
our initial example repeated in (95) along the lines of option 1.
(95) Ich
I
wünschte,
wish-CF
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene.
shine-CF
Following option 1, (95) has an LF like (96): Just as under option 2, a CF-operator
attaches to the missing antecedent, so disbelief is derived as well, (96-a). This
is desirable. However, there is another CF-operator CF′ attached to the overt
consequent containing wünschen. The PSP that CF′ triggers under the current
analysis is far from desirable: S is presupposed to have no actual desire for ϕ, (96-b).
This is what we want to avoid: The persistence of the desire remains unexplained,
making CF′ and problematic and showing us that we are better off with option 2.
(96) [ 2@ [ CF@ 3DOX,S(ϕ) ] ] [ CF′@ I wish ϕ ]
presupposed:
a. ¬3DOX,S(ϕ) (still) disbelief, via CF
b. S does not prefer ϕ over ¬ϕ #absent speaker-desire, via CF′
2.3.3 CF-marking on the desideratum ϕ
So far, little if anything has been said about CF-marking on the desideratum ϕ. As
noted in subsection 2.1, ϕ is obligatorily CF-marked as well:
(97) Ich
I
wünsch-te,
wish-CF
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene
shine-CF
/
/
*scheint.
shine*-IND
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Again, the question arises how to treat this instance of CF-morphology. We could
follow a footnote in Heim 1992 where she treats CF-marking on ϕ under English
wish as vacuous, and the actual contribution to be made by wish itself. So for an
English version of (97), we get something like (98-b):
(98) a. I wish the sun was shining.
b. I WISH[iSUBJ] [ϕ the sun be-ed[uSUBJ] shining ]
If we apply this to CF-wishing in German (without thereby taking wünschen to
select CF-marking on ϕ), this would be to pursue a multiple agreement approach:
wünschen, unlike wish, is already CF-marked itself.33 Both instances of CF-marking
would then agree with the CF-operator that triggers the disbelief-implication. This
option is given in (99-a). Alternatively, we could treat CF-marking on ϕ literally,
as I did in Wimmer 2019: ϕ has a CF-operator CF′ of its own attached to it at LF
(99-b). Both LFs in (99) presuppose speaker-disbelief in ϕ via the first CF-operator
attached to the antecedent. What distinguishes (99-b) from (99-a) is the additional
operator CF′ on ϕ, presupposing ϕ to be false (99-b-ii).
(99) a. [ 2 [ CF[iSUBJ] 3ϕ ] ] Ø I wish-CF[uSUBJ] ϕ-CF[uSUBJ]
presupposed: ¬3ϕ via CF
b. [ 2 [ CF[iSUBJ] 3ϕ ] ] Ø I wish-CF[uSUBJ] [ CF′[iSUBJ] ϕ-CF[uSUBJ] ]
presupposed:
(i) ¬3ϕ via CF
(ii) ¬ϕ via CF′
There are two possible reasons in disfavor of (99-b), and hence in favor of (99-a).34
First, the outright ungrammaticality of IND-marking on ϕ seen in (97) may indicate
a syntactic violation. Second, the semantic contribution of the additional CF′ in
(99-b) seems redundant, even though it doesn’t do any harm for sure. It presup-
poses ϕ to be false (99-b-ii), which is in line with the disbelief-implication already
contributed by the first CF-operator (99-b-i). So (99-b) seems to be ruled out based
on considerations of structural economy: Two CF-operators are structurally more
complex than just one.
Anticipating a discussion that will be relevant in the next chapter, I am still go-
ing to argue CF-marking on ϕ to be obligatory for semantic reasons: IND-variant
33vF&I 2008, 2017 consider wish to be covertly CF-marked WANT. Under this assumption, we
have multiple agreement in both English and German.
34These reasons made me decide for (99-a) in the SuB 24 paper this chapter is based on.
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may well be bad due to an inconsistency that arises with the preceding part of the
sentence. It is safe to see the IND as implying its surrounding clause to be held
possible by the speaker S, 3ϕ (Schlenker 2005, Leahy 2011, 2018), be this a PSP, an
anti-PSP, or something else. This sharply contrasts with the disbelief-implication
triggered by CF-marking on wünschen, ¬3ϕ:
(100) I wünsch-CF [ϕ … ] ; ¬3ϕ
It may seem like a bit of a stretch, but we may even see obligatory CF-marking on
ϕ as a sentence-internal effect of Maximize Presupposition. The sentential context
preceding ϕ establishes disbelief in ϕ, licensing CF-marking on ϕ. Since CF-marking
on ϕ is locally licensed, it must occur. In any case, the redundancy CF-marking on
ϕ comes with is a little price to pay given that it wards off the contradiction that
would arise in its absence.
To sum up this subsection, CF-marking on ϕ was argued not to be semantically vac-
uous, and hence to be different from CF-marking on wünschen itself: IND-marking
on ϕ would be inconsistent with the preceding sentence context, i.e., the disbelief-
implication triggered by CF-marking on wünschen. On this view, German CF-
wishing has two CF-operators at LF, while English CF-wishing has at most one.
This single CF-operator might be wish itself (Heim 1992), unless we follow vF&I
2008, 2017 in taking wish to be covertly CF-marked WANT, see footnote 33.
2.3.4 Some more on CF-agreement
This subsection contains a few more remarks on agreement involving CF-marking.
The first part compares the present view to a remark in Heim 1992, on which would
in a CF-consequent spells out a conditional operator WOULD. The second part
looks into some data suggesting there to be Sequence of Mood in English.35
WOULD
In (101) we have a recap of the agreement mechanism assumed to underly CF-wishes
and CF-conditionals more generally in this chapter. Ignoring CF-marking on ϕ for
the time being, what is crucial for given purposes is that the consequent containing
wünschen, while CF-marked, has no CF-operator attached to it.
(101) [ 2 [ CF[iSUBJ] C7 ] I wish-CF[uSUBJ] that [ CF′[iSUBJ] ϕ-CF[uSUBJ] ]
35Thanks to Vera Hohaus for bringing this term to my attention.
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As a comparison, let’s consider a footnote in Heim 1992 where she takes CF-
marking on the antecedent to be vacuous, and ascribes the actual CF-semantics
to a WOULD-operator spelled out as would in the consequent. von Fintel 1998
adopts this assumption, and Schulz 2014’s more recent account seems close enough
in spirit. Under this view, a CF-conditional like (102-a) has a structure like (102-b).
(102) a. If it was raining, I would stay at home.
b. [ WOULD[iSUBJ] (if) it be-ed[uSUBJ] raining ] I stay at home
(101) is closer to (102-b) than it may appear: The former just separates the con-
ditional operator 2 from the CF-operator in its scope; one may say that (101)
decomposes WOULD into these two operators:36
(103) WOULD → 2 + CF
If we generalize Heim 1992’s system – confined to a footnote, not to forget –, we
always seem to have an overt element with a CF-semantics, hence endowed with
an [iSUBJ]. But as we saw with Sode 2017 in section 2.1, (German) CF-wishes
don’t contain würde ‘would’ in their embedding part, (104-a). And in overt CF-
conditionals, würde may appear in both the antecedent and the consequent (104-b)
or be omitted altogether (104-c) (Braun 2019, Grønn & von Stechow 2009).
(104) a. Ich
I
würde
will-CF
wünschen,
wish
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene.
shine-CF
̸= ‘I wish the sun was shining.’
b. Wenn
if
die
the
Sonne
sun
scheinen
shine
würde,
will-CF
würde
will-CF
ich
I
spazieren
walk
gehen.
go
c. Wenn
if
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene,
shine-CF
ginge
go-CF
ich
I
spazieren.
walk
One may tentatively conclude from the two instances of würde in (104-b) that this
modal is vacuous and just carries a [uSUBJ] just like the two synthetic CF-inflections
in (104-c). So the element carrying [iSUBJ] would be silent either way. wünschen
also doesn’t carry [iSUBJ], unlike wish as conceived of following Heim 1992 in the
preceding subsection. So does German ever spell out [iSUBJ] overtly? Here are two
candidates that come to mind. The first of them is negation, which may license,
and in fact necessitate, verbal CF-marking:
36The resemblance is even more transparent in Schulz 2014, who works with a 2-operator endowed
with a special CF-semantics.
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(105) a. Nicht,
not
dass
that
ich
I
{wüsste
{know-CF
/
/
*weiß}.
know-*IND}
b. NOT[iSUBJ] [ that I know-CF[uSUBJ] ]
The second are adverbs like beinahe ‘nearly’, which are inherently counterfactual:
Their prejacent p was only close to happening, but didn’t actually happen. It is a
little surprising that CF-marking on p is only optional:
(106) a. Ich
I
{bin
{be-IND
/
/
wäre}
be-CF}
fast
nearly
eingeschlafen.
fallen-asleep
b. [ NEARLY[iSUBJ] [ I be-CF[uSUBJ] fallen asleep ] ]
So German does have overt elements that carry [iSUBJ]; it just seems they are to
be found outside of conditionals.
Sequence of Mood
CF-wishes offer themselves to be compared to Sequence of Tense (SoT) construc-
tions exemplified by English (107-a), a variant of a wellknown example: The comple-
ment ϕ of the past-tensed attitude verb is also past-tensed even if Mary’s happiness
temporally overlaps with, rather than precedes, John’s saying that she is. This
simultaneous reading is sometimes explained via multiple agreement of both past
morphemes with a higher PAST-operator on top of LF (Kauf & Zeijlstra 2018); this
is sketched in (107-b).37
(107) a. John said [ϕ Mary was happy ].
b. PAST[iPAST] [ John say-ed[uPAST] [ϕ Mary be-ed[uPAST] happy ] ]
CF-wishes, too, often have a finite complement ϕ embedded under an attitude
verb, and both carry the same kind of morphology. The fact that CF-marking
often involves past morphology only strengthens the resemblance. So in both SoT
and CF-wishing, an embedded verb V′ has the same [uF] as the attitude verb V
below which it is embedded:
(108) a. [ … V-[uPAST] … [ϕ ... V′-[uPAST] ... ] ]
b. [ … V-[uSUBJ] … [ϕ ... V′-[uSUBJ] ... ] ]
But wait. In the preceding subsection, the ϕ-part of German CF-wishes was argued
to have an additional CF-operator attached to it. This weakens the parallelism in
37The literature on SoT is vast, and I wish I could do it justice here. Thank you to Giuliano
Armenante for ongoing discussion.
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(108). What about English? We followed Heim 1992 in taking CF-marking on ϕ
under wish to be vacuous, but wish is not overtly CF-marked. So should (108) be
rejected?
The following data give reason to believe that English follows (108), while German
does not. Consider the English CF-wishes in (109), with yet another clause em-
bedded under ϕ, call it ϕ′. CF-marking on ϕ′ occurs naturally, and can safely be
treated as semantically vacuous. If it were not, it should imply ϕ′ to be false, but it
clearly doesn’t. In other words, (109) are fairly clear cases of multiple agreement.
(109) a. I just wish [ϕ I knew [ϕ′ what went on inside that little head of his ]
].38
̸; there is something that doesn’t go on inside his head
b. I wish [ϕ you were playing [ϕ′ when I was visiting ] ].39
̸; I’m not visiting
This doesn’t carry over to German. If context implies ϕ′ to be possible or even true,
IND-marking seems even preferred over CF-marking.
(110) a. Ich
I
wünschte,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
ich
I
wüsste,
know-CF
[ϕ′
[ϕ′
was
what
in
in
seinem
his
Kopf
head
vor
on
sich
itself
geht
go-IND
/
/
?ginge
go-?CF
]
]
].
]
b. Ich
I
wünschte,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
du
you
spieltest,
play-CF
[ϕ′
[ϕ′
wenn
when
ich
I
da
there
bin
be-IND
/
/
?wäre
be-?CF
]
]
].
]
This contrast in turn weakly supports the point made in section 2.3.3, were CF-
marking on ϕ was argued to agree with a different CF-operator than CF-marking
on wünschen: If CF-marking on ϕ were obligatory agreement with CF-marking on
wünschen, one would expect CF-marking on ϕ′ to be obligatory as well, maintaining
a chain of agreement.
The contrast between (110) and (109) seems to reflect a more general difference
between English and German regarding a subdomain of what has already been
called Sequence of Mood. The difference is less about CF-agreement between an
antecedent and a consequent; after all, it is the case in both languages that one
cannot be CF-marked without the other being too. It is rather about CF-marking
on an embedding verb and the clause it embeds. In these cases, CF-agreement
38From Mindhunter, season 1, episode 6.
39An example kindly provided by Lilian Gonzalez.
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seems more readily available in English than in German. Another case in which
this comes to light is when we have verbal embedding within a CF-antecedent.
(111-a), a slogan for the 1976 movie Carrie, is an optative conditional. Again,
CF-marking on the more deeply embedded verb is dispreferred in German (111-b).
(111) a. If only [ϕ they knew [ϕ′ she had the power ] ].
b. Wenn
if
[ϕ
[ϕ
sie
they
nur
only
wüssten,
know-CF
[ϕ′
[ϕ′
dass
that
sie
she
die
the
Macht
power
{hat
{have-IND
/
/
?hätte}
?have-CF}
]
]
].
]
There are cases in German where both IND- and CF-marking seem allowed below a
CF-marked attitude verb like know. Take (112-a), an example from Iatridou 2000.
Its German counterpart allows for both CF- and IND-marking.
(112) a. If [ϕ I knew [ϕ′ this were chocolate ] ], I would eat it.
b. Wenn
if
[ϕ
[ϕ
ich
I
wüsste,
know-CF
[ϕ′
[ϕ′
dass
that
das
this
Schokolade
chocolate
{wäre
{be-CF
/
/
ist}
be-IND}
]
]
],
]
würde
will-CF
ich
I
es
it
essen.
eat
Why does German allow for embedded CF-marking in (112-b), but less so in
(111-b)? The key to the answer, I suppose, lies in the different belief-states the
speaker S has w.r.t. ϕ′. In (111-b), S quite clearly believes the female subject
referent to have the power. In (112-b), S does not believe she has chocolate in
front of her, though she doesn’t disbelieve it either. The CF-semantics assumed in
this chapter, on which CF(p) presupposes p’s negation, cannot account for why the
CF-variant of (112-b) sounds okay. This anticipates a less rigid approach to the
semantics of CF-marking as considered by one of the approaches discussed in the
following chapter.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter spelled out vF&I’s 2017 idea to treat CF-wishes as implicit CF-
conditionals. What we see is just a CF-marked consequent. A missing CF-antecedent
denotes the doxastic possibility of the desideratum ϕ, accommodating a PSP trig-
gered by wünsch-. CF-marking on wünschen was argued to be semantically vacuous,
in line with previous treatments of CF-marking on consequents. All it does on the
present analysis is to agree with the single CF-operator applied to the missing
antecedent. Desiderata to be addressed by future research are manyfold. The re-
mainder of this conclusion starts with a drawback to the present analysis coming
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from vF&I 2020, but ends with a more promising note on different patterns for
CF-wishes in different languages.
2.4.1 A drawback
The CF-wish in (113-a) was taken to have, very roughly, the minimalistic LF in
(113-b) and the truth conditions in (113-c).
(113) a. Ich
I
wünsch-te,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene
shine-CF
].
]
b. [ 2@ [ CF 3ϕ ] ] I wish that ϕ
c. All 3ϕ-worlds closest to @ are worlds in which S wishes that ϕ
There is a drawback to this analysis: The truth conditions in (113-c) say nothing
about whether S has an actual preference for ϕ. But a CF-wish clearly implies
such a preference to exist. In other words, it seems too weak that the desire is
not denied; it should also be implied. vF&I 2017 find an intuitive explanation:
“the only missing factor” keeping S from wishing that ϕ is S’s holding ϕ possible,
3ϕ (vF&I 2017: 62). Just because S has no desire qualifying as wishing doesn’t
mean she has none whatsoever. This follows from the notion of maximal similarity
figuring in (113-c): Relevant antecedent-worlds deviate from @ in nothing but 3ϕ.
But as vF&I 2020 make clear, this still wrongly predicts a CF-wish to be felicitous
in a scenario where S has no desire for ϕ because the missing factor is not met:
Disbelief in ϕ kills the desire for ϕ. One may object that this is a fairly artificial
scenario: Ordinary human beings have no such control over their passions so as to
stop wanting something upon realizing it’s beyond their reach. But the problem
still remains.
2.4.2 Patterns of CF-wishes
CF-wishes may take different forms, to be compared to each other in future research.
The conditional pattern in (113-b) does not apply to CF-wishes across the board.
There is variation at least w.r.t. the structural location of the desideratum ϕ. In
(113-b), ϕ is embedded in what was taken to be the consequent q in this chapter.
In (114), we have a different pattern: Conditionals whose antecedent boils down
to ϕ. This is exemplified by the Japanese example in (114-a)40 and the Mandarin
one in (114-b). q is reduced to an evaluative predicate (Hole 2004 on Mandarin,
Kaufmann 2017 on Japanese, Sode 2018 on German). The Japanese variant has the
40I owe this example to Toshiko Oda.
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regret-particle noni attached to q (Ogihara 2014). Optatives like (114-c), studied
in depth by Grosz 2012, also follow this pattern by virtue of being bare ϕ-denoting
antecedents.
(114) a. [ϕ
[ϕ
Ame-ga
rain-NOM
yan-dara
stop-if
]
]
ii-noni.
good-noni
b. [ϕ
[ϕ
Yu
rain
ting
stop
xia
fall
]
]
jiu
jiu
hao
good
le!
ASP
c. (i) If only [ϕ it would stop raining ]!
(ii) Wenn
if
[ϕ
[ϕ
es
it
nur
only
aufhören
stop
würde
would
zu
to
regnen
rain
]!
]
To sharpen the contrast with (113-b) repeated in (115-a), one may bring the cases
in (114) under the LF-skeleton in (115-b).
(115) a. [ 2@ [ CF 3ϕ ] ] I wish that ϕ
b. [ 2@ [ CF ϕ ] ] … (good) …
In section 2.1, CF-wishes like (115-a) were taken to abide by the consequent-part
of vF&I’s 2017, 2020 Conditional Desire Generalization (C/D) repeated for conve-
nience in (116), which morphologically likens the embedded part of a CF-wish to a
CF-antecedent, and the matrix-part to a CF-consequent.
(116) The C/D ≈vF&I 2017, 2020
a. [ if p-CFp ] q-CFq
b. … WANT-CFq [ ϕ-CFp ]
The CF-wishes in (114) have ϕ as their antecedents, so they fully abide by the C/D’s
antecedent-part. Almost needless to say that they differ in interesting ways: The
Sino-Japanese examples in (114) lack overt CF-marking on p, which the English
and German optatives have. The English and German optatives in turn lack an
overt consequent, which the Sino-Japanese examples have. In addition, we have
different particles whose contribution remains to be clarified, Grosz 2012’s optative
ONLY taken aside.
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3 On antecedent falsity in present counterfactuals41
The previous chapter on CF-wishing took for granted that CF-marking on a condi-
tional antecedent p presupposes p to be false. This is a fairly strong assumption to
make, and no proposal on CF-conditionals I am aware of is that simple; subjunc-
tive form and CF have been disentangled long ago (Anderson 1951). This chapter
reports an empirical study aimed at shedding more light on the contribution of
CF-marking to antecedent falsity, an endeavor recently undertaken by Leahy 2011,
2018. To ask this question is also to question the term CF-marking itself (von Fintel
& Iatridou 2017).
The scope is narrowed down to a type of construction Iatridou 2000 calls present
CF: p is interpreted as strictly overlapping with the speech time. (1-a), for example,
conveys Lena not to be sleeping right now.42 This makes it good for a speaker to
utter (1-a) if she knows p to be false. The same context makes it bad to use the
indicative (IND) counterpart (1-b), which suggests p to be possibly true.
(1) [Speaker knows Lena is awake]
a. If Lena were sleeping, she would be missing the lunar eclipse.
b. # If Lena is sleeping, she’s missing the lunar eclipse.
Now things change if the speaker no longer disbelieves in p, but rather is uncertain
about whether or not p is the case. In such a context, the CF-variant is at least
not clearly as good as the IND variant.43
41The term antecedent falsity is taken from Leahy 2018. The ideas for the experiment reported
in this chapter have developed in conversations with Nadine Bade. Robin Hörnig, Doris Penka,
Vera Thomas and Lukas Stein helped me with the steps that followed, which is why this chapter
at least occasionally switches from first person singular to plural, despite my full responsibility
for any shortcomings. A special thank you to Robin for invaluable support in the shape of
sharpening the predictions, analyzing the data and discussing them with me. Further helpful
impulses came from Giuliano Armenante, Nadine Balbach, Polina Berezovskaya, Julia Braun,
Susanne Riecker, Wanda Rothe, Konstantin Sachs, Cosima Schneider, Alexander Turtureanu, as
well as participants at the workshop Processing presuppositions held virtually in October 2020,
and (other) participants at a research seminar co-taught by Sigrid Beck and Doris Penka in the
summer of 2020.
42Iatridou 2000’s definition requires the consequent q to also not hold at present. The present
chapter is sloppy in this respect, and treats a conditional as a present CF as soon as p is implied
to be false at present, no matter if q has a present interpretation or not.
43According to Iatridou 2000, it is fine to use a present CF when there is ignorance on p. She
presents the following example:
(i) I don’t know if he is rich, but if he were rich, he would be popular with that crowd.
The subtlety of the data warrants an empirical investigation.
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(2) [Speaker is unsure whether Lena is asleep]
a. ? If Lena were sleeping, she would be missing the lunar eclipse.
b. If Lena is sleeping, she’s missing the lunar eclipse.
One point existing accounts of CF-conditionals are divisive on is the status of an-
tecedent falsity (henceforth ¬p). Given that CF-implications are projective – how
else could the implication survive conditional embedding –, this may be narrowed
down to the question if p in (1-a) is presupposed or anti-presupposed to be false. On
the latter option, ¬p is derived via competition with the IND counterpart (1-b).44
So one way of treating the contrasts in (1) and (2) would be to take CF-marking
to presuppose ¬p, and IND-marking to presuppose p to be (doxastically) possible,
3p. This is theory 1 (T1) in the table below. But one might as well approach
the data from the viewpoint of Maximize Presupposition (MP), treating only one
of the two mood types as presuppositional, with the respective other presupposing
nothing at all. Theories MP1 and MP2 stand for the two options opened up this
way. The implication triggered by the non-presuppositional mood is then viewed
as anti-presupposed, i.e., roughly, as being the pragmatically inferred negation of
what the stronger competitor presupposes.
T1 MP1 MP2
if p-CF, q presupposes ¬p ¬p nothing
if p-IND, q presupposes 3p nothing 3p
Views that resemble T1 in treating both moods as presuppositional are entertained
by Portner 1992 (via von Fintel 1998) and Schulz 2014; views like MP1 are enter-
tained by von Fintel 1998 and Grosz 2012,45 and a view like MP2 by Leahy 2011,
2018.46
My colleagues and I conducted an acceptability rating study to test the three theo-
ries in the table above. Their differences were expected to be reflected by correspond-
ing differences in violation costs: that is, how severe a violation of the respective
44Note that what we actually seek to derive is p’s impossibility, ¬3p.
45MP1 is just a working assumption for Grosz. He is explicitly open to (what I call) MP2.
46Two crucial differences have to be made clear, however. First, none of these proposals takes the
CF-competitor to presuppose something as strong as ¬p. Second, most of them explicitly focus
on past CFs (i-a) and their IND counterparts (i-b), hence tackle a data set that differs from (1)
in terms of temporal orientation.
(i) a. If Lena had been sleeping, she would have been missing the lunar eclipse.
b. If Lena was sleeping, she was missing the lunar eclipse.
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mood type (CF vs. IND) is perceived and, accordingly, how low such violations are
rated on a scale. This follows as long as a presupposition (PSP) is thought of as
semantically hardwired, and an anti-PSP as pragmatically derived. An anti-PSP
violation is expected to be bad, yet to be still (slightly) better than a PSP-violation,
as suggested by recent experimental findings (Bade & F. Schwarz 2019). The object
language of the study was German, so the material looked something like (3), with
the CF-variant containing the Konjunktiv 2 (K2):
(3) a. Wenn
if
sie
she
gerade
now
schlafen
sleep
würde,
will-K2
würde
will-K2
sie
she
die
the
Mondfinsternis
lunar-eclipse
versäumen.
miss
b. Wenn
if
sie
she
gerade
now
schläft,
sleeps
versäumt
misses
sie
she
die
the
Mondfinsternis.
lunar-eclipse
The chapter is organized as follows. The following section provides the theoreti-
cal background on the three theories under comparison. Section 3.2 reports and
discusses the study, and section 3.3 concludes the chapter.
3.1 Theoretical background
The three theories under comparison are about the relation between CF and IND.
Since the object language is German, CF (as a mood) is hereby narrowed down
to the K2. All three theories capture the data in (1) and (2), but explain them
differently.
In (1), the speaker is contextually established to believe ¬p. On T1 and MP2, the
IND on p is odd because it triggers a doxastic PSP that is unmet in such a context.
On MP1, it is odd because the K2 is presuppositionally stronger than the IND, the
PSP of the K2 is met, so MP dictates its use.
In (2), where speaker-uncertainty on p is contextually supplied, the same reasoning
applies, except that the moods are switched.
The following subsections sketch the three theories. An additional subsection ad-
dresses a fact predicted by none of them: it can be rather odd to use an IND-
conditional when the speaker is contextually established to believe that p.
3.1.1 T1: no difference in presuppositional strength
On T1, both the K2 and the IND are presuppositional. This assumption is shared
with Schulz 2014, and von Fintel 1998 tentatively ascribes such a view to Portner
1992. It seems reasonable to tie these PSPs to the beliefs of the speaker, more
49
generally the attitude holder: A speaker uttering a conditional is presupposed to
hold an antecedent p possible iff p is IND-marked, and impossible iff it is K2-marked.
The LFs in (4) express the view that each PSP comes from an operator that the
visible mood marking agrees with.47
(4) a. [ MUST [ K2 p ] ] q presupposed: S holds p impossible
b. [ MUST [ IND p ] ] q presupposed: S holds p possible
We can think of both operators as truthconditionally vacuous, differing in their
PSPs. The semantics for the K2-operator in (5) is equivalent to Grosz 2012’s
tentative semantics for CF-mood: p is presupposed to be doxastically impossible,
i.e., to be false in all of the speaker’s belief-worlds.
(5) K2S,w(p) = p; defined iff ¬3DOX,S,w(p) ≡ 2DOX,S,w(¬p)
The following entry for the IND is essentially Leahy 2011, 2018’s, with the difference
that the modal flavor he chooses is epistemic, not doxastic.
(6) INDS,w(p) = p; defined iff 3DOX,S,w(p)
Before we move on to MP1, a short note on a possible refinement: The person
whose belief-state K2 and IND require to be in a certain way doesn’t have to be
the speaker. Iatridou 2000 shows that a CF-wisher may be someone other than the
speaker:
(7) In the movie True Lies, Jamie Lee Curtis wishes she were married to an
exciting person and she is.
Jamie Lee Curtis believes not to be married to an exciting person, but the speaker
believes her to be. K2-marking on conditional antecedents can be untied from the
speaker in the same way. (8) may be uttered in a context in which Amalia, who
suffers from amnesia, is under the misconception that she is poor.
(8) Amalia
Amalia
glaubt,
believes
dass,
that
wenn
if
sie
she
reich
rich
wäre
be-K2
–
–
was
which
sie
she
ist
is
–,
–
sie
she
ein
an
weitläufiges
extensive
Anwesen
estate
besäße.
own-K2
47This matches Iatridou 2000’s remark that the semantic contribution of CF-marking is made
“inside the conditional antecedent and not outside it.” It may be compatible with Heim 1992
and von Fintel 1998, who take CF-marking on p as reflecting the semantic contribution of the
modal would in the consequent. On (4-a), would’s German counterpart würde decomposes into
MUST and K2.
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‘Amalia believes that if she were rich – which she is –, she would own an
extensive estate.’
(9) does the same for the IND. The speaker believes p to be false, so the IND should
be out of place if its use were inextricably tied to the speaker’s beliefs. But the
doxastic possibility of rainfall is successfully ascribed to Amalia.
(9) Amalia
Amalia
glaubt,
believes
dass,
that
wenn
if
es
it
gerade
right-now
regnet
rains
–
–
was
which
nicht
not
der
the
Fall
case
ist
is
–,
–
ihr
her
Kater
tomcat
nass
wet
wird.
becomes
‘Amalia believes that if it’s raining right now – which is not the case –, her
cat is getting wet.’
To do justice to (8) and (9), the speaker-index S in (5) and (6) would have to be
replaced by a contextually salient attitude holder x, for which we insert Amalia,
and not the speaker, in (8) and (9).
3.1.2 MP1: the IND is vacuous
MP1 takes T1 and deprives the IND of its PSP. The semantics for the K2 remains
as in (5).
(10) a. K2S,w(p) = p; defined iff ¬3DOX,S,w(p) ≡ 2DOX,S,w(¬p)
b. IND(p) = p.
We now have an imbalance in presuppositional strength: The IND, presupposing
nothing, is presuppositionally weaker than the K2 with its disbelief-PSP.
(11) {INDØ, K2}
The kind of relationship in (11) is assumed by von Fintel 1998 for the contrast
between past CFs and past INDs, as well as by Grosz 2012: 181. With Grosz, we
can think of (11) as linking morphological markedness with semantic strength: The
presuppositional weakness of the IND is reflected by its morphological unmarked-
ness, the presuppositional strength of the K2 by its markedness.48
Given (11) and MP, the 3p-implication of the IND arises ex negativo from the
48To the extent that past tense is involved in conveying counterfactuality, (11) is anticipated by
Sauerland 2002’s treatment of the present tense as the weaker competitor of the past tense.
Iatridou 2000 also tends towards such a negative definition of the present: “The present tense …
would … just indicate the absence of” what the past contributes (Iatridou 2000: 253, emphasis
added).
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K2-PSP. We may sketch the derivation as follows.49 The non-use of the K2 leads
the hearer to infer that the speaker does not believe the K2-PSP, ¬3p, to be met.
(12) IND(p) anti-presupposes ¬2DOX,S [ ¬3DOX,S(p) ]
The next step is to apply the Competence assumption, which applies trivially here:
A speaker can always be held competent (opinionated) about her own beliefs.50 So
(12) is automatically strengthened to speaker-belief that she does not hold p to be
impossible. The two negations cancel each other out.
(13) 2DOX,S(¬¬3DOX,S[p])
= 2DOX,S(3DOX,S[p])
The last step is to get rid of the belief-operator 2DOX: An individual can be held
reliable about her own beliefs,51 so the belief in holding p possible is nothing but
holding p possible.
(14) 3DOX,S(p)
3.1.3 MP2: the K2 is vacuous
MP2 reverses MP1, making the K2 the weaker competitor of the IND. The scale of
presuppositional strength now looks as in (15).
(15) {K2Ø, IND}
A view like (15) has recently been entertained by Leahy 2011, 2018; see also
Schlenker 2005 on the French subjunctive, even though the latter is not a CF-
mood. As on T1 above, the IND presupposes 3p again. Unlike both T1 and MP1,
the K2 presupposes nothing.
(16) a. INDS,w(p) = p; defined iff 3DOX,S,w(p)
b. K2(p) = p.
The derivation of the K2’s anti-PSP now proceeds as the one for the IND under
MP1. K2-marking on p triggers an anti-PSP that the speaker S does not believe p
49This is simplified insofar as the Authority-assumption that Chemla 2008 argues to be involved
in anti-presuppositional reasoning is left aside for lack of immediate relevance.
50Leahy 2011 sees it as problematic if the “competence assumption [can] never fail” (Leahy 2011:
271). This is a potential problem for both MP1 and MP2 as spelled out here, with the PSP of
the stronger competitor being doxastic.
51See Chemla 2008 for some discussion on reliability.
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to be possible (line 2). The following two steps are governed by Competence and
Reliability. Since S is certain about her beliefs, S is inferred to believe to hold p
impossible (line 3). Since she is reliable about her beliefs, line 3 reduces to line 4.
(17) K2(p) anti-presupposes
¬2DOX,S(3DOX,S[p])
2DOX,S(¬3DOX,S[p]) via Competence
¬3DOX,S(p) via Reliability
MP2 derives the ¬p-implication via pragmatic reasoning. In this respect, it is
closer to Iatridou 2000’s implicature account than T1 and MP1, leaving aside the
fact that this account is not based on presuppositional competition. On both MP2
and Iatridou 2000, ¬p is prominent, but not presupposed, which it is under both
T1 and MP1.
One may find MP2 counterintuitive in morphosemantic respects: The K2 is the
marked form after all. However, it allows us to handle the following two data
sets better than the other two theories considered: first, the K2 sometimes acts
as a placeholder for the Konjunktiv 1 (K1); second, the K2 shows up in so-called
Anderson-examples, cases in which p’s truth is argued for.52
K1 for K2
Schlenker 2005 takes (18-a) to suggest that in third person singular, French uses
its subjunctive to express an imperative. This is based on a contrast with other
person-number combinations, whose verbal inflection are also identical with the
corresponding subjunctive, but crucially lack a subject and the complementizer que
‘that’.
(18) a. *(Que votre Altesse)
*(that your Highness)
soit
be-3SG-SUBJ
prudente!
cautious
b. (*Que
(*that
tu)
you)
sois
be-2SG-IMP
prudente!
cautious
c. (*Que
(*that
nous)
we)
soyons
be-1PL-IMP
prudentes!
cautious
Schlenker 2005 and Sauerland 2008a take this observation to suggest the subjunctive
to be a semantic default: a neutral fallback option in case a designated imperative
form is unavailable. By hypothesis, the subjunctive presupposes nothing, so it is a
52Of course, one could maintain a treatment of the K2 as presuppositional by having it presuppose
something weaker than ¬p or ¬3p (von Fintel 1998).
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suitable placeholder for the imperative.53
A similar pattern emerges in German when it comes to expressing reported speech.
The mood typically chosen in this case is the K1, characterized by Schlenker 2005 as
a reportative indicative. Now, according to a wellknown substitution rule, whenever
the K1 is formally indistinguishable from the IND, the K2 kicks in as its placeholder.
(This is to leave aside for the time being the K1’s gradual disappearance from
everyday language.) Consider the following inflectional paradigm of indirect speech,
with default substitutions in boldface:
(19) Er meint, … ‘He thinks’
a. ich
I
{gehe
{go-K1=IND
/
/
ginge}
go-K2}
schon
already
b. du
you
gehest
go-K1
schon
already
c. sie
she
gehe
go-K1
schon
already
d. wir
we
{gehen
{go-K1=IND
/
/
gingen}
go-K2}
schon
already
e. ihr
you
gehet
go-K1
schon
already
f. sie
they
{gehen
{go-K1=IND
/
/
gingen}
go-K2}
schon
already
The pattern in (19) is expected under MP2, enriched by the assumption that the
K1 is also presuppositional. Formal identity between K1 and IND is undesirable
because the IND presupposes something different from the K1, hence would distort
the meaning the speaker seeks to convey. To avoid such misleading identity in form,
the K2 is resorted to, being vacuous and hence a harmless choice to take.
Anderson examples
Leahy 2011, 2018 shows his analysis of past CFs (see footnote (i)) to capture so-
called Anderson-examples, past CF conditionals which pose a wellknown challenge
53Schlenker 2005’s theory is supported by the fact that the IND is no alternative to the subjunctive
in (18-a):
(i) *Est
*be-3SG-IND
prudente!
cautious
On Schlenker’s theory, the subjunctive competes with the IND as well, i.e., the IND triggers a
presupposition while the subjunctive doesn’t.
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for any theory treating CF-marking on p as presupposing ¬p. This reasoning also
defends theory MP2, given that there are Anderson-examples that come as present
CFs.
Anderson 1951 was the first to disentangle CF-form from CF-meaning, showing
that such a form can be used to argue for the truth of p. This clearly wouldn’t
work if CF-marking on p presupposed that ¬p. Iatridou 2000 presents a variant of
Anderson’s example where p is in the present (20-a). This carries over to German
(20-b).
(20) a. If the patient had the measles, he would have exactly the symptoms he
has now.
We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles.
b. Wenn
if
er
he
die
the
Masern
measles
hätte,
have-K2
hätte
have-K2
er
he
genau
just
die
the
Symptome,
symptoms
die
that
er
he
jetzt
now
hat.
has
The data in (20-b) cause trouble for both T1 and MP1, on which the K2 presupposes
¬p, but not for MP2, on which it is vacuous. This doesn’t explain, however, why
the IND variant of (20) is so awful (von Fintel 1998 crediting Robert Stalknaker):54
(21) a. ??If the patient has the measles, he has exactly the symptoms he has now.
b. ??Wenn
??if
er
he
die
the
Masern
measles
hat,
has
hat
has
er
he
genau
just
die
the
Symptome,
symptoms
die
that
er
he
jetzt
now
hat.
has
There is no easy way to explain the data in (21), but von Fintel 1998 and Leahy 2011
offer ideas on this matter.55 Whatever the badness of the IND is rooted in though,
the pure fact still supports MP2: Given that the IND is not an option, we resort to
the , its null competitor whose vacuity can’t do any harm. So Anderson-examples
come as in (20).
54Thanks to Sabine Iatridou (pc) for pointing this out to me.
55Here is a reasoning inspired by Leahy 2011: The speaker believes q (= he has the symptoms)
to be true, 2DOX,S(q). The IND presupposes p (= he took arsenic) to be possible, 3DOX,S(p).
So automatically, every doxastically accessible p-world is a q-world; the conditional becomes
trivially true. Remember that on Leahy’s account, the modal flavor of the IND is epistemic, not
doxastic.
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3.1.4 Antecedent variety?
There is an infelicity captured by none of the three theories introduced above. If
a speaker is certain that p, it is quite odd for her to use p in a conditional if p,
q, no matter if p is CF- or IND-marked. The above theories only predict the CF-
variant to be odd. The IND is analyzed as implying p’s possibility, which is clearly
consistent with its certainty.
(22) [Speaker knows Lena is asleep]
a. # If Lena were sleeping, she would be missing the lunar eclipse.
b. ? If Lena is sleeping, she’s missing the lunar eclipse.
One may consider (22-b) to reflect a pragmatic constraint on the use of a conditional
per se. In allusion to von Fintel 1998’s Consequent Variety,56 it is called Antecedent
Variety in (23), and formulated as the need for the speaker of a conditional to hold
¬p possible.
(23) Antecedent Variety (AV)
A speaker S cannot felicitously utter a conditional if p, q unless 3DOX,S(¬p)
But then again, there are instances of factual conditionals (von Fintel 2011 refer-
encing Sabine Iatridou), exemplified by the italicized antecedent in the following
dialogue from the movie Django Unchained (2012):57
(24) Dr. Schultz: You really want me to shake your hand?
Calvin Candie: I insist.
Dr. Schultz: Well, if you insist …
Although Dr. Schultz is certain to take Calvin Candie’s insistence as fact, there is
nothing odd about his (implicit) conditional. It takes wonder what distinguishes
cases like (22) from ones like (24), but this is left for another occasion. We may
keep AV in mind, being aware that it is probably not a PSP in the strict sense.
3.2 Experiment
The basic observation we started out with was a quasi-complementary distribution
between K2 and IND in disbelief- vs. uncertainty-contexts.
56von Fintel 1998 considers this constraint to come to light in the oddity of IND-marked Anderson-
conditionals as exemplified by (21).
57Cited from genius.com, 2020/04/25.
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(25) a. [S, disbelieving in p:] if p{-K2 / #-IND}, q
b. [S, being uncertain on p:] if p{?-K2 / -IND}, q
All three theories capture the intuitive judgments in (25), which translates into
a jointly predicted interaction effect between the two factors context and mood.
However, as seen above, each theory explains (25) in a slightly different way:
(26) a. T1: K2 presupposes ¬3p, IND presupposes 3p
b. MP1: {INDØ, K2¬3p}
c. MP2: {K2Ø, IND3p}
The aim of our rating study was to find out which is closer to the truth. The pre-
dictions were derived based on the assumption that anti-PSPs, being pragmatic in
nature, are more easily violable than PSPs, being semantic in nature. As a result,
the balance in violation costs (VCs) between the two moods differs from theory to
theory. The table below illustrates this, putting the K2 and the IND in their re-
spective violating context and assigning to it the predicted degree of badness, with ! indicating a more severe violation than  .58
T1 MP1 MP2
K2 in UC  !  !  
IND in DB  !   !
T1 differs from MP1 and MP2 as to whether the two moods differ in VCs in the
first place. MP1 and MP2 differ as to which mood is more costly: MP1 says K2,
MP2 says IND.
(27) Predicted violation costs (VCs)
K2

=T1
>MP1
<MP2
 IND
3.2.1 Design and procedure
The study was conducted as an online experiment hosted by the platform OnExp.
Participants were recruited via Prolific; each participant was pre-selected for having
German as her or his first language. The material comprised 36 items59 following a 3
58As suggested by Robin Hörnig, a given mood’s VC was measured considering how much worse
it gets in its violating compared to its licensing context.
59See the appendix for a comprehensive list.
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x 2 design, with belief-state as the context andmood as the target factor. Targets
were presented in written form on screen. The former were conditionals whose
antecedents and consequents were either K2- or IND-marked. Antecedents usually
contained an activity predicate like sleep, cook or write, and had to be interpreted
as simultaneous with the speech time in virtue of containing the temporal adverbial
gerade ‘right now’. The context above them established the conditional’s speaker
S to be in one out of three belief-states regarding the antecedent p: S was either
uncertain about whether or not p (28-a), to believe that p is not the case (28-b),
or to believe that it is (28-c).60
(28) Contexts
It’s Advent season. Bernd and Ingrid are visited by Frank, their son in law.
Ingrid has announced baking cookies.
a. [UC] Frank helps Bernd with some gardening, and the two wonder if
the cookies are already in progress.
b. [DB] Frank helps Bernd with some gardening, and expresses his hope
for the cookies to be already in progress. It’s in that moment that they
see Ingrid driving off in her car.
c. [BL] Frank helps Bernd with some gardening, and expresses his hope
for the cookies to be already in progress. It’s in that moment that they
see Ingrid pulling a tray of Vanillekipferl out of the oven.
Bernd says to Frank:
Targets
a. Wenn
if
Ingrid
Ingrid
gerade
now
bäckt,
bake-IND
durchzieht
fill-IND
ein
a
süßer
sweet
Duft
scent
das
the
Haus.
house
b. Wenn
if
Ingrid
Ingrid
gerade
now
backen
bake
würde,
will-K2
würde
will-K2
ein
a
süßer
sweet
Duft
scent
das
the
Haus
house
durchziehen.
fill
60This certainly didn’t exhaust the range of possible belief-states S can be in regarding p. More
fine-grained distinctions such as being in doubt about or falsely believing that p are left for
future research to tackle. Thanks to Nadine Bade (pc) for discussing the options with me.
The remainder of this footnote pertains to two aspects of the sample item in (28):
• It seems that with bäckt in the target’s IND-variant, a dialectal form has sneaked its way
into the items. Some German native speakers at the workshop Processing presuppositions
(2020/10), including Patrick Grosz (pc), preferred backt (without the Umlaut) as third
person singular IND of the verb backen ‘to bake’.
• Vanillekipferl are a vanilla-flavored Christmas cookie in the shape of a crescent (or crois-
sant, if you prefer) %. Definitely worth trying.
58
A quick remark on these items is in place. p was always ensured to be present-
oriented. At least some targets looked like (29), where q was in the future:
(29) a. If Kira is having a phone call right now, she won’t join us for dinner
[later].
b. If Kira was having a phone call right now, she wouldn’t join us for
dinner [later].
This is in conflict with Iatridou 2000’s stricter definition of present CFs, on which
both p and q are implied not to hold at the speech time; future studies might con-
trol for this factor.
A context and its target were shown simultaneously on screen, but targets were
highlighted as such. Participants were asked to rate a target in its context on a
1-7 scale of increasing acceptability. In an introductory part that familiarized par-
ticipants with the procedure, the rating criterion was specified to be a sentence’s
intuitive naturalness in its context.
The 36 items were pseudo-randomized across nine lists, ensuring each list to con-
tain four variants of the same condition, and no more than one variant of the same
item.61 Main stimuli were mixed with an equal number of fillers. To make sure par-
ticipants paid enough attention, each stimulus was followed by a yes-no question
asking for information given in the context.62
3.2.2 Results
The data gained from 52 participants were subjected to a statistical analysis us-
ing the statistics software SPSS. Due to a technical error, only seven of the nine
lists were tested. To evaluate the VCs that emerged, only four conditions were
considered, namely those involving the UC- and the DB-context. Predictions were
straightforward in these cases: UC licenses IND and violates K2, vice versa for DB;
the question was if the K2- and the IND-violation were equally bad, and if not,
which one was worse.63 Mean target ratings per context are shown in figure 1.
61A more conventional choice would have been to have only six lists, with six variants of each
condition per list. This also would have required less participants. We chose otherwise to keep
the input for participants low, making it more likely for them to remain concentrated throughout
the experiment.
62A participant’s data were only included in the analysis if at least 90% of the questions had
been answered correctly. Given 48 questions, this makes for a minimal threshold of 43 correct
answers. On this basis, three out of 55 participants were excluded.
63Again following a suggestion by Robin Hörnig, the two conditions involving the BL-context
were excluded as predictions were less clear in this case. As briefly discussed in section 3.1.4,
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Figure 1: Mean ratings observed for each condition
The global analysis revealed an overall interaction between the factors context and
mood [F(2,102) = 106.02, p < 0.01]. This interaction also obtained in a contrastive
2 x 2 analysis between contexts UC and DB [F(1,51) = 79.53, p < 0.01], confirming
a prediction shared by all three theories: under UC, the IND was rated significantly
better than the K2 [M = 5.7 vs. M = 4.5]; under DB, the reverse obtained [M =
5.0 for K2, 3.2 for IND].
As laid out above, the decisive criterion to distinguish between theories T1, MP1
and MP2 were the relative VCs between the two moods. These costs turned out to
be 1.13 lower for the K2 than for the IND [t(51) = 4.49; p < 0.01], presenting clear
evidence in favor of MP2.
In addition to this main finding, mood and context significantly interacted between
contexts UC and BL [F(1,51) = 51.34, p < 0.01]. The K2, whose implication is
violated in both UC and BL, was rated worse in the latter [M = 3.00] than in the
former [M = 4.54]. Ratings for the IND barely decreased from UC [M = 5.66] to
BL [M = 5.46].
3.2.3 Discussion of results
The study’s main finding is the evidence in favor of MP2, on which the K2 pre-
supposes nothing, but the IND does. The BL-context had been excluded from the
predictions, but the high ratings for the IND in this context still came as a surprise:
given the antecedent variety (AV) constraint tentatively postulated in section 3.1.4
above, a conditional was expected to be odd per se in such a context. As has
been pointed out to me by various people, this indicates that a factual reading for
belief in p appeared to make a conditional if p, q deviant to begin with, no matter if p was
K2- or IND-marked. This made it hard to predict how the K2 would be received in this case:
Its ¬3p-implication also conflicts with BL. It was unclear whether this double violation should
lead one to expect still lower ratings for the K2 than for the IND.
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IND-conditionals is much more readily available than we expected it to be.64 By
contrast, the K2’s decrease in acceptability from UC to BL was expected under the
assumption of AV: BL violates both the K2 and AV, UC just violates K2.
3.3 Conclusion
The present chapter reported a rating study on antecedent-falsity (¬p) in German
present CFs. Given that German CFs are K2-marked, the leading question was
what, if anything, the K2 contributes. Among three theories inspired by previ-
ous accounts, the results clearly favored theory MP2, on which the K2 and the IND
are presuppositional alternatives, with the IND presupposing antecedent-possibility
(3p), and the K2 presupposing nothing at all. Under this view, the K2’s ¬p-
implication is an anti-PSP derived from what the IND presupposes. This view
may strike some as morphosemantically less unintuitive than MP1, on which the
unmarked IND is vacuous and the marked K2 is not. Schlenker 2005 and Leahy
2011, 2018 provide reasons to question this intuition, and so does the present chap-
ter, reminding us to draw the line between morphological and semantic markedness
(Sauerland 2008b)
It remains to be seen what a treatment of the K2 as vacuous entails for a theory
of past morphology. Past morphology is among the grammatical ingredients of
counterfactuality (Iatridou 2000). This also holds true of the K2, whose form is
sometimes identical to the past tense:
(30) wenn ‘if’
a. ich lächel-tepast=k2 ‘I smiled’
b. du lächel-testpast=k2 ‘you smiled’
c. sie lächel-tepast=k2 ‘she smiled’
d. wir lächel-tenpast=k2 ‘we smiled’
e. ihr lächel-tetpast=k2 ‘you smiled’
f. sie lächel-tenpast=k2 ‘they smiled’
There are attempts to unify temporal and CF-past under a shared semantics (Iatri-
dou 2000, Schulz 2014, Romero 2014).65 Sauerland 2002 argues temporal past to be
the presuppositionally stronger competitor of the present. How does this fit with
64Maybe even more so in German than in English, where if tends to be blocked by causal since,
as suggested to me by Patrick Grosz (pc).
65Schulz 2014 distinguishes two approaches to what I call CF-past here, calling the former past
as modal and the latter past as past. On the former, whom Schulz is herself a proponent of, the
meaning of the past is vague enough to cover both CF- and temporal cases. On the latter, the
contribution of the past is consistently temporal across both uses.
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the present view of the CF-past (the K2) as vacuous? This potential incosistency
is left to future research to be resolved.66
Another issue to tackle is the difference in meaning between past and present CFs.
The treatment of the K2 as vacuous is strongly inspired by Leahy 2011, 2018. But
as already mentioned in footnote (i), Leahy investigates the contrast between past
CFs and INDs, exemplified in (31-a). He is explicitly neutral regarding the type of
data the present study was concerned with, i.e., the contrast between present CFs
and INDs (31-b).
(31) a. (i) If Lena had been sleeping, she would have been missing the lunar
eclipse.
(ii) If Lena was sleeping, she was missing the lunar eclipse.
b. (i) If Lena were sleeping, she would be missing the lunar eclipse.
(ii) If Lena is sleeping, she’s missing the lunar eclipse.
Temporal orientation has been noted to matter for the strength of CF-inferences
(Iatridou 2000, Ippolito 2003, Ashwini Deo pc). This raises the question if the differ-
ence in meaning between (31-a-i) and (31-b-i) is purely temporal, or whether using
the former strengthens the ¬p-implication in some way or other. More empirical
data may be of help in answering this question.
66It seems tempting to answer this question by pointing to vacuous past-marking found in Sequence
of Tense (SoT) constructions like the following.
(i) John saidpast [ Mary wasø happy ]
Indeed, Armenante & Braun 2020 identify a crosslinguistic co-occurrence pattern involving CF-
and SoT-past. However, they do not resort to any kind of reductionist approach, which Schulz
2014 argues against.
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4 Mandarin jiu and German schon: early times and low antecedents67
The previous two chapters dealt with counterfactual conditionals. This one deals
with two scalar particles that interact with conditionals in an interesting way: Man-
darin jiu and German schon, which are sometimes translated as ‘already’. With jiu
or schon in a conditional consequent q, the antecedent p is conveyed to minimally
suffice for q, that is, to be a condition that is easy to satisfy. This conditional use
of the particles will be brought in connection with a temporal one: In a different
environment, jiu and schon both convey earliness.
The core of the proposal to be developed is that both particles stand in a close rela-
tion to an LF-operator LOW encoding (presupposing) scalar lowness. This kind of
lowness translates into earliness in the temporal use, and into minimal sufficiency
in the conditional use.
The overall contribution of the chapter is twofold: First, it unifies two uses of the
particles that aren’t unified in an obvious way. Second, it makes in case in favor of
a semantic universal: LOW is successfully applied to two particles from two distinct
languages; the argument gains force from the fact that the two object languages
could barely be further apart from each other than they are.
4.1 Introduction
Mandarin jiu and German schon are two scalar particles sharing a considerable
overlap of uses. Both often translate as ‘already’, and both can be thought of as
conveying lowness on a scale in some way.
As a starting point, jiu’s and schon’s scalar lowness may be best exemplified by
their temporal uses, exemplified in (1). Scalar lowness surfaces as earliness here.
In (1), jiu and schon each imply that it’s raining earlier than expected, or, to be
more precise, that the speech time tnow is an early time for rain to be falling. But
earliness is not the only implication that arises, as can be seen in (1-c): It is also
implied that it didn’t rain before tnow (Lai 1999 on jiu, Löbner 1989 on schon), an
implication I will refer to as the inception-implication. Plus, there is an additive
implication that rain will keep falling at times later than tnow.
67The bulk of this chapter has been submitted to the proceedings of the 35th annual conference of
the Israel Association for Theoretical Linguistics (IATL 35; Wimmer 2020′). For valuable input,
I am particularly indebted to Nadine Bade, Jun Chen, Zhuo Chen, Daniel Hole, Mingya Liu,
Doris Penka (who meticulously commented on the first draft), Yenan Sun, as well as people at
and abstract reviewers for IATL 35. Mingya, Yenan and Zhuo also shared Mandarin data and
judgments with me, in addition to quite a few other native speakers, linguists and non-linguists,
whose help is gratefully acknowledged. To the latter I owe all of this chapter’s Mandarin data
points, unless indicated otherwise. All remaining inadequacies are, of course, my own.
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(1) a. Ganggang
just-now
haishi
still
qing
clear
tian,
sky
xianzai
now
jiu
jiu
xia
fall
yu
rain
le.
ASP
b. Eben
just
hat
has
noch
still
die
the
Sonne
sun
geschienen.
shone
Jetzt
now
regnet
rains
es
it
schon.
schon
‘Just a moment ago, the sun was still shining. Now it’s already raining.’68
c. ; tnow is an early time for rainfall low = early
; it didn’t rain before tnow inception
; it will be raining after tnow additivity
Conditional uses of the two particles exemplify the ease with which scalar lowness
translates into minimal sufficiency (MS), a term that to my knowledge was
coined by Grosz 2012: Placed in the consequent of a conditional, jiu/schon signal
the antecedent to be low in some relevant sense. This may be temporal earliness
like above, but it can also be, say, the little effort it takes to smile in the case
under consideration.69 The meaning that arises is that a smile from the hearer (the
antecedent p) minimally suffices for the speaker to be happy (the consequent q to
become true). In addition to scalar lowness, analogous implications to the ones in
(1-c) arise: Inception is implied in the sense that anything less than a hearer-smile
is not enough to make the speaker happy. Additivity is implied in the sense that
anything more than a smile from the hearer makes the speaker at least as happy as
the smile itself.
(2) a. Ni
you
xiao,
smile
wo
I
jiu
jiu
kaixin.
happy
b. Wenn
if
du
you
lächelst,
smile
bin
am
ich
I
schon
schon
glücklich.
happy
≈ ‘A smile from you is all it takes for me to be happy.70’
c. ; it takes as little as your smile to make me happy MS
; nothing less than your smile makes me happy inception
; anything more than your smile also makes me happy additivity
These are the core facts this chapter wants to tackle. At the heart of the proposal
is an LF-operator LOW that jiu/schon both spell out (a working hypothesis to be
refined).
Section 4.2 establishes an underspecified semantics for LOW, on which the latter
68The jiu-example is from from bilingoal.com [2019/07/14], the schon-example from Zimmermann
2018: 693.
69This is to follow Liu 2017, who assumes an effort scale for a jiu-sentence he discusses.
70Thanks to Zhuo Chen for a commented variant of the jiu-conditional. jiu is often translated as
then in (2-a). But this doesn’t seem to capture the lowness-implication that the conditional use
gives rise to as well.
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presupposes scalar lowness of its only argument on a contextually salient scale. This
analysis is applied to both the temporal and the conditional examples.
Section 4.3 takes into account two co-occurrence patterns that Hole 2004 presents
to support his view of jiu as a semantically vacuous agreement marker. Such pat-
terns suggest a refinement of the view put forth in section 4.2, to the effect that jiu
no longer spells out LOW, but agrees with an instantiation thereof, be it overt or
covert.
Section 4.4 addresses the two other implications noted above, additivity and incep-
tion. These are both kept out of the semantics of LOW.
Section reviews some previous work on jiu and schon, especially Krifka 2000’s view
that schon presupposes scalar highness.
Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 LOW
This section introduces a type-flexible operator LOW and shows how it captures the
meaning contributions of both jiu and schon in both their temporal and conditional
uses. Similar to Grosz 2012’s MS-ONLY, LOW is an identity function presupposing
its only argument to rank low on a scale. At least for the time being, both jiu and
schon are taken to spell out LOW.
LOW takes a single subclausal argument x of an underspecified semantic type σ,71
and presupposes x to rank lowest on a salient scale among all members in C, a set
of contextual alternatives including x itself. This is essentially the presupposition
(PSP) Liu 2017 assumes for jiu and the exact opposite of the one Krifka 2000
assumes for schon. At the truthconditional level, LOW just vacuously returns x,
i.e., has the semantic type ⟨σ,σ⟩.
(3) LOWC(xσ) is defined iff ∀y ∈ C [ y ̸= x → x <C y ].
If defined, then LOWC(x) = x.
In prose:
(4) LOWC(x) is defined iff for all y in C [ if y isn’t x, then x is lower on a
contextually salient scale than y ].
If defined, then LOWC(x) is x.
A treatment of jiu and schon in terms of scalar lowness is not unprecedented in the
71Thanks to Doris Penka for bringing this notational tool to my attention. σ is a variable over se-
mantic types, which is what we need to capture both temporal and conditional uses of jiu/schon.
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literature. Long before Liu 2017, Lai 1999 has put forth a convincing account of
jiu in terms of lowness, including temporal earliness. von Stechow 2006 pursues a
scalar lowness account of schon, pace Krifka 2000’s scalar highness account. For a
more detailed review of previous work on the two particles, see section 4.5.
It is still unclear what the source of the alternatives is that already, schon and
jiu work with. Given the present proposal, this question carries over to LOW. Its
alternatives in (3) may or may not come from focus on x. jiu’s focus-sensitivity
seems quite uncontroversial (Hole 2004, 2006, Liu 2017). Krifka 2000 and Ippolito
2007 treat already as focus-sensitive as well. But Beck 2019′ considers schon to be
discourse-anaphoric rather than focus-sensitive, in analogy to her treatment of still
and its German counterpart noch (Beck 2020). Grosz 2012 also argues schon not
to be focus-sensitive. The example he gives looks something like the following.
(5) a. Is it OK for two people to enter the boat?
b. Nein,
no
denn
since
dann
then
wird
will
es
it
schon
schon
sinken.
sink
The point Grosz makes with this example is based on the assumption that a focus-
sensitive item requires an element bearing prosodic stress in its scope. The only
candidate for such an element is the anaphoric particle dann ‘then’, which replaces
a conditional antecedent if 2 people enter the boat whose alternatives vary along
the numeral 2. But dann cannot be stressed in this case. Grosz concludes that the
alternatives for schon are not induced by focus. This set is freely retrieved from
the context in pretty much the same way as contextual restriction on quantifying
expressions is standardly taken to function (von Fintel 1994).
An analogous example to (5) can be constructed with jiu.
(6) a. Is it OK for two people to enter the boat?
b. Bu
not
xing,
ok
zhe-yang
this-way
ta
it
jiu
jiu
yiding
definitely
hui
will
chen.
sink
Following Grosz, we may tentatively conclude from (5) and (6) that LOW’s alter-
natives are not focus-induced.
Another debatable assumption is that jiu directly spells out LOW just as schon
does. This works at least for the first two types of examples presented in this chap-
ter’s introduction. A challenge to this view is posed by co-occurrence facts involving
jiu (Hole 2004). This will lead us to loosen the tie between jiu and LOW in section
4.3, as already announced.
But the next goal is to show how LOW’s semantics captures the two pairs of exam-
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ples we started out with, the temporal and the conditional one.
4.2.1 Capturing earliness
It was noted above that in their temporal use, jiu/schon convey earliness. The
schon-sentence (7) repeated from above serves as a reminder.
(7) Jetzt
now
regnet
rains
es
it
schon.
schon; tnow is an early time for rainfall
In this case, a temporally flavored version of LOW is at work. Let this variant
be called LOWTEMP(ORAL). LOW’s single argument x is now a time argument t of
type ⟨i⟩, the type for times; by consequence, LOWTEMP is of type ⟨i,i⟩. Under such
a choice of argument, the scalar ordering turns into one of temporal succession,
and lowness becomes earliness. LOWTEMP presupposes t to be the ‘lowest’, that is,
earliest, time in C, a set of contextually salient times. If this earliness-presupposition
is satisfied, LOWTEMP returns t.
(8) LOWTEMP C(ti) is defined iff ∀t′ ∈ C [ t′ ̸= t → t <C t′ ].
If defined, LOWTEMP C(t) = t.
It was decided above not to treat LOW as focus-sensitive. This comes in handy in
the temporal cases considered here: If LOWTEMP were focus-sensitive, its argument
t would be focused. But in (7) prosodic focus doesn’t fall on the temporal adverbial
jetzt ‘now’. So a focus semantic account would have to assume covert focus on t,
which is what Ippolito 2007 does in her analysis of aspectual already. The present
account doesn’t have to defend itself against skepticism pertaining to covert focus,
as focus on t is not required.
That being said, we can convince ourselves how LOWTEMP conveys earliness in (7).
The German sentence (as well as its Mandarin counterpart) can be assigned the
following (simplified) LF.72
(9) [ LOWTEMP C tnow ] rain⟨i,t⟩
The LF in (9) presupposes tnow to be the earliest rain-time in C. This captures the
earliness implication. Rain is predicated over tnow in the assertion via Function Ap-
plication (Heim & Kratzer 1998). Both meaning components come from LOWTEMP
72A more comprehensive LF would have to include an imperfective operator ensuring the rain-time
to be ongoing at the speech time, see Beck 2020’s analysis of a minimally different example with
still.
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as defined above. Assertion and presupposition together imply tnow to be an early
time for rain to be falling.
(10) J (9) K
a. is true iff [ λt rain(t) ](tnow); it’s raining now
b. defined iff ∀t′ ∈ C [ t′ ̸= tnow → tnow <C t′ ]
Something needs to be said about the contextually salient times in C. The speech
time need not be the earliest time in the context, quite the contrary. Consider again
(7), in whose longer version in (1-b) an even earlier time is made salient before schon
is used. In the following paraphrase of (1-b), already stands for both jiu and schon.
(11) Just a moment ago<tnow , the sun was still shining. Now it’s already raining.
So C includes a time preceding tnow.
(12) C = {shortly before tnow, tnow, …}
The present conception of LOW as implemented in (8) follows Liu 2017 in making
the argument time the earliest time in the context. In other words, our analysis
seems to wrongly predict PSP-failure. But (11) doesn’t cause a serious problem
if we follow Krifka 2000 in taking schon – and, more generally, LOW – to impose
“a certain restriction on the alternatives”, leading the hearer to consider only the
ones satisfying this restriction (Krifka 2000: 404): On this view, the earliness-
component in (10-b) does not require C to contain no time preceding tnow. What
happens instead is that already actively shapes C, signaling the hearer to simply
ignore such earlier times. This comes in handy for the present analysis even though
it seems to defy a strict view of presupposition as a constraint on the preceding
context, an issue I leave as a loose end.
4.2.2 Capturing minimal sufficiency
It was noted above that when jiu and schon appear in a conditional consequent,
the antecedent is evaluated as low on a scale. The resulting reading is that the
antecedent minimally suffices for the consequent to become true. With Liu 2017,
the scale may be specified as one of effort, narrowing down lowness to easiness.
(13) Wenn
if
du
you
lächelst,
smile
bin
I
ich
am
schon
schon
glücklich.
happy; it takes as little as your smile to make me happy MS
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What does a conditional variant of LOW look like? If indeed the whole antecedent
is evaluated, the argument of LOWCOND(ITIONAL) has to be a proposition. This
is spelled out in (14). The single argument p is the antecedent, whose type ⟨s,t⟩
is written as ⟨p⟩. Apart from this specification, LOWCOND works in the by now
familiar fashion. p is presupposed to be the lowest proposition in C.
(14) LOWCOND C(pp) is defined iff ∀q ∈ C [ q ̸= p → p <C q ].
If defined, LOWCOND C(p) = p.
In the LF below, LOWCOND and p combine at the very top. p has undergone move-
ment, leaving a propositional trace in its launching site. p is abstracted over right
above the conditional, a mechanism that creates a function taking a proposition as
argument.73
S
S′p
LOWCOND C
you smile
S′′p,t
λp
if t⟨p⟩ I’m happy
S is interpretable as follows. A smile from the hearer is asserted to make the speaker
happy: the proposition denoted by S′ saturates the propositional argument of S′′
via Function Application (Heim & Kratzer 1998). LOWCOND presupposes this smile
(actually a proposition) to rank lowest in C.
(15) J S K
a. is true iff [ λp if p, I’m happy ](you smile)
= if you smile, I’m happy;
b. defined iff ∀q ∈ C [ q ̸= (you smile) → (you smile) <C q ].
LOWCOND evaluates a proposition p as low. It is little surprising that this lowness
can be untangled from logical weakness, given the wellknown existence of nonlogical
73Thanks to Doris Penka and Sigrid Beck for suggesting this to me. Propositional traces are ruled
out by Poole 2017’s Trace Interpretation Constraint, according to which traces can only be of a
simple type such as ⟨e⟩. On the other hand, they are not unprecedented in the literature: For
example, a propositional trace plays a role in Beck & Rullmann 1999’s analysis of the sentence
John knows where you can buy the New York Times.
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scales in the semantic literature.74 This becomes clear if we think of possible choices
for C, keeping in mind the notion of easiness evoked above. p’s easiness may well
coincide with its logical weakness, as seen in (16). In this case, p’s alternatives are
not only harder to put into action than p, but also asymmetrically entail p.
(16) C = {you smile, you smile & dance, you smile & dance & play the harp}
But easiness can well do without logical weakness. Another plausible choice for C is
(17), where p easily ranks as easiest without being entailed by any of its alternatives.
The hearer may have an easier time smiling than baking a cake, but he may well
pull a sulky face while baking.
(17) C = {you smile, you bake a cake, you take me to Paris}
A final note on p ranking lowest as encoded in the semantics of LOWCOND. We
saw that temporal schon felicitously applies to a time t even if the context provides
times earlier than t. Analogously, conditional schon doesn’t disallow for the saliency
of a proposition that’s easier to put into action than p. Consider the following
monologue, supposing that it’s easier for the hearer to sulk than to smile:
(18) a. Every time you look sulky, I’m pretty unhappy.
b. Doch
yet
wenn
if
du
you
lächelst,
smile
bin
am
ich
I
schon
schon
glücklich.
happy
Again, this is harmless following Krifka 2000’s view that schon allows and even
requires us to ignore certain alternatives, in this case any action that is easier for
the hearer to perform than a smile.
4.2.3 Interim conclusion
The aim of this subsection was to show how temporal and conditional jiu and schon
can be treated as different flavors of one and the same semantic operator LOW, an
identity function ranking its single argument as lowest on a scale. Lowness translates
into earliness in the temporal uses, and MS in the conditional ones.
74Thanks to Yimei Xiang and Yenan Sun for discussion on this topic. It is crucial for Liu 2017’s
analysis of jiu that scalar lowness is independent from logical weakness.
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4.3 Lowness as agreement75
Up to this point in the present chapter, jiu and schon have been somewhat naïvely
assumed to be perfect analoga in the sense that they both spell out an LF-operator
LOW. But Hole 2004 gives reason to loosen the tie between jiu and LOW some-
what, identifying two items that necessitate jiu’s insertion close before the sentence
predicate:76 the conditional subjunction zhi-yao ‘only-need’ and the particle guang
‘alone’, both of which convey MS in (19).
(19) a. Zhi-yao
only-need
ni
you
xiao,
smile
wo
I
*(jiu)
*(jiu)
kaixin.
happy
≈ ‘Your smile is the little it takes for me to be happy.’
b. Guang-shi
alone-be
xiang
think
*(jiu)
*(jiu)
ling
make
ren
people
haipa.
afraid
≈ ‘The very thought is frightening.’77
These patterns motivate Hole’s treatment of jiu as a semantically vacuous agreement
marker that merely reflects pre-established quantification over alternatives. In the
given cases, the actual quantifiers are zhiyao and guang, respectively. Refining the
present account accordingly, this means that scalar lowness (and more narrowly:
MS) actually comes from these two items, not from jiu itself.
The German variants of the sentences in (19) are given in (20). schon is preferred if
an MS-reading is intended, see Grosz 2012 on the disambiguating role the particle
plays in sentences like (20-b). But by no means is it ungrammatical to omit it.
(20) a. Allein
alone
(schon)
(schon)
der
the
Gedanke
thought
ängstigt
scares
mich.
me
b. Wenn
if
du
you
nur
only
lächelst,
smile
bin
am
ich
I
(schon)
(schon)
glücklich.
happy
Based on the patterns in (19), the present section refines the view put forth in 4.2:
jiu doesn’t spell out LOW, but merely agrees with it, i.e., indirectly reflects its
presence.
In the remainder of this subsection, guang and zhiyao are analyzed as overt instan-
tiations of LOW. But before that, let us try and make the potential agreement seen
in (19) a bit more precise.
75Title inspired by Lee 2005’s paper on Korean man ‘only’, which is taken to agree with a covert
ONLY-operator. This proposal is likened by Beck 2007 to Hole 2004’s for jiu and other Mandarin
particles, and has recently been applied to English only by Quek & Hirsch 2016.
76It seems safe to adopt Hole 2004’s characterization that jiu occurs right before what he calls the
predicative complex.
77LINE dictionary, 2019/01/11.
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From a Minimalist viewpoint (Chomsky 1995), the idea that jiu is in agreement
with LOW can be modeled as follows. Being semantically contentful, LOW carries
an interpretable lowness-feature [iLOW], and jiu its uninterpretable counterpart
[uLOW]. The structural configuration underlying the two examples in (19) is as in
(21).
(21) [ LOW[iLOW] x ] [ … jiu[uLOW] … ]78
If LOW is not spelled out, it still needs to be posited at LF. This follows from Brody
1997’s Principle of Radical Intepretability, on which every uninterpretable feature
needs to have an interpretable counterpart. A jiu-sentence lacking overt LOW still
contains an [iLOW], carried by a phonetically empty head Ø.
(22) [ Ø[iLOW] x ] … jiu[uLOW] …
We can take such configurations to underlie the two sentences we started out with,
where jiu doesn’t co-occur with any overt lowness-conveying element:
(23) a. Xianzai
now
jiu
jiu
xia
fall
yu
rain
le.
ASP
b. Ni
you
xiao,
smile
wo
I
jiu
jiu
kaixin.
happy
Based on the schema in (22), these two sentences can be given structures like the
following.
(24) a. [ Ø[iLOW] now ] jiu[uLOW] fall rain (23-a)
b. [ Ø[iLOW] [i you smile ] ] [ [ MUST ti ] I jiu[uLOW] happy ] (23-b)
What is still unclear at this point is jiu’s obligatory insertion in the presence of
zhiyao and guang as seen in (19). One potential solution is opened up by Pesetsky
& Torrego 2007’s (P&T’s) classification of features along two dimensions that had
previously been treated on a par: interpretability and valuation. The classic view
is that an [iF] is lexically valued, while a [uF] is not. P&T’s system allows there to
be unvalued [iFs] and valued [uFs]. jiu’s obligatoriness following overt LOW is less
puzzling if we think of LOW’s [iLOW] as unvalued and of jiu’s [uLOW] as valued.
An unvalued feature needs to be valued by a matching valued feature; this arguably
captures the incompleteness effect that arises when zhiyao or guang are not followed
78This configuration is somewhat reminiscent of Spec(ifier)-head agreement. Hole 2017 proposes
such an analysis for a similar construction involving the particle cai, but see Sun 2019 for
concerns. I leave it open whether or not the sentences in (19) fall under this type of agreement.
72
up by jiu in the same sentence.
The syntactic details are left to future research. It should be noted though that
things may well be different from how they are presented here. This is suggested
by an assumption underlying both Hole 2017’s and Sun 2019’s treatments of the
ONLY-particle cai. The latter appears in similar co-occurrence patterns as jiu; in
the following example from Hole, cai obligatorily follows zhiyou ‘only’.
(25) Akiu
Akiu
zhiyou
only
niurou
beef
*(cai)
*(cai)
chi.
eat
‘Akiu only eats beef.’
While their accounts differ, Hole and Sun both assign the [iF] to cai, and the [uF]
to zhiyou. If we were to apply this to jiu, we would have to treat jiu as carrying
the [iF], contrary to what is assumed here.
With a rough idea of what agreement between LOW and jiu may look like, let us
now turn to the promised analysis of guang and zhiyao as overt variants of LOW.
4.3.1 guang ‘alone’
Recall the above example containing subject-internal guang:
(26) Guang-shi
alone-be
xiang
think
*(jiu)
*(jiu)
ling
make
ren
people
haipa.
afraid
I suggest to treat guang as an ⟨e,e⟩-typed version of LOW here:
(27) LOWIND(IVIDUAL) C(xe) is defined iff ∀y ∈ C [ y ̸= x → x <C y ].
If defined, then LOWIND C(x) = x.
LOWIND, spelled out as subject-internal guang, carries [iLOW]. jiu agrees with
LOWIND in virtue of carrying [uLOW].
(28) [ LOWIND [iLOW] think ] jiu[uLOW] scary
At LF, LOW’s first argument think undergoes type-shifting from a predicate to an
individual that amounts to something like ‘the act of thinking’ and will henceforth
be referred to as ‘the thought’. This is to apply Partee 1986’s iota-shift. In the LF
below, this shift is performed by an ⟨et,e⟩-type iota operator ι attached to think.
jiu does not enter semantic computation, given its assumed vacuity.
(29) [ LOWIND C [ ι think⟨e,t⟩ ] ] (jiu) scary⟨e,t⟩
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Inspired by Coppock & Beaver 2014, who tackle the very similar sentence just the
thought of him sends shivers down my spine, the alternatives in C can be thought
of as different degrees of perceived intensity regarding some salient entity x. Let x
be an encounter with a grizzly bear. The mere thought of having such an encounter
is conceivably less intense than the actual encounter. In a context like this, the
alternatives in C can be informally described as follows:
(30) C = {the thought of the encounter, the actual encounter}
(29) presupposes the thought to be less intense than all other things in C, that is,
the actual encounter. On the level of assertion, we simply get that the thought is
scary.
(31) J (29) K is true iff scary′(ιz [thought′(z)]);
defined iff ∀y ∈ C [ y ̸= ιz [thought′(z)] → ιz [thought′(z)] <C y ].
It has to be noted that guang also has exclusive uses. This raises the question
how it comes to act as a pure instantiation of the nonexclusive operator LOW, and
touches on the relation between MS and exclusiveness more generally.
To illustrate, let’s look once more at the above example repeated in (32). It has a
nonexclusive interpretation analogous to Coppock & Beaver 2014’s just the thought
of him sends shivers down my spine. All guang seems to be doing here is to evaluate
thinking as low.
(32) Guang-shi
alone-be
xiang
think
*(jiu)
*(jiu)
ling
make
ren
people
haipa.
afraid; nothing but the thought is scary nonexclusive
; the thought is not much low
If (32) is negated, however, the lowness evaluation projects, but negation targets
an exclusive interpretation of guang that is absent under (32). If (33) were just
the negation of (32), the thought would be implied not to be scary. What we get
instead is the additive meaning that apart from the thought, something other than
it is scary too, which is why the negated variant is not that dissimilar from the
positive one. Along with this interpretive effect, jiu, while being obligatory in the
positive sentence, makes the negative one ungrammatical.
(33) Bu guang-shi
not alone-be
xiang
think
(*jiu)
(*jiu)
ling
make
ren
people
haipa.
afraid; the thought is not much lowness
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; ¬(nothing but the thought is scary)
≡ something other than the thought is scary
It seems from (33) that under negation, subject-internal guang doesn’t just carry
[iLOW], but also carries an exclusion feature [iEXCL]. There are at least three
puzzles surrounding the data in (32) and (33):
• P1Why does subject-internal guang become exclusive (only) under negation?
• P2 Why is jiu a bad match for exclusive guang?
• P3 Can guang’s exclusive and MS-uses be derived from the same lexical entry?
P1 and P2 are left as puzzles here.79 As for P3, there are proposals on the mar-
ket that derive cases analogous to (32) via typeshifting (Coppock & Beaver 2014,
Coppock & Lindahl 2014, Liu 2016′).80
4.3.2 zhi-yao ‘only-need’
Compared to subject-internal guang, the complex conditional subjunction zhiyao
seems a bit harder to treat as a variant of LOW: By definition, the latter takes
just a single argument, while the former seems to take two. A potential solution is
offered by a decompositional approach to zhiyao considered by Sigrid Beck (pc).
At first glance, zhiyao appears to be a conditional operator encoding MS. To see this,
we may reconsider (34), repeated from above. This sentence can be paraphrased as
your smile is the little it takes for me to be happy.
(34) Zhi-yao
only-need
ni
you
xiao,
smile
wo
I
*(jiu)
*(jiu)
kaixin.
happy
Let us first see what treating zhiyao as a conditional operator would amount to. In
the LF below, zhiyao is represented as ONLY-NEED, an operator that carries an
interpretable lowness feature [iLOW] and takes two propositions as its arguments,
an antecedent and a consequent. jiu, which sits in the sentence part denoting the
consequent, agrees with ONLY-NEED in virtue of carrying [uLOW].81
79Liu 2017 might explain P2 with an ‘anti-exhaustive’ PSP that jiu comes with, see also section
4.5.1.
80Coppock & Lindahl 2014 and, more recently, Panizza & Sudo 2020 explore the conditions under
which subject-internal just is read nonexclusively. Interestingly, subject-internal guang always
seems to have an MS-reading in positive syntactic environments.
81Such a view resembles Tsai 2017’s, who argues jiu to (sometimes) reflect an MS-operator ONLY
HAVE TO.
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ONLY-NEED[iLOW]
you smile
I jiu[uLOW] happy
On this analysis, jiu stands in a similar structural relation to ONLY-NEED as it
does to subject-internal guang ‘alone’: In both cases, the overt operator O with the
[iLOW] first combines with an element x that neither contains jiu nor is identical
to it. When O is ONLY-NEED, x is the antecedent.
(35) [ O[iLOW] x ] ... jiu[uLOW] ...
A possible semantics for ONLY-NEED is given in (36). Its semantics deviates only
slightly from that for the necessity modal MUST that, on the so-called restrictor
approach, is taken to be at play in conditionals, see von Fintel & Heim 2011 for an
introduction. Like MUST, ONLY-NEED as defined in (36) takes two propositions
(sets of possible worlds), the antecedent p and the consequent q, and asserts p to
be a subset of q, that is, all p-worlds to be q-worlds.82 Put informally, MUST
asserts p to suffice for q. ONLY-NEED distinguishes itself from ‘bare’ MUST in
presupposing p to rank lowest on a scale. Taken together, the presupposition and
assertion of ONLY-NEED convey p to minimally suffice for q.
(36) ONLY-NEEDC(p)(q) is defined iff ∀p′ ∈ C [ p′ ̸= p → p <C p′ ].
If defined, ONLY-NEEDC(p)(q) = 1 iff p ⊆ q, i.e., ∀w* [ p(w*) → q(w*) ].
The problem posed by (36) is that ONLY-NEED does not fit the semantic type
we’ve assigned to LOW, and hence cannot be taken to instantiate the latter. LOW
was defined as taking a single argument. ONLY-NEED, however, takes two argu-
ments. So as things stand, ONLY-NEED is not an exact instantiation of LOW.
This problem is solved under a decompositional approach to ONLY-NEED sug-
gested to me by Sigrid Beck (p.c.). On this approach, it is just the ONLY-part
of ONLY-NEED that instantiates LOW, i.e., carries [iLOW]; NEED independently
acts as the conditional operator. In close analogy to the analysis of jiu-conditionals
without zhiyao pursued in subsection 4.2.2, p raises above NEED to combine with
82This is a blatant simplification in view of wellknown overgenerations, but one that should do
given our purposes. The quantificational domain of conditional MUST needs to be restricted (at
least) to worlds that are maximally similar to the actual world, see e.g. Heim 1992 on work by
Lewis and Stalnaker. Thanks to Daniel Margulis for pointing this out to me in the first place,
and to Doris Penka for further discussion.
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ONLY on top of LF:
i⃝
ONLYC [iLOW] p
λp1
NEED p1
q
... jiu[uLOW] ...
It is intuitively clear that among ONLY and NEED, the former is more likely to
carry an [iLOW] than the latter. Evidence that zhi is indeed a scalar kind of ONLY
is suggested by the following example.
(37) Wo
I
zhi
only
shi
be
yi-ge
a-CL
fuwuyuanF.
waiterF; a waiter is low in rank lowness
But unsurprisingly, zhi is also an exclusive particle. In the following example, an
attempt at denying the exclusive contribution of zhi leads to inconsistency.
(38) a. Yiting
Yiting
zhi
zhi
pa-le
climb-ASP
[Bai
[White
Shan]F.
Mountain]F
b. #Ta
#She
ye
also
pa-le
climb-ASP
Huang
Yellow
Shan.
Mountain
Under the decompositional approach taken in i⃝, we do not want ONLY to be ex-
clusive. The truth conditions of the LF would read as ‘nothing other than p makes
q true’. But this defies the MS-nature of sentences containing zhiyao, which convey
that at least p makes q true, and alternatives to p are likely to make q true as well.
Now Grosz 2012 assumes there to be two kinds of ONLY, an exclusive and a nonex-
clusive one. The latter is assumed to be at play in a German MS-conditional like
the following.
(39) Wenn
if
nur
only
zweiF
twoF
Leute
people
kommen,
come
spielen
play
wir
we
schon
schon
Siedler.
Siedler
≈ ‘It only takes 2 people for us to play Siedler’
Both ONLYs convey scalar lowness, but only one of them is exclusive. With Grosz,
this fact can be thought of such that both ONLYs share a lowness-feature LOW,
but only one of them has an exclusive feature EXCL to it.
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ONLY
{LOW, EXCL} {LOW}
Nonexclusive ONLY, henceforth referred to as MS-ONLY, is an identity-function
triggering a scalar lowness presupposition regarding its prejacent p.
(40) MS-ONLY[Grosz 2012] C(p) is true iff p is true;
defined iff ∀q ∈ C [ q ̸= p → p <C q ].83
So ONLY in i⃝ is arguably MS-ONLY. It carries [iLOW], but it carries no exclu-
sive feature [iEXCL]. As an identity function, MS-ONLY fits LOW’s type-logical
template.
This sketch of an analysis for zhiyao raises at least two questions. First, it takes
wonder why the exclusive variant of ONLY is blocked in a zhiyao-conditional. This
again touches on a question that arose in connection with guang ‘alone’ above,
namely how exclusives contribute to nonexclusive MS-meanings. von Fintel & Ia-
tridou 2007’s decompositional take on only have to as in to get good cheese, you only
have to go to the North End leaves only exclusive. The striking similarity between
only have to and zhi-yao ‘only-need’ makes it tempting to leave zhi exclusive as well.
Second, the present analysis draws no semantic distinction between jiu-conditionals
with zhiyao on the one hand and minimally different ones without it on the other.
The type of jiu-conditional analyzed in 4.2.2 contained no conditional subjunction,
(41-a), and was assgined the LF in (41-b).
(41) a. Ni
you
xiao,
smile
wo
I
jiu
jiu
kaixin.
happy
b. [ LOWCOND [ you smile ] ] λp. if p, I’m happy
In this LF, pretty much the same ingredients are organized in exactly the same
way as in i⃝, the LF for a minimally different zhiyao-sentence. In both cases,
the antecedent p is presupposed to be the lowest proposition in the context, and
asserted to verify the consequent. If this parallel treatment is correct, the presence
or absence of zhiyao has no effect on the interpretation of a conditional with jiu in its
consequent. It is possible, however, that zhiyao makes subtle interpretive differences
that the present account is insensitive to. More concretely, the scalar component
zhi may emphasize the antecedent’s lowness, compared to a minimally different
83The quantification in the presupposition assumed by Grosz is over most alternatives, not over
all.
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sentence lacking zhiyao. On the other hand, if we take into account the sometimes
emphatic nature of agreement configurations (Zeijlstra 2007), this enhancement of
scalar lowness even speaks in favor of the present account rather than casting doubt
on it: Scalar lowness is ensured either way via jiu, it is just implied more strongly
with zhiyao than without it.
4.3.3 Interim conclusion
This subsection spelled out Hole 2004’s treatment of jiu as a semantically vacu-
ous agreement particle. jiu was endowed with an uninterpretable lowness-feature
[uLOW]. We explored the possibilities of treating subject-internal guang ‘alone’ as
well as the subjunction zhi-yao ‘only-need’ as carrying the interpretable counter-
part [iLOW]. Many open questions remain, the most pressing of which still seems
to be how these two items come to have nonexclusive MS-readings, in spite of being
exclusive (guang) or having an exclusive as a building block (zhi-yao). The afore-
mentioned proposals cited above may prove helpful in tackling zhiyao and guang
and their relationship with jiu. A promising guideline is to see both exclusive and
MS-cases as linked by a presupposition of scalar lowness (Grosz 2012, Liu 2017),
hence to the semantics proposed for LOW here. Whatever the exact derivation
looks like, this presupposition survives.84
4.4 Other implications triggered by jiu/schon
Up to this point, the focus of this chapter was to capture scalar lowness. This was
to leave aside two other implications that jiu and schon give rise to: an additive
and an inception-implication. Reconsider the temporal schon-sentence from above.
(42) Jetzt
now
regnet
rains
es
it
schon.
schon; it didn’t rain before tnow inception
; it will be raining after tnow additivity
These implications persist in the conditional use:
(43) Wenn
if
du
you
lächelst,
smile
bin
am
ich
I
schon
schon
glücklich.
happy
84On a related note, the involvement of exclusives suggests a more flexible conception of LOW.
Exclusives are generally treated as focus-sensitive in the literature. LOW, by contrast, is de-
scribed as focus-insensitive above, even though this doesn’t play a role in its formal definition.
So maybe this description is too restrictive, and LOW may actually be [±focus-sensitive].
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; nothing less than your smile makes me happy inception
; anything more than your smile also makes me happy additivity
In this subsection, the additive and the inception implication will be discussed in
turn.
4.4.1 Additivity
The additive implication raises the question whether or not additivity is hardwired
in the semantics of LOW, or at least of the elements LOW is spelled out by. This
is not an unsual take on certain scalar particles: Ippolito 2007, for example, assigns
an additive presupposition to aspectual already; see also Beck 2020 on still and the
traditional view of even dating back to Karttunen & Peters 1975.
An additive view of LOW is mildly supported by the following Mandarin example
brought to my attention by Mingya Liu: subject-internal guang ‘alone’ may option-
ally be followed up by the additive particle ye ‘also’, which casts some doubt on
Hole 2004’s generalization that subject-internal guang necessitates jiu:
(44) Guang-shi
alone-be
xiang
think
ye
ye
ling
make
ren
people
haipa.
afraid
In the preceding subsection, guang was treated as overt LOW. The fact that guang
licenses additive ye suggests the conclusion that LOW is additive.
Another Mandarin data point to consider is the one in (45-b), which Liu 2017
presents to argue for an ‘anti-exhaustive’ presupposition. jiu as used in (45-b)
clashes with the default assumption that there can be only one winner.85
(45) a. Among John, Bill and Mary, who won?
b. #Yuehan
#John
jiu
jiu
ying
win
le.
ASP
85To be sure, Liu 2017 doesn’t assign this presupposition to jiu itself, but to the contrastive topic
(CT) he takes the subject John to be. In line with this view, jiu patterns with the Japanese
CT-marker wa when placed after a universal quantifier (Tomioka 2010):
(i) a. A asks: Among our friends, who can speak French? B replies:
b. #Dajia
#everyone
jiu
jiu
hui.
can
The universal leaves no individual that the sentence predicate could possibly be ascribed to. A
CT requires this possibility. Note that the infelicity is also predicted to arise under an additive
view of jiu (or LOW, for that matter).
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The tie between LOW and additivity is not as strong as the above examples suggest.
If we take the rain example in (42) and replace its stative predicate with a punctual
one such as come, the additive implication goes lost:86
(46) Heinrich
Henry
kam
came
schon
schon
um
at
5.
5
̸; Henry kept coming after 5
In tackling this inconsistent additivity, it seems instructive to consider Rullmann
1997’s discussion of an additive presupposition for even; cf. also Crnič 2011 for
more recent discussion. Examples like (47) motivate such an additive view:
(47) Mary even invited BillF.
; Mary invited someone other than Bill
But as Rullmann 1997 shows, the additive implication does not always go through.
In (48), B explicitly negates the only contextually salient alternative, Claire’s being
an assistant professor. But on an additive view of even, this is what Claire is
presupposed to be.
(48) A: Is Claire an assistantF professor?
B: No, she’s even an associateF professor.
̸; Claire is an assistant professor
Given cases like these, Rullmann 1997 proposes even’s additivity to be convention-
ally implicated rather than presupposed. This implicature is drawn on the basis
of two components, the assertion and a ‘scalar’ presupposition. The assertion is
simply even’s prejacent p. The presupposition is that p is less likely than most
(if not all) of its alternatives. The following passage, also quoted by Crnič 2011,
reconstructs the pragmatic reasoning thus triggered.
… [T]he speaker of [(47)] asserts that Mary invited Bill and presupposes that
this proposition is the least likely of all alternative propositions. Now on the
basis of this, the speaker [sic] will most certainly be inclined to conclude that
all the more likely propositions in the set of alternatives will also be true, on
the basis of the default assumption that if p is less likely than q and p is true,
then (in all likelihood) q is also true. … In this way what used to be called the
existential [additive, AW] presupposition can be derived from the combination
of the assertion and the scalar presupposition. Rullmann 1997: 59
86Thanks to Paula Menéndez-Benito for pressing this point.
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In the following passage, Krifka 2000 heads into a similar direction regarding schon
and noch ‘still’:
[A] pragmatic side-effect [of using a particle like schon, AW] is that the common
ground is often understood as containing the information that at least one of the
alternative propositions is true. … Again, this is not a presupposition, but an
implicature, due to general laws of conversation. Krifka 2000: 406
If we start thinking this way of LOW, we stay out of trouble when it comes to
examples involving punctual predicates like (46). In this case, the additive inference
is blocked by lexical aspect, the punctuality of come. Its emergence in (42) is due
to the interplay between presupposition and assertion. These two layers of meaning
have been derived in subsection 4.2, which is why informal paraphrases should
suffice at this point. More concretely, someone saying jetzt regnet es schon, lit.
‘now rains it already’,
• asserts rain to be falling at tnow and
• presupposes tnow to be the earliest time in the context.
Given the default assumption that states such as rain persist over time, it is easy
to conclude from presupposition and assertion that rain will keep falling at times
following tnow.
Similar considerations apply to the conditional wenn du lächelst, bin ich schon
glücklich, lit. ‘if you smile am I already happy’. Someone saying this
• asserts a smile from the hearer to make her happy and
• presupposes a smile from the hearer to be the smallest thing in the context.
If something as little as a smile from the hearer makes the speaker happy, one is led
to believe that anything greater than that will make the speaker at least as happy.
So the additive implication may not be presupposed, but when it kicks in, it becomes
harder to cancel than we would expect from an implicature. Consider the following
examples:87
(49) A is asking B for help with a problem. John is right next door. B says to A:
a. Yuehan
John
jiu
jiu
keyi
can
bang
help
ni,
you
?bieren
?others
dou
all
bu
not
keyi.
can
b. Schon
schon
John
John
kann
can
dir
you
helfen,
help
?sonst
?else
niemand.
nobody
‘John can help you, no one else can.’
87The scenario is inspired by one in Liu 2017.
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B’s replies strongly suggest that someone other than John can help A. This makes
it odd to follow up claiming John to be the only one who can help. The oddity
doesn’t arise if jiu and schon are dropped:
(50) a. Yuehan
John
keyi
can
bang
help
ni,
you
bieren
others
dou
all
bu
not
keyi.
can
b. John
John
kann
can
dir
you
helfen,
help
sonst
else
niemand.
nobody
Rullmann 1997 also notes even’s additivity to be hard to cancel once it arises. That
is the very reason why he takes it to be conventionally implicated rather than con-
versationally, as already mentioned above. So (49) doesn’t pose a serious problem
for a non-presuppositional treatment of jiu’s and schon’s additivity.
But let us now reconsider the Mandarin example from above that seemed like evi-
dence for an additive treatment of LOW: guang, taken to be overt LOW, may be
followed by the additive particle ye.
(51) Guang-shi
alone-be
xiang
think
ye
ye
ling
make
ren
people
haipa.
afraid
Let us loosely follow Hole 2004 in viewing ye as an agreement marker carrying an
additive feature [uADD]. If LOW is semantically non-additive, and merely triggers
an additive implicature, it takes wonder how guang, spelling out LOW, comes to
license ye’s [uADD]. One may consider a grammatical approach to the potential
implicature as a compromise:88 e.g., to ascribe the additive implication to an op-
erator ADD, named after (though semantically somewhat deviant from) one Crnič
2011 proposes to be spelled out by even. ADD attaches to an LF containing LOW
as long as it isn’t contradictory to do so. It would be contradictory in case of (46),
so it doesn’t happen there. This sure feels a bit like an ad hoc solution, but it
has its perks. For one thing, ADD would not only supply [uADD]’s interpretable
counterpart [iADD]. For another, it would also capture the fact that the additive
implication seen above is so robust when it does arise. Consider the following LF
for (51). As a propositional operator, ADD is attached on top of the structure con-
taining LOW. The simultaneous presence of individual LOW and ADD accounts
for why there is a choice between jiu and ye.89
88This obviously alludes to the wellknown strand of research taking a grammatical approach
especially to ONLY-, yet also to EVEN-like inferences, see e.g. Chierchia 2006, Fox 2007 or Fox
& Spector 2018.
89A data point kindly provided by Yenan Sun suggests there to be a preference for jiu over ye
following zhi-yao ‘only-need’, the ONLY-part of which was also taken to be overt LOW in
subsection 4.3.
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(52) ADD[iADD] [ [ LOW[iLOW] think ] {jiu[uLOW]/ye[uADD]} scary ]
For simplicity’s sake, let’s assume ADD to mean the following:90
(53) ADDC(p) is true iff p is true;
defined iff ∃q ∈ C [ q ̸= p ∧ q is true ].
In (54-a), we have a more elaborate LF of (51) and the alternatives for each operator.
Like in section 4.3.1, LOW comes in an ⟨e,e⟩-typed variant, and a iota-shifter turns
think into the thought. ADD’s alternatives in C′ vary along LOWIND’s alternatives
in C, whose informal paraphrase is also from subsection 4.3.1. Let once more the
thought of running into a grizzly bear be the object of discussion (and fear), and
its salient alternative be the actual encounter with that animal.
(54) a. ADDC′ [ [ LOWIND C [ ι think ] ] (ye) scary ]
b. C = {the thought, the encounter}
C′ = {scary′(the thought), scary′(the encounter)}
It is easy to see now that ADD presupposes the actual encounter to be scary.
(55) J (54-a) K is true iff scary′(the thought);
defined iff
a. ∀y ∈ C [ y ̸= the thought → the thought <C y ] via LOWIND
b. ∃q ∈ C′ [ q ̸= scary′(the thought) ∧ q is true ]. via ADD
To conclude, we now have a rough idea of how to tackle the additive implication jiu
and schon often come with, and why it doesn’t always arise. Very loosely following
Crnič 2011 on even, we ended up with a somewhat hybrid solution where an additive
implicature was put into the presupposition of an LF-operator ADD. Refinements
are left for the future.
(i) Zhi-yao
only-need
shuoming
clarify
zhe
this
yi-dian
a-little
ye
ye
?(jiu)
?(jiu)
gou
enough
le
ASP
‘It is already enough to clarify this just a little.’
What (i) might be taken to suggest is that the syntax reflects a hierarchy of implications, if you
will. Scalar lowness is the primary implication, given the direct link between zhiyao and LOW.
Additivity is secondary in that it arises on the basis of scalar lowness. So jiu, reflecting the
primary implication, is obligatory, while ye, reflecting the secondary one, is optional.
90See Crnič 2011 for a refined semantics of ADD.
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4.4.2 Inception
What is referred to as the inception implication here can be visualized as in (56).
(56) Es
it
regnet
rains
schon.
schon; inception implication: it didn’t rain before tnow
——☼——|tnow————
As Krifka 2000 reports, inception is encoded in Löbner 1989’s semantics of schon.
A prima facie argument in favor of such a view comes from the following data point.
(57) It’s been raining an hour ago, and it’s {#already / ✓still} raining now.
But this preference for still can safely be seen as a Maximize Presupposition (MP)
effect. The first sentence licenses the characteristic presupposition of still that it’s
been raining before the speech time (Beck 2020). still is licensed, so it must be
used, according to MP.
There are wellknown arguments against treating (what I call) inception as pre-
supposed. Take the following from Mittwoch 1993 for already. If inception were
semantically encoded, the sentence should be contradictory, which it isn’t.
(58) My husband is already American, for he was born in America.
Lai 1999 shows jiu to behave just the same in this respect:
(59) a. Amei
Amei
ba
8
dian
o’clock
jiu
jiu
zai
be
bangongshi
office
le.
ASP
‘Amei was at the office at 8.’
b. Shishishang,
actually
ta
she
shi
be
qi
7
dian
o’clock
lai
come
de.
PRT
‘In fact, it was 7 when she came.’
Do (58) or (59) pose a problem for the present account? The latter assigns to
the jiu-sentence in (59) the presupposition that 8 o’clock is the earliest time in
the context – understood with Krifka 2000 as the earliest time being considered.
Nothing prevents the speaker from following up bringing into play an even earlier
time (7 o’clock), thereby simply widening the hearer’s ‘horizon of attention’.91
Lai 1999 treats inception as a scalar implicature. Beck 2020 holds a similar view of
91The term is borrowed from Heim 1991, who considers a spontaneous widening of the Aufmerk-
samkeitshorizont shared by speaker and hearer to be the reason why the second definite NP in
(i) doesn’t contradict the first one.
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an analogous implication arising with German noch ‘still’, which I will henceforth
refer to as a cessation implication:
(60) Es
it
regnet
rains
noch.
still; cessation implication: it will stop raining soon
————|tnow——☼——
It seems worthwhile to spell out Lai 1999’s implicature view of inception for jiu
adopting Beck 2020’s formally explicit take on cessation for still. The following is
a sketch of what this might look like.
Let’s take the German rain-sentence in (56). It gets the simplified LF in (61-a).
Let the sentence be uttered at 5 o’clock, and let there be the prior expectation that
rain would set in at 6. Based on this, we get the set of alternative times in (61-b).
(61) a. [ LOWTEMP C tnow ] rain
b. C = {tnow, tnow+1h}
Following a grammaticalized view of scalar implicatures, Beck 2020 attaches an
exhaustivity operator EXH on top of an LF containing still. In our case, EXH
attaches to the LF in (61-a).
(62) EXHC′ [ [ LOWTEMP C tnow ] rain ]
EXH tends to be informally described as silent ONLY. On a simplified construal,
it takes a proposition p and conjoins it with the negation of p’s non-identical alter-
natives, see e.g. Chierchia 2006, Fox 2007.
(63) EXHC(p) is true iff p is true & ¬∃q ∈ C [ q ̸= p ∧ q is true ]
The question gaining importance now is what the alternatives for EXH in (62) look
like. It is clearly undesirable for the elements in C′ to vary along the alternative
(i) Der
the
Tisch
table
wackelt.
shakes
Wir
we
hätten
had
doch
doch
lieber
better
den
the
Eichentisch
oaktable
von
from
Tante
aunt
Lida
Lida
behalten
keep
sollen.
shall
‘The table is shaky. We should have kept Aunt Lida’s oak table after all.’
Such examples pose a slight challenge for the wellknown view that the definite article presupposes
uniqueness. In an attempt to rescue this view, Heim considers the relevant set of entities to
spontaneosly widen from physically given to mentally retrievable ones. Among the physically
given entities, there is just a single table. Among the mentally retrievable ones, there is more
than one table, but only one oak table by aunt Lida.
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times in C, because that would get us the unattested implication that it’s not going
to rain in an hour:
(64) a. C′ = {rain′(t) | t ∈ C}
b. J (62) K is true iff rain(tnow) ∧ ¬∃q ∈ C′ [ q ̸= rain(tnow) ∧ q is true ]
c. Given C′ in (64-a), we get rain(tnow) ∧ ¬∃t ∈ C [ t ̸= tnow ∧ rain(t) ]
d. Given C in (61-b), we get ¬rain(tnow+1h)  
What we want instead is that the propositions in C′ vary along contextually salient
times preceding the speech time:
(65) C′desired = {rain′(t) | t is contextually salient ∧ t ≤ tnow}
Assuming C′ to look as in (65), inception is derived for (62): tnow is a rain-time,
unlike any contextually salient time preceding it.
(66) J (62) K is true iff rain(tnow) ∧ ¬∃q ∈ {rain′(t) | t is salient ∧ t ≤ tnow} [ q
̸= rain′(tnow) ∧ q is true ]
≡ rain′(tnow) ∧ ¬∃t [ t is salient ∧ t < tnow ∧ rain(t) ] ✓
But how do we arrive at the desired alternatives in (65)? Beck 2020 derives a simi-
lar restriction on alternatives for EXH, but for the cessation implication she seeks
to capture, the goal is to have them vary only along later times. She derives the
restriction by assuming a still-sentence to make salient ‘pragmatically open’ alter-
natives. On her account, noch in (60) triggers the presupposition that it rained at
an immediately preceding time. What is left open is whether or not it rains at later
times.
It is unclear at this point how the alternatives in (65) can be thought of as prag-
matically open: Our semantics of LOW is non-additive, so LOW in (62) doesn’t
ascribe rain to times later than the speech time. So it almost seems as if later
times are as open as earlier ones (and quite naturally so, given the unpredictability
of the future). However, section 4.4.1 discussed additive implications triggered by
jiu/schon, and it was suggested that they are derived by an operator ADD inserted
at LF. So (65) can possibly be derived via ADD.
In any case, we now have a way of going about implied inception. Following Lai
1999’s implicature view and Beck 2020’s analysis of cessation arising with still, in-
ception was derived via EXH. The source of EXH’s alternatives remains an open
issue, however. If this approach proves to be successful though, it remains to be
extended to conditional uses of jiu/schon, where inception is attested as well.
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4.4.3 Interim conclusion
This subsection addressed two further implications not captured by LOW: additivity
and inception. Both were treated as a certain kind of implicature, and both were
derived via a silent operator at LF. For additivity, an operator ADD was considered,
for inception EXH was made use of, in close analogy to Beck 2020’s take on a
cessation implication still comes with. Both approaches taken, if viable at all, are
mere sketches to be made more concrete.
4.5 Previous work on jiu and schon
There is quite some previous work on jiu and schon, some of which the present
proposal is strongly inspired by. This subsection’s purpose is to review some of
these accounts just a little more closely. Let’s start with jiu.
4.5.1 jiu
Core aspects that the present account adopts from previous work are scalar lowness
as well as the treatment of jiu as an agreement particle. Scalar lowness views of jiu
are held by Lai 1999 and Liu 2017. The agreement view of jiu is put forth by Hole
2004, but Tsai 2017’s recent account is headed into a similar direction.92 This brief
subsection is centered around Hole 2004’s and Liu 2017’s accounts, each a major
source of inspiration for the present account.
Liu 2017’s study on jiu is based on an ambiguity that has been neglected here so
far. His key example is the minimal pair in (67), which shows jiu to be exclusive
when it precedes, and nonexclusive when it follows, a focused NP. What connects
both sentence variants is an implication of scalar lowness. It is easy to see that the
use in (67-b) is the one the present chapter has been concerned with.
(67) a. Jiu
jiu
YuehanF
JohnF
hui
can
shuo
speak
fayu.
French
‘Only John can speak French.’ exclusive
; John stands for a low number of people lowness
b. YuehanF
JohnF
jiu
jiu
hui
can
shuo
speak
fayu.
French
92Tsai 2017’s as well as Zhang & Ling 2017’s proposals establish a link between jiu and (minimal)
sufficiency, a link that the present account reinforces. Tsai 2017 takes the particle to (sometimes)
reflect an LF-operator ONLY HAVE TO, inspired by von Fintel & Iatridou 2007. Zhang & Ling
2017 think of jiu’s sufficiency as discourse-related in the sense of marking a sufficient answer.
I believe that Tsai 2017’s idea can be fruitfully elaborated upon putting to use the syntax-
semantics mapping Hole 2006 proposes jiu and related particles to mark, though this is left for
another occasion.
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‘John can speak French.’ nonexclusive
; John is easy to get hold of lowness
Disfavoring lexical ambiguity for obvious reasons, Liu 2017 proposes jiu to be one
and the same scalar ONLY in both cases: Its truth-conditions exclude logically
stronger alternatives. The difference in meaning is ascribed to different alternatives.
In the nonexlusive use, alternatives happen to be equally strong, so there is nothing
to be excluded.
The present account tacitly returns to Hole’s 2004 view that the ambiguity in (67) is
lexical, i.e., that exclusive and nonexclusive jiu exist independently. One reason to
do so is the unified treatment of nonexclusive jiu and schon pursued here. Another
are Hole 2004’s agreement data, which can be taken to motivate a treatment of
nonexclusive jiu as semantically vacuous.
Liu’s account is too intricate to be done justice here, and essentially relies on plural
semantic notions in construing the different kinds of alternatives. I wish to point out
though that even if an ambiguity is assumed, Liu’s account draws great appeal from
implicitly telling a story how this ambiguity might have come about diachronically.
Hole 2004’s earlier proposal is rather different from Liu’s in that it takes jiu to reflect
a ban on universal quantification over focus alternatives, henceforth referred to as
the ¬∀-constraint. More specifically, a jiu-sentence is taken to presuppose there to
be at least one wrong alternative. A core example he provides is the following.
(68) a. Dongya
East-Asia
ren
people
dangzhong,
among
…
‘Among East Asian people, …’
b. #RibenF
#JapaneseF
ren
person
jiu
jiu
zhang-zhe
grow-ASP
hei
black
toufa.
hair
‘…, the Japanese have black hair.’
Hole argues (68-a) to restrict the domain of quantification to East Asian people. jiu
is infelicitous in (68-b) since according to a stereotypical worldview, all East Asians
are black-haired.
Such a semantics aligns nicely with the fact that jiu is often translated as then.93
93A translation of jiu as ‘then’ also seems adequate in the following example from Hole 2004.
(i) a. Old Wang got up at 6, took the bus at 6:30, and …
b. …
…
ta
he
qi
seven
dian
o’clock
jiu
jiu
zai
at
bangongshi
office
le.
ASP
As Daniel Hole (pc) has pointed out to me, such examples seem devoid of scalarity. I leave it
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Iatridou 1993 proposes conditional then (if p, then q) to presuppose just what
Hole says jiu does: there has to be some alternative to the antecedent p that does
not verify the consequent q. However, there are clear counter examples to Hole’s
analysis.
Varying on Hole’s (68) just a bit, jiu becomes felicitous even though the new context
now explicitly violates the ¬∀-constraint:94
(69) a. Zai
at
dongya
East-Asia
li,
in
suoyoude
every
ren
person
dou
dou
zhang-zhe
grow-ASP
hei
black
toufa.
hair
‘In East Asia, everyone is blackhaired.’
b. RibenF
JapaneseF
ren
person
jiu
jiu
zhang-zhe
grow-ASP
hei
black
toufa.
hair
This raises the suspicion that the infelicity seen in (68-b) is not rooted in the
hypothesized ¬∀-constraint, but rather in the way the context is set up. It seems
that (68-b) comes across as uttered out of the blue, and that the frame-setting
adverbial in (68-a) doesn’t suffice to set up a context.
In her review of Hole 2004, Tham 2005 makes a strikingly similar case against
Hole’s presupposition. (70-b) is felicitous in its context, which it shouldn’t be if jiu
required there to be some place that cannot be played at.
(70) a. We can play anywhere.
b. Zai
at
zherF
hereF
women
we
jiu
jiu
neng
can
wanr.
play
‘We can play here.’
It might be on grounds like these that Liu 2017 considers the ¬∀-constraint to be an
implicature rather than a presupposition. As briefly mentioned in section 4.4.1, Liu
even takes a sentence like (70-b) to come with the ‘anti-exhaustive’ presupposition
that another playground’s existence may not be ruled out to begin with.
4.5.2 schon
The following discussion will be largely based on Krifka 2000’s idea that schon ranks
a focus highest on a scale, which is the exact opposite to what the present account
assumes. Under Krifka’s view, schon is implicitly likened to even, which tends to
be seen as evaluating its prejacent as least likely, hence as most noteworthy.
The subsection can be broken down into two parts. First, Lai 1999’s and von
Stechow 2006’s defense of scalar lowness will be sketched. Second, it will be explored
open whether the present account can accommodate (i).
94It should be noted that one out of four informants disliked jiu in (69-b) as well.
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to which degree schon and even are similar. Some jiu-data will be considered along
the way. Other highly relevant accounts of schon (or already, for that matter) will
have to be left aside, including Löbner 1989 (whose account Krifka 2000 seeks to
refine) and Ippolito 2007.
Krifka 2000’s highness analysis is motivated by examples like the following.95 Lydia
is conveyed to have grown fast, which is a kind of highness rather than lowness. In
other words, (71) poses a challenge for the present account.
(71) Lydia
Lydia
ist
is
schon
schon
dreiF
3F
Monate
months
alt.
old; Lydia has grown fast
There are no highness accounts of jiu I am aware of. But Lai 1999 presents a
sentence where jiu seems to have a similar effect to schon in (71): Three apples are
implied to be a lot, i.e., to rank high rather than low.
(72) (Cai
(cai
wu
5
fenzhong)
minutes)
Lisi
Lisi
jiu
jiu
chi
eat
san-ge
3-CL
pingguo
apple
le
ASP; 3 apples are a lot
On the other hand, it seems that ‘high’ schon as it figures in (73-a) doesn’t typically
translate as jiu, but as dou in Mandarin (73-b)96 dou sometimes translates as ‘even’,
and is in fact treated as such by Liu 2017, though see Chen 2019 for a recent
objection. even is generally seen as conveying scalar highness: the view that it
evaluates its prejacent p as least likely easily translates into p’s being most surprising
or simply the strongest alternative.97
(73) a. Es
it
ist
is
ja
PRT
schon
schon
achtF!
8F
b. {Dou
{dou
/
/
#
#
jiu}
jiu}
baF
8F
dian
o’clock
le,
ASP
kuaidian
quickly
qichuang!
get-up
c. ; 8 o’clock is late
95(71) is a type 2 use in the sense of Löbner 1989. According to Krifka (2000), these are cases
where schon associates with a sentence predicate in focus.
96Variation on an example taken from resources.allsetlearning.com, 2019/07/14; thanks to Jun
Chen (pc) for informing me about jiu’s infelicity in such sentences.
97An observation owing to Zimmermann 2018, who explicitly likens schon to even as conceived of
by Beaver & Clark 2008:
Scalar particles (even) resemble schon in presupposing that the asserted alternative is the
strongest among the contextually salient focus alternatives.
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At least some highness examples can be reasonably brought under a lowness anal-
ysis. von Stechow 2006 does it for schon, following discussions with Doris Penka;
Lai 1999 does it for jiu. The essence of both attempts is the following: jiu/schon
evaluate the speech time as early; they don’t evaluate the overt focus. This implicit
evaluation enables the speaker to express a discrepancy between the subjective and
the objective time: The state of affairs in question was expected to hold at a later
time.
Let’s apply this line of thought to Krifka 2000’s example in (71). Lydia was ex-
pected to be younger than she is asserted to be, which means she was expected to
be three months old at a time later than the speech time. schon doesn’t evaluate
Lydia’s age as high or her growth as fast, it just evaluates the speech time as early.
Taking schon to spell out temporal LOW, the resulting analysis can be sketched as
follows.98
(74) [ LOWTEMP C tnow ] λt. Lydia is 3 months old at t
; tnow is the earliest C-time
; Lydia has grown fast, given how early it is
Britta Stolterfoht (pc) finds elegance in this approach, but points out noteworthy
exceptions: The approach overgenerates in that it wrongly ascribes a temporal
flavor to all cases in which schon coincides with scalar highness. In the following
example she provides, the temporal flavor no longer persists:
(75) Lisi
Lisi
bekommt
gets
keinen
no
Apfel
apple
mehr,
more
sie
she
hat
has
ja
ja
schon
schon
3
3
gegessen.
eaten
In this sentence, schon relates to the sheer number of apples eaten rather than
to the speed with which they were eaten. In other words, schon doesn’t seem to
convey that the speech time is an early time for Lisi to have eaten three apples; the
sentence may well be uttered in a situation in which it wasn’t clear from the start
that she would ever eat as many as three. In other words, schon seems to be doing
here what Krifka 2000 says it does, evaluate the overt focus on the number as high,
and the lowness-analysis only captures some of the highness-cases.99
Given (75), is it safer to treat schon as presupposing highness rather than lowness
98It takes wonder whether or not this suffices to capture the attested highness effect: LOW doesn’t
evaluate the focus on Lydia’s age after all. A possible way of capturing highness more directly
is to posit silent EVEN at LF, whose existence is by no means an unprecedented assumption to
make (Chierchia 2006).
99It seems that the lowness-analysis only works as long as the sentence predicate naturally changes
over time. Lydia would have been 3 months old sooner or later. But Lisi wouldn’t have eaten
three apples sooner or later.
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after all? Further support for such a view comes from a type of example in Grosz
2012:
(76) {Selbst
{even
/
/
schon}
schon}
wenn
if
nur
only
zwei
two
Leute
people
einsteigen,
get-in
wird
will
das
the
Boot
boat
sinken.
sink
≈ ‘It only takes two people for the boat to sink’
schon and selbst ‘even’ are perfectly interchangeable in (76). even is generally
conceived of as conveying highness, cf. footnote 97. It is thus understandable why
Grosz 2012 explicitly adopts Guerzoni & Lim 2007’s analysis of even for schon.
However, if we play with (76) just a bit, selbst and schon fall apart, casting doubt
on an even-treatment of schon. Once we have a boat that can be entered by a
fairly high number of people without sinking, only selbst works, and schon becomes
odd.100
(77) {Selbst
{even
/
/
#
#
schon}
schon}
wenn
if
zehn
ten
Leute
people
einsteigen,
get-in
wird
will
das
the
Boot
boat
nicht
nicht
sinken.
sink
Under the standard view of even, selbst is correctly predicted to be fine in both
(76) and (77): the prejacent p, presupposed to be most surprising, is the entire
conditional. What is surprising in (76) is how few people it takes for the boat to
sink. What is surprising in (77) is how many people may enter the boat without
causing it to sink.
But how can we explain the oddity of schon in (77)? Given the analysis put forth in
section 4.2.2, a conditionally flavored variant of LOW combines with the antecedent
at LF, presupposing it to be the scalarly lowest (weakest) one in the context.
(78) a. [ LOWCOND C [ 10 ppl enter ] ] λp. if p, the boat won’t sink
b. J (78-a) K is defined iff ∀q ∈ C [ q ̸= (10 enter) → (10 enter) <C q ]
One may see this PSP as flawed in the given context, where weaker alternatives are
100Something similar happens when the particles occur subject-internally:
(i) a. This is such a heavy table.
b. {Selbst
{even
/
/
#
#
schon}
schon}
hundert
hundred
Leute
people
vermögen
are-able
ihn
him
nicht
not
zu
to
stemmen.
lift
However, Doris Penka (pc) has pointed me to a potential confounding factor: The sentence
predicate’s downward scalarity in the sense of Beck Rullmann (1999) plays a role here, too.
The schon-variant of (i-b) remains odd even if the numeral is replaced by a low number.
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salient. C arguably looks as follows:
(79) C = {2 enter, 3 enter, ..., 10 enter}
But following Krifka 2000, it was also decided early on in this chapter that the low-
ness presupposition doesn’t disallow for lower alternatives, it just acts as a signal to
ignore them. I therefore suppose something else to be going on in (77). Intuitively,
schon is odd in (77) because it strongly suggests a number of people greater than
ten to make the boat ride even safer. But this is just not how it works in real life. In
other words, the blame can be put on the additive implication discussed in section
4.4.1.
To sum up, we have seen in this subsection that some, but not all of the data un-
derlying Krifka 2000’s view of schon as presupposing highness can be reduced to
a lowness analysis in the way suggested by Lai 1999 and von Stechow 2006. We
have also seen that there is no easy way to reduce schon to even. The only serious
problem a lowness view seems to face at this point are the highness cases that seem
irreducible to actual lowness.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, Mandarin jiu and German schon were semantically reduced to an
LF-operator LOW taking a single argument and ranking it lowest on a scale. LOW
was shown to capture the temporal and conditional uses of jiu and schon. At the
beginning, both particles were treated as spelling out LOW. This was later refined
so as to treat jiu as being in mere agreement with LOW, based on data presented
by Hole 2004. This refinement didn’t affect the endeavor of a unified semantics. In
the further course of the chapter, two other implications the particles give rise to
were addressed, additivity and inception, both of which leave ample room for future
investigation.
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5 Conclusion
This thesis has dealt with seemingly disparate phenomena surrounding conditionals:
The first two chapters were about counterfactual (CF) conditionals, with a focus
on CF-wishing in chapter 2. CF-wishes aren’t explicit conditionals, but I followed
von Fintel & Iatridou 2017 in treating them as implicit ones. Chapter 3 was about
German present CFs and the contribution of the conjunctive. Chapter 4, finally,
was about the way that the lowness-conveying particles jiu and schon conspire
with conditionals to convey minimal sufficiency (MS). All three chapters are about
conditionals, but what else do they have in common? These concluding remarks
point to some more connections, as well as to future work to be conducted on their
basis.
Scalar lowness in CF-wishes
At first sight, there is no obvious connection between the CF-wishes from chapter
1 and the MS-conditionals from chapter 3. Yet they may not be as far apart as it
seems: Grosz 2012 investigates optatives (roughly, bouletic exclamations) like (1),
a CF-wish in the shape of a bare antecedent containing only.
(1) a. Wenn
if
es
it
nur
only
aufhören
stop
würde
would
zu
to
regnen!
rain
b. If only the rain would stop!
; preference for the rain to end, but no end in sight
It is intuitively clear that ONLY conveys scalar lowness in (1). Grosz 2012 argues
optative ONLY to be the exact same ONLY that appears in the antecedent of an
MS-conditional like (2), repeated from above. MS-ONLY endows a CF-wish with a
certain humbleness: the antecedent “is ‘not much to ask’” (Grosz 2012: 216).
(2) Schon
already
wenn
if
nur
only
zwei
two
Leute
people
einsteigen,
get-in
wird
will
das
the
Boot
boat
sinken.
sink
≈ ‘It only takes two people for the boat to sink’
This liaison of scalar lowness in CF-wishing exists in Mandarin as well: one means
of expressing a CF-wish in Mandarin is a kind of conditional with the antecedent
denoting the desideratum and the consequent being essentially composed of an
evaluative predicate and jiu, a particle that chapter 4 argued to convey scalar
lowness in general, and MS in its conditional use.
95
(3) Yu
rain
ting
stop
xia
fall
jiu
jiu
hao
good
le!
ASP; preference for the rain to end, but no end in sight
jiu may act as an analogon to Grosz 2012’s optative ONLY here. Under the anal-
ysis for conditional jiu proposed in section 4.2.2, lowness of the rainfall-denoting
antecedent follows straightforwardly. An overall compositional analysis taking care
of the consequent reduced to the evaluative predicate hao ‘good’ may well draw
inspiration from similar constructions in Japanese (Kaufmann 2017) and German
(Sode 2018).
An exciting twist comes from the fact that jiu is not the only particle to appear in
Mandarin optative conditionals. The scalar exclusive cai ‘only’ can also be used to
the same effect, as shown again by Hole 2004:
(4) Ni
you
gen
with
wo
me
shangliang
discuss
cai
cai
hao.
good
‘I wish you had discussed it with me.’
Lai 1999 offers a contrastive account of cai and jiu based on minimal pairs like in
(5).101
(5) a. Xianzai
now
{jiu
{jiu
/
/
cai}
cai}
xia
fall
yu
rain
(le).
(ASP); tnow is an {early / late} time for rainfall
b. Ni
you
xiao,
smile
wo
I
{jiu
{jiu
/
/
cai}
cai}
kaixin.
happy; it takes {as little / as much} as your smile for me to be happy
On its temporal use (5-a), cai conveys lateness rather than earliness; on its condi-
tional use (5-b), it conveys the antecedent to be hard rather than easy to fulfill.
Put more generally, cai conveys highness rather than lowness on a scale.102
This raises the question if a CF-wish with cai is any different in meaning from one
with jiu. If not even subtle differences can be detected, it takes wonder why, given
the opposed implications the particles give rise to in (5).
101Sentence-final le goes well together with jiu, but not with cai.
102There are noteworthy exceptions to this generalization (Hole 2017, Sun 2019). Another aspect
in which cai and jiu are opposed in (5) is the feature [±exclusive], with cai being +. In fact,
the cai-variant of (5-a) translates as ‘it’s raining only now’, the cai-variant of (5-b) as ‘only
if you smile am I happy’. In the conditional case, [±exclusive] translates into [±necessary],
an observation at least partly owing to Lai 1999, who links conditional jiu with sufficiency,
conditional cai with necessity.
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Competition and agreement
Two principles that dominated throughout this thesis are presuppositional compe-
tition and syntactic agreement.
Presuppositional competition was evoked in order to account for the contrasts in
(6). The one in (6-a) was central to chapter 2, the one in (6-b) to chapter 3.
(6) a. wünschen ‘wish’ vs. sich freuen ‘be glad’
b. conjunctive vs. indicative
Chapter 2 argues wünschen to be presuppositionally weaker than freuen. The em-
pirical results discussed in chapter 3 suggest the German Konjunktiv 2 to be pre-
suppositionally weaker than the indicative.
Chapters 1 and 3 evoked agreement to account for data like those in (7). In (7-a),
CF-marking on the desire verb wünschen does not behave as expected in that it
leaves the desire untouched (von Fintel & Iatridou 2008, 2017). (7-b) follows a
pattern identified by Hole 2004 where the particle jiu doesn’t seem to add anything
to the meaning of the sentence.
(7) a. Ich
I
wünsch-te,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene
shine-CF
].
]
̸; absent desire for ϕ
b. Guang-shi
alone-be
xiang
think
*(jiu)
*(jiu)
ling
make
ren
people
haipa.
afraid
In both cases, agreement offered a neat explanation, and allowed us to treat both
Mandarin jiu and CF-marking on wünschen as vacuous.
Competition and agreement as understood above might have more in common than
meets the eye. Both are economical in that they put as little into a given item’s
lexical semantics as possible. In the case of competition, part of the item’s mean-
ing is ascribed to pragmatic strengthening. In the case of agreement, part of the
item’s meaning is ascribed to something else in the structure; a simple 1:1-mapping
between structure and meaning won’t do.
A data point discussed in chapter 2 supports the view that the two mechanisms
are similar in nature: the finite complement ϕ under CF-marked wünschen is itself
obligatorily CF-marked.
(8) Ich
I
wünsch-te,
wish-CF
[ϕ
[ϕ
die
the
Sonne
sun
schiene
shine-CF
/
/
*scheint
*shine-IND
].
]
This data point may be addressed on either of the above approaches, which may
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come as a lesser surprise in light of their similarity. On a multiple agreement
approach to CF-wishes, CF-marking on ϕ is mere agreement morphology, and we
have a clear analogy to the wellknown phenomenon known as Sequence of Tense.
On a competition-based view, ϕ is CF-marked because disbelief in ϕ has been pre-
established earlier in the clause, via CF-marking on wünschen. I argued the latter
to be the preferable take on (8), taking it to be an unusual case in which Maximize
Presupposition (MP) applies sentence-internally.
If this is an idea not to be rejected in the first place, one has to look for analogous
cases to (8) and try to define where to draw the line between the two mechanisms.
Contrasting presuppositional particles
Any MP-account is contrastive in nature in that one lexical item is compared to
another. In this sense, chapters 2 and 3 are contrastive in nature. In dealing
with Mandarin jiu and German schon, chapter 4 only occasionally brought other
presuppositional particles into play. Contrastive analyses of either jiu or schon
to other particles are not rare to find,103 and this is a line of research well worth
continuing, given its obvious potential to reveal a whole system of such function
words both within and between languages.
In the above discussion, the contrast between jiu and cai was evoked. Another
wellknown contrast is the one between already and still, taking these particles to
have roughly the same meaning as their counterparts hai in Mandarin and noch
in German. In (9), hai and noch each imply rain to have been falling at a time
immediately preceding the speech time, as visualized in the timeline. Dotted lines
indicate future times that are left open as to whether it’s raining at them or not.
(9) a. Hai
still
zai
be
xia
fall
yu.
rain
b. Es
it
regnet
rains
noch.
still; it was raining at a time immediately preceding tnow
————|tnow- - - - - -
On Beck 2020’s account of still, the implication seen in (9) comes from a presuppo-
sition triggered by a suitably typed variant of still, which along with an argument
time t and a predicate P picks up an anaphoric time t* and presupposes it to be a
P-time immediately preceding t. In (10), this is put as t’s immediate succession to
103For Mandarin, cf. e.g. Lai 1999 on cai and jiu, Hole 2004 on cai, jiu, dou and ye, Liu 2017 on
jiu and dou; for German, Löbner 1989 on schon, erst and noch, Krifka 2000 on schon and noch.
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t* (t ≻ t*), but nothing crucial hinges on this.104
(10) still[Beck 2020](t*)(t)(Pi,t) is true iff P(t); defined iff t ≻ t* ∧ P(t*)
The following is a strongly simplified version of how Beck 2020’s analysis applies to
(9), ignoring imperfective aspect as above.
(11) a. [ still[Beck 2020] t* tnow ] rain
b. J (11-a) K is true iff rain′(tnow); defined iff tnow ≻ t* ∧ rain′(t*)
Now, Ippolito 2007 argues that “already is the mirror image of still”, an idea also
contemplated in class notes by Sigrid Beck (Beck 2019′): The former is about later,
the latter about earlier times. This suggests a beautifully simple way of deriving
the semantics of still and already from one another.
In this spirit, Beck 2019′ offers an analysis of already based on still[Beck 2020]. The
sole point of deviation is that the temporal order is reversed: What is now salient
is an immediately following time t*, making t immediately precede, rather than
follow, t* (t ≺ t*)’, see (12-a).105 Compare this to temporally flavored LOW from
section 4.2.1, repeated in (12-b).
(12) a. already[Beck 2019′](t*)(t)(Pi,t) is true iff P(t); defined iff t ≺ t* ∧ P(t*)
b. LOWTEMP C(t) = t; defined iff ∀t′ ∈ C [ t′ ̸= t → t <C t′ ]
Unlike already[Beck 2019′], LOWTEMP is non-additive, and just requires t to precede
contextually salient times <, not to immediately precede them ≺. Which one is the
better take on a rain-sentence like (13)?
(13) It’s already raining.
Let’s see already[Beck 2019′] in action. (13) is predicted to presuppose rain to be
falling at a time immediately following the speech time. The dotted lines in the
timeline again indicate ‘open’ times; these lie in the past now.
(14) J [ already[Beck 2019′] t* tnow ] rain K is defined iff tnow ≺ t* ∧ rain′(t*)
- - - - - -|tnow————
This is intuitively correct: Uttered in a situation in which a later rain time t′ was
104Beck 2020’s rendition is ‘t* ≺ t’ (t* immediately precedes t). The alternative was only chosen
to be consistent with the formalizations in chapter 4.
105Beck 2019′ models this requirement as ‘t* ≻ t’ (t* immediately follows t), see footnote 104.
Ippolito 2007’s aspectual already is only minimally different from already[Beck 2019′] in that it
has < instead of ≺.
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expected, (13) suggests rain to also be falling at t′. By contrast, on the analysis in
terms of LOWTEMP, the speech time is simply presupposed to be early (15).
(15) J [ LOWTEMP C tnow ] rain K is defined iff ∀t′ ∈ C [ t′ ̸= tnow → tnow <C t′ ]
Neither of the two analyses in (14) and (15) seems to be getting (13) wrong, but the
latter has the clear advantage of being more parallel to the semantics of still[Beck 2020].
Both share the view that the presupposition of already is about times following
tnow, more generally: the argument time t. already[Beck 2019′] crucially differs from
LOWTEMP in being additive and in evoking immediate rather than ‘simple’ prece-
dence (≺ vs. <). More data may help in deciding which approach is to be pre-
ferred.106
106Section 4.4.1 argued to keep already and its kin non-additive, but also evoked an additive
operator ADD, bringing the two approaches closer together. However, the additive implication
of already may vary in strength, which would pose a challenge for both Beck 2019′’s and the
present account. More concretely, temporal orientation seems to matter. Beck 2019′ notes the
following to be odd.
(i) ?It was already raining at 9am, and it stopped immediately.
Now consider a present-tensed counterpart to (i), which doesn’t sound as odd.
(i′) It’s already raining, but it’ll stop in just a sec.
If there is a genuine contrast between the two variants, then this is expected assuming already
to be LOWTEMP, which evokes future times in (i′). The future is unpredictable, and may hence
weaken certain inferences (Ashwini Deo, pc). This makes it hard to see rain in the immediate
future as presupposed in the first sentence in (i′).
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A Experimental items (chapter 3)
An item is composed as follows:
(n) Contexts: belief-state of the speaker regarding the target-antecedent p
a. [UC]: uncertainty about p
b. [DB]: disbelief in p
c. [BL]: belief in p
Targets: conditionals varied by mood on the antecedent p
a. [IND]: p is in the indicative
b. [K2]: p is in the Konjunktiv 2
(1) Contexts
Diego hat Besuch von seinen Eltern. Die Fahrt hat mehrere Stunden gedauert
und sein Vater ist müde. Diego macht sich Sorgen, ob sein Vater die Rück-
fahrt durchhalten kann.
a. [UC] Kurz vor dem Abschied gehen Diego und seine Mutter spazieren.
Der Vater bleibt in Diegos Wohnung. Während des Spaziergangs sagt
Diego zu seiner Mutter:
b. [DB] Während Diego und seine Mutter kurz vor dem Abschied im
Wohnzimmer Karten spielen, sieht sein Vater im Nebenzimmer Fußball.
Als der Vater sich lauthals über ein Foul beschwert, sagt Diego zu seiner
Mutter:
c. [BL] Während Diego und seine Mutter kurz vor dem Abschied imWohnz-
immer Karten spielen, hören die beiden den Vater aus dem Nebenzim-
mer schnarchen. Diego sagt zu seiner Mutter:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Vater gerade schläft, fährt er auf der Rückfahrt konzentri-
ert.
b. [K2] Wenn Vater gerade schlafen würde, würde er auf der Rückfahrt
konzentriert fahren.
(2) Contexts
Juliane und David verbringen die Woche bei Julianes Schwester Sarah. Sarah
muss tagsüber arbeiten, hat jedoch angekündigt, heute Abend für alle zu
kochen. Juliane und David verbringen den frühen Abend in der Stadt.
a. [UC] Auf dem Rückweg fragen sie sich, ob Sarah schon mit der Zubere-
itung des Abendessens begonnen habe.
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b. [DB] Auf dem Rückweg fragen sie sich, ob Sarah schon mit der Zubere-
itung des Abendessens begonnen habe. Da werden sie von Sarah per
Handy benachrichtigt, dass diese leider so schnell nicht von der Arbeit
wegkomme.
c. [BL] Da werden sie von Sarah per Handy benachrichtigt, dass die Zu-
bereitung des Abendessens schon im vollen Gange sei.
Juliane sagt zu David:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Sarah gerade kocht, erwartet uns in der Wohnung ein Essen.
b. [K2] Wenn Sarah gerade kochen würde, würde uns in der Wohnung ein
Essen erwarten.
(3) Contexts
In der WG von Peter, Susi und Oskar findet heute ein Karaoke-Abend statt.
a. [UC] Während Oskar die Wohnung putzt, kaufen Peter und Susi Snacks
und Getränke ein. Peter ist sich nicht sicher, ob Oskar seine Stimme bis
heute Abend ausreichend schont, da er beim Aufräumen gerne Schlager
schmettert. Auf dem Heimweg sagt Peter zu Susi:
b. [DB] Es ist Nachmittag, und die drei sind dabei, die Wohnung aufzuräu-
men. Beim Frühstück hat Oskar noch angekündigt, sich am Nachmittag
durch lautes Singen auf den Abend einzustimmen. Doch im weiteren
Verlauf des Vormittags hat er so viel reden müssen, dass er nun ganz
heiser ist und schweigend Tee trinkt. Peter sagt zu Susi:
c. [BL] Es ist Nachmittag, und die drei sind dabei, die Wohnung aufzuräu-
men. Oskar macht sich einen Spaß daraus, zur Einstimmung auf den
Abend lauthals Schlager zu schmettern. In Sorge um Oskars Stimmbän-
der sagt Peter zu Susi:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Oskar gerade singt, hat er nachher keine Stimme.
b. [K2] Wenn Oskar gerade singen würde, hätte er nachher keine Stimme.
(4) Contexts
Lea, Nedim und Georg sind Lehrer an der gleichen Schule, und essen oft
gemeinsam zu Mittag. Nedim und Lea ist aufgefallen, dass Georg nach
dem Unterricht zu müde für ein Gespräch ist. Heute wollen die drei wieder
gemeinsam zu Mittag essen.
a. [UC] Gegen Mittag fragen sich Lea und Nedim, wie aktiv sich Georg
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dieses Mal am Gespräch beteiligen wird.
b. [DB] Gegen Mittag fragen sich Lea und Nedim, wie aktiv sich Georg
dieses Mal am Gespräch beteiligen wird. Als sie das Lehrerzimmer
betreten, sehen sie Georg dort in Ruhe Kaffee trinken.
(i) [BL] Gegen Mittag gehen Lea und Nedim ein paar Schritte durch
das Schulhaus. Durch die offene Türe zu einem Klassenzimmer
bekommen sie mit, wie Georg seinen Schülern etwas an der Tafel
erklärt.
Lea sagt zu Nedim:
Targets
(i) [IND] Wenn Georg gerade unterrichtet, ist er beim Essen wieder
so schweigsam.
(ii) [K2] Wenn Georg gerade unterrichten würde, wäre er beim Essen
wieder so schweigsam.
(5) Contexts
Mona ist bei Hannah und Lisa zu Besuch. Als es dunkel wird, möchte sie
mit dem Bus zurück fahren. Der nächste Bus kommt in zwei Minuten, und
die nächste Haltestelle ist ein paar Straßen entfernt. Mona verabschiedet
sich, und verlässt das Haus.
a. [UC] Angesichts der knappen Zeit fragen sich Hannah und Lisa, ob
Mona sich genügend beeilt.
b. [DB] Angesichts der knappen Zeit fragen sich Hannah und Lisa, ob
Mona sich genügend beeilt. Da sehen sie durch das Fenster, dass Mona
gemütlich die Straße entlang schlendert.
c. [BL] Vom Fenster aus sehen Hannah und Lisa, dass Mona die Straße
entlang stürmt.
Hannah sagt zu Lisa:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Mona gerade rennt, erwischt sie noch den Bus.
b. [K2] Wenn Mona gerade rennen würde, würde sie noch den Bus erwis-
chen.
(6) Contexts
Motoki und sein Mann Michael bringen Motokis Mutter zum Flughafen. Auf
der Hinfahrt gab es lange Stau. Da die beiden Männer zur Arbeit müssen,
bleibt keine Zeit mehr, Motokis Mutter zum Terminal zu begleiten.
a. [UC] Erst nach der Verabschiedung merken Motoki und Michael, wie
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knapp die Zeit wirklich ist. Michael äußert Zweifel, dass es noch reicht.
Motoki entgegnet:
b. [DB] Trotz der knappen Zeit ist die Mutter tief entspannt. Als sie aus
dem Auto gestiegen ist, flaniert sie gemächlich in Richtung des Eingangs
zum Flughafen. Motoki sagt zu Michael:
c. [BL] Sie muss sich nun beeilen, doch zum Glück ist sie trotz ihres hohen
Alters noch immer gut zu Fuß. Nach einer schnellen Umarmung springt
sie aus dem Auto und stürmt davon. Motoki sagt zu Michael:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Mutter gerade rennt, schafft sie es noch.
b. [K2] Wenn Mutter gerade rennen würde, würde sie es noch schaffen.
(7) Contexts
Die Mitbewohner Hasan, Aylin und Serkan nehmen am Fastenmonat Ra-
madan teil. Heute ist es Serkans Aufgabe, für das abendliche Fastenbrechen
einzukaufen.
a. [UC] Es sind nicht mehr genug Lebensmittel da, und die Geschäfte
schließen bald. Aylin und Hasan halten sich in einem Park auf. Hasan
will Serkan anrufen, um ihn an seine heutige Pflicht zu erinnern.
[UC′] Am frühen Abend halten sich Aylin und Hasan in einem Park auf.
Sie fragen sich, ob Serkan die Uhr im Blick behält, denn die Geschäfte
schließen bald.107
b. [DB] Am frühen Abend halten sich Aylin und Hasan in einem Park auf.
Sie fragen sich, ob Serkan die Uhr im Blick behält, denn die Geschäfte
schließen bald. Da sehen sie Serkan auf einer Bank liegen.
c. [BL] Am frühen Abend gehen Aylin und Hasan spazieren. Sie fragen
sich, ob Serkan die Uhr im Blick behält, denn die Geschäfte schließen
bald. Als sie kurz darauf an einem Supermarkt vorbei kommen, sehen
sie von außen, wie Serkan einen Wagen voller Lebensmittel vor sich
herschiebt.
Aylin sagt zu Hasan:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Serkan gerade einkauft, gibt es später genug zu essen.
b. [K2] Wenn Serkan gerade einkaufen würde, würde es später genug zu
essen geben.
107For the given item, the UC-context unintentionally varied as shown here. However, these two
variants appear similar enough not to give rise to any serious concerns regarding parallelism.
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(8) Contexts
a. [UC] Daniel, Johannes und Ruben verbringen den Abend in einer Bahn-
hofsunterführung. Daniel hat wie vereinbart Sprühfarbe mitgebracht
–für den Fall, dass einer von ihnen Lust bekommt, sich künstlerisch
zu betätigen. Als Daniel und Ruben Bier kaufen gehen, lassen sie Jo-
hannes mit der Farbe zurück. Auf dem Weg erblicken die beiden einen
Wachmann, der in Richtung der Unterführung schreitet.
b. [DB] Daniel, Johannes und Ruben verbringen den Abend in einer Bahn-
hofsunterführung. Daniel hat wie vereinbart einige Dosen Sprühfarbe
mitgebracht. Als Daniel und Ruben Bier kaufen gehen, nehmen sie vor-
sichtshalber die Dosen mit: Johannes neigt zu unerwünschten Einzel-
Aktionen. Auf dem Weg erblicken die beiden einen Wachmann, der in
Richtung der Unterführung schreitet.
c. [BL] Daniel, Johannes und Ruben verbringen den Abend in einer Bahn-
hofsunterführung, um deren Wand mit Graffiti zu besprühen. Ruben
hat den Anfang gemacht. Als Daniel und Ruben Bier kaufen gehen,
führt Johannes das von Ruben begonnene Kunstwerk fort. Auf dem
Weg erblicken Daniel und Ruben einen Wachmann, der in Richtung der
Unterführung schreitet.
Daniel sagt zu Ruben:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Johannes gerade sprüht, bekommt er Ärger mit dem Wach-
mann.
b. [K2] Wenn Johannes gerade sprühen würde, würde er Ärger mit dem
Wachmann bekommen.
(9) Contexts
Die Mitbewohner Greta, Nils und Sava möchten heute Abend zusammen
ins Theater. Nils, der Krankenpfleger ist, musste die letzten Tage nachts
arbeiten.
a. [UC] Beim Einkaufen fragen sich Greta und Sava, ob er sich wohl ein
wenig abgelegt hat.
b. [DB] Da er müde aussieht, raten ihm Greta und Sava zu einem Mittagss-
chlaf. Doch schon kurz darauf sehen die beiden ihn in Joggingkleidung
die Wohnung verlassen.
c. [BL] Greta und Sava sind daher nicht erstaunt, als sie ihn mit geschlosse-
nen Augen auf dem Sofa liegen sehen.
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Greta sagt zu Sava:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Nils sich gerade ausruht, geht er nachher fit ins Theater.
b. [K2] Wenn Nils sich gerade ausruhen würde, würde er nachher fit ins
Theater gehen.
(10) Contexts
Ulrich, Nathalie und Daniel sind zusammen im Urlaub und wollen morgen
in aller Frühe mit dem Bus die Heimreise antreten.
a. [UC] Da Ulrich gerne spät ins Bett geht, erinnern Nathalie und Daniel
ihn beim Abendessen an die frühe Abfahrt. Als die beiden sich später
schlafen legen, sagt Nathalie zu Daniel:
b. [DB] Nathalie und Daniel teilen sich ein Hotelzimmer neben dem von
Ulrich. Ulrich geht gerne spät ins Bett, und diese Nacht bildet keine
Ausnahme: Durch die dünne Wand hören die beiden, wie er nach Mit-
ternacht noch angeregt telefoniert. Nathalie sagt zu Daniel:
c. [BL] Nathalie und Daniel teilen sich ein Hotelzimmer neben dem von
Ulrich. Ulrich geht gerne spät ins Bett geht, doch diese Nacht bildet
eine Ausnahme: Durch die dünne Wand hören ihn die beiden schon vor
Mitternacht laut schnarchen. Nathalie sagt zu Daniel:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Ulrich gerade schläft, wacht er rechtzeitig auf.
b. [K2] Wenn Ulrich gerade schlafen würde, würde er rechtzeitig aufwachen.
(11) Contexts
Elisa ist bei Paul und Viola zu Besuch. Da Viola am Nachmittag sehr
müde ist, schlagen Elisa und Paul ihr vor, sich hinzulegen, und gegen Abend
wecken zu lassen. Elisa und Paul gehen ein paar Einkäufe erledigen.
a. [UC] Auf dem Heimweg sagt Paul sagt zu Elisa:
b. [DB] Als sie zurückkommen, sehen sie durch die Tür zur Küche, dass
Viola schon das Abendessen zubereitet. Paul sagt zu Elisa:
c. [BL] Als sie zurückkommen, sehen sie durch die Tür zum Schlafzimmer,
dass Viola auf dem Bett liegt. Paul sagt zu Elisa:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Viola sich gerade ausruht, hat sie nachher wieder Energie.
b. [K2] Wenn Viola sich gerade ausruhen würde, hätte sie nachher wieder
Energie.
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(12) Contexts
a. [UC] Petra, Luise und Karl sind Kollegen. Sie wollen heute nach der
Arbeit zusammen ins Kino gehen. Petra und Karl sind im gleichen Büro,
Luise in einem anderen. Während Petra und Karl bereits zusammen
packen und Feierabend machen, fragen sie sich, ob Luise, die derzeit
viel zu tun hat, wohl auch schon soweit ist.
b. [DB] Petra, Luise und Karl sind im Büro. Sie wollen heute nach der
Arbeit zusammen ins Kino gehen. Petra und Karl packen bereits zusam-
men und machen Feierabend. Als die beiden sich Luises Tisch nähern,
sehen sie, dass diese sich Katzenvideos im Internet anschaut.
c. [BL] Petra, Luise und Karl sind im Büro. Sie wollen heute nach der
Arbeit zusammen ins Kino gehen. Petra und Karl packen bereits zusam-
men und machen Feierabend. Als die beiden sich Luises Tisch nähern,
sehen sie, dass diese unter Hochdruck an einer Präsentation bastelt.
Petra sagt zu Karl:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Luise gerade arbeitet, geht sie nicht mit ins Kino.
b. [K2] Wenn Luise gerade arbeiten würde, würde sie nicht mit ins Kino
gehen.
(13) Contexts
Der sechsjährige Simon ist bei seinen Großeltern John und Carola. Die
beiden tun alles, um ihren Enkel bei Laune zu halten.
a. [UC] Bevor sie einen kurzen Spaziergang machen, richten sie Simon
Wasserfarben und ein Blatt Papier hin. Während des Spaziergangs sagt
John zu Carola:
b. [DB] Als sie ihm Wasserfarben und ein Blatt Papier hinrichten, beginnt
er stattdessen, das Sofa als Trampolin zu missbrauchen. John sagt zu
Carola:
c. [BL] Als sie ihn zum Spazieren mitnehmen wollen, sehen sie, dass Simon
Wasserfarben auf ein Stück Papier aufträgt. John sagt zu Carola:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Simon gerade malt, ist er für eine Weile beschäftigt.
b. [K2] Wenn Simon gerade malen würde, wäre er für eine Weile beschäftigt.
(14) Contexts
Die Mitbewohner Sophie, Robin und Emma essen gemeinsam zu Abend.
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Gewöhnlich gehen die drei nach dem Abendessen noch etwas joggen.
a. [UC] Heute ist jedoch auch Emmas Waschtag, und sie ist bekannt dafür,
Aktionen im Haushalt mit peinlicher Genauigkeit auszuführen. Nach
dem Abendessen verschwindet Emma lautlos aus der Küche. Als sie
nach einiger Zeit noch nicht zurück ist, sagt Sophie zu Robin:
b. [DB] Heute ist jedoch auch Emmas Waschtag, und sie ist bekannt dafür,
Aktionen im Haushalt mit peinlicher Genauigkeit auszuführen. Doch
nach dem Abendessen sehen Sophie und Robin durch die offene Türe
zum Bad, wie die sportlich gekleidete Emma ein paar Dehnübungen
macht. Sophie sagt zu Robin:
c. [BL] Heute ist jedoch auch der Wochentag, an dem Emma den Haushalt
in Schwung hält, und sie ist bekannt dafür, Aktionen im Haushalt mit
peinlicher Genauigkeit auszuführen. Nach dem Abendessen sehen So-
phie und Robin durch die offene Türe zum Bad, wie Emma Wäscheteile
einseift. Sophie sagt zu Robin:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Emma gerade wäscht, bleibt sie daheim.
b. [K2] Wenn Emma gerade waschen würde, würde sie daheim bleiben.
(15) Contexts
Lisa, Albert und Christoph sind zusammen im Urlaub. Eines Morgens kurz
vor neun Uhr sitzen Lisa und Christoph auf der Hotelterrasse mit Meerblick.
a. [UC] Da das Hotel nur noch bis neun Uhr Frühstück anbietet, erwägen
die beiden, Albert zu suchen, der um diese Zeit gewöhnlich schon im
Meer krault.
b. [DB] Da das Hotel nur noch bis neun Uhr Frühstück anbietet, erwägen
die beiden, Albert zu suchen, der um diese Zeit gewöhnlich schon im
Meer krault. Da sehen sie ihn plötzlich die zur Terrasse führende Treppe
hinab kommen.
c. [BL] Da das Hotel nur noch bis neun Uhr Frühstück anbietet, erwägen
die beiden, Albert zu suchen. Da erkennen sie in der Ferne plötzlich
den sportlichen Albert, wie er im offenen Meer krault.
Lisa sagt zu Christoph:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Albert gerade schwimmt, frühstücken wir ohne ihn.
b. [K2] Wenn Albert gerade schwimmen würde, würden wir ohne ihn früh-
stücken.
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(16) Contexts
Ramona, Melissa und Christine wohnen im gleichen Wohnheim. Ramona
und Melissa wohnen im vierten Stock, Christine im fünften. Der fünfte
Stock ist für seine lauten Küchen-Partys bekannt. Unter diesen Partys leidet
Christine so sehr, dass sie schon viele Male einen Auszug erwogen hat.
a. [UC] Beim Abendessen im vierten Stock vernehmen Ramona und Melissa
laute Musik, deren Quelle jedoch nicht klar auszumachen ist.
b. [DB] Beim Abendessen im vierten Stock vernehmen Ramona und Melissa
laute Musik, deren Quelle jedoch nicht klar auszumachen ist. Als die
beiden die Küche des fünften Stocks betreten, treffen sie dort keine
Menschenseele an.
c. [BL] Beim Abendessen im vierten Stock vernehmen Ramona und Melissa
laute Musik, deren Quelle jedoch nicht klar auszumachen ist. Als die bei-
den die Küche des fünften Stocks betreten, treffen sie dort eine feiernde
Masse an.
Ramona sagt zu Melissa:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn der fünfte Stock gerade feiert, zieht Christine aus.
b. [K2] Wenn der fünfte Stock gerade feiern würde, würde Christine ausziehen.
(17) Contexts
Bettina und Max besitzen einen Papageien namens Heinrich, den sie frei
fliegen lassen. Heinrich unternimmt zwar gerne Ausflüge, kehrt aber stets
zu seinen Besitzern zurück. Für den heutigen Tag ist ein starkes Unwetter
vorhergesagt.
a. [UC] Bettina und Max fragen sich, wo Heinrich abgeblieben ist. Während
sie die Wohnung nach ihm absuchen, sagt Bettina zu Max:
b. [DB] Deshalb sind Max und Bettina erleichtert, als sie Heinrich auf dem
Sofa vorfinden. Bettina sagt zu Max:
c. [BL] Deshalb sind Max und Bettina etwas beunruhigt, als sie beim Blick
aus dem Fenster Heinrich über einem Waldstück kreisen sehen. Bettina
sagt zu Max:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Heinrich gerade fliegt, schwebt er in Gefahr.
b. [K2] Wenn Heinrich gerade fliegen würde, würde er in Gefahr schweben.
(18) Contexts
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Bernd und Ingrid haben in der Adventszeit Besuch von ihrem Schwiegersohn
Frank. Ingrid hat angekündigt, Plätzchen zu backen.
a. [UC] Frank hilft Bernd beim Holzhacken im Garten, und die beiden
fragen sich, ob die Plätzchen schon in Arbeit seien.
b. [DB] Frank hilft Bernd beim Holzhacken im Garten, und äußert dabei
die Hoffnung, dass die Plätzchen schon in Arbeit seien. Da sehen die
beiden, wie Ingrid mit dem Auto davon fährt.
c. [BL] Frank hilft Bernd beim Holzhacken im Garten, und äußert dabei
die Hoffnung, dass die Plätzchen schon in Arbeit seien. Da sehen die
beiden durch das Fenster zur Küche, wie Ingrid ein Blech Vanillekipferl
aus dem Ofen holt.
Bernd sagt zu Frank:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Ingrid gerade bäckt, durchzieht ein süßer Duft das Haus.
b. [K2] Wenn Ingrid gerade backen würde, würde ein süßer Duft das Haus
durchziehen.
(19) Contexts
Andreas und Grete möchten Renate einen spontanen Besuch abstatten. Sie
klingeln an der Tür, doch niemand öffnet. Aus Erfahrung wissen die beiden,
dass Renate sich gerne in Meditationsübungen verliert.
(19) [UC]
(19) [DB] Doch als sie von außen einen Blick in die Küche werfen, sehen sie
Renate, wie sie sich einen Salat zubereitet.
(19) [BL] Als sie von außen einen Blick in das Wohnzimmer werfen, sehen sie
Renate aufrecht und mit geschlossenen Augen auf einer Yogamatte sitzen.
Andreas sagt zu Grete:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Renate gerade meditiert, lässt sie uns nicht rein.
b. [K2] Wenn Renate gerade meditieren würde, würde sie uns nicht rein lassen.
(20) Contexts
Max, Philipp und Johannes sind auf einer Berghütte.
a. [UC] In der Dämmerung geht Johannes gewöhnlich noch ein Weilchen
auf Wanderschaft. Max und Philipp wollen zu Abend kochen, doch sie
entschließen sich, einen Moment auf den noch abwesenden Johannes zu
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warten.
b. [DB] In der Dämmerung geht Johannes gewöhnlich noch ein Weilchen
auf Wanderschaft. Doch als Max und Philipp zu Abend kochen wollen,
bemerken sie, dass Johannes schon in der Küche steht.
c. [BL] Kurz bevor sie kochen wollen, schauen Max und Philipp aus dem
Fenster und sehen Johannes in voller Wandermontur von der Hütte
weglaufen.
Max sagt zu Philipp:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Johannes gerade wandert, kocht er nicht mit.
b. [K2] Wenn Johannes gerade wandern würde, würde er nicht mit kochen.
(21) Contexts
Patrick, Liliana und Lukas sind mit dem Zug nach Berlin unterwegs.
a. [UC] Patrick, Liliana und Lukas sind mit dem Zug nach Berlin unter-
wegs. Während einem längeren Zwischenstopp fragen sich Patrick und
Liliana, ob Lukas, der Raucher ist, wohl den Zug verlassen hat, um
seine Sucht zu befriedigen. Kurz vor Abfahrt sagt Patrick zu Liliana:
b. [DB] Patrick, Liliana und Lukas sind mit dem Zug nach Berlin unter-
wegs. Kurz bevor der Zug nach einem längeren Zwischenhalt weiter-
fährt, bemerken Patrick und Liliana, dass Lukas, der Raucher ist, im
Abteil nebenan telefoniert. Patrick sagt zu Liliana:
c. [BL] Kurz bevor der Zug nach einem längeren Zwischenhalt weiterfährt,
sehen Liliana und Patrick durch ein Fenster ihres Abteils, dass Lukas
noch auf dem Bahnsteig im Raucherbereich steht und genüsslich an
einer Zigarette zieht. Patrick sagt zu Liliana:
Max sagt zu Philipp:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Lukas gerade raucht, verpasst er den Zug.
b. [K2] Wenn Lukas gerade rauchen würde, würde er den Zug verpassen.
(22) Contexts
a. [UC] Matthias, Lisa und Johann wollen sich gemeinsam ein für den
Abend angekündigtes Fußballspiel anschauen. Johann widmet sich abends
häufig den Aufgaben, die tagsüber liegen geblieben sind. Matthias und
Lisa fragen sich, ob er sich heute Zeit für das Spiel nimmt. Kurz vor
Anpfiff sagt Matthias zu Lisa:
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b. [DB] Matthias, Lisa und Johann wollen sich gemeinsam ein für den
Abend angekündigtes Fußballspiel anschauen. Johann widmet sich abends
häufig den Aufgaben, die tagsüber liegen geblieben sind. Kurz vor
Anpfiff merken Matthias und Lisa, dass Johann schon auf dem Sofa
vor dem Fernseher sitzt. Matthias sagt zu Lisa:
c. [BL] Matthias, Lisa und Johann wollen sich gemeinsam das heutige
Fußballspiel anschauen. Kurz vor Anpfiff merken Matthias und Lisa,
dass Johann noch an seinem Schreibtisch sitzt, und sich konzentriert
mit der Lösung einer Aufgabe befasst. Matthias sagt zu Lisa:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Johann gerade arbeitet, verpasst er den Anfang des Spiels.
b. [K2] Wenn Johann gerade arbeiten würde, würde er den Anfang des
Spiels verpassen.
(23) Contexts
Maike, Anna und Wiebke sind zusammen im Urlaub am Atlantik.
a. [UC] Maike und Anna möchten allmählich das gemeinsame Zelt abbauen.
Wiebke, die um diese Zeit manchmal die Wellen reitet, lässt auf sich warten.
b. [DB] Maike und Anna möchten allmählich das gemeinsame Zelt abbauen. Sie
rechnen nicht mit Wiebke, die um diese Zeit gewöhnlich die Wellen reitet. Da
merken die beiden, dass Wiebke bereits dabei ist, die Schlafsäcke zusammen
zu rollen.
c. [BL] Als Maike und Anna allmählich das gemeinsame Zelt abbauen wollen,
sehen die beiden, wie Wiebke draußen auf dem Meer die Wellen reitet.
Maike sagt zu Anna:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Wiebke gerade surfen ist, hilft sie uns nicht beim Abbauen.
b. [K2] Wenn Wiebke gerade surfen wäre, würde sie uns nicht beim Abbauen
helfen.
(24) Contexts
Lena, Tina und Kurt sind verabredet, um im Sonnenuntergang auf dem
Balkon zu Abend zu essen.
a. [UC] Tina und Kurt fragen sich, ob Lena, die sonst Tag und Nacht an
einer Hausarbeit sitzt, sich tatsächlich Zeit für den Sonnenuntergang
nehmen wird. Kurz bevor es soweit ist, sagt Tina zu Kurt:
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b. [DB] Kurz bevor die Sonne untergeht, merken Tina und Kurt, dass
Lena, die sonst Tag und Nacht an einer Hausarbeit sitzt, schon den
Grill anheizt. Tina sagt zu Kurt:
c. [BL] Als die Sonne untergeht, merken Tina und Kurt, dass Lena noch
im Wohnzimmer am Laptop an ihrer Hausarbeit sitzt. Tina sagt zu
Kurt:
Maike sagt zu Anna:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Lena gerade schreibt, verpasst sie den Sonnenuntergang.
b. [K2] Wenn Lena gerade schreiben würde, würde sie den Sonnenunter-
gang verpassen.
(25) Contexts
Die Mitbewohner Tim, Patrick und Liana sind zum Lernen im Wohnzimmer
verabredet.
a. [UC] Tim und Liana fragen sich, ob Patrick, der momentan jede freie
Minute nutzt, um auf seiner Gitarre zu spielen, sich tatsächlich zu ihnen
gesellen wird.
b. [DB] Tim und Liana fragen sich, ob Patrick, der momentan jede freie
Minute nutzt, um auf seiner Gitarre zu spielen, sich tatsächlich zu ihnen
gesellen wird. Als sie sich aber dem Wohnzimmer nähern, sehen sie
ihn durch die offene Tür bereits auf dem Sofa sitzen, vertieft in seine
Vorlesungs-Mitschriebe.
c. [BL] Tim und Liana sind schon bereit und wollen Patrick dazu holen.
Als sie sich aber seinem Zimmer nähern, hören sie ihn auf seiner Gitarre
spielen.
Liana sagt zu Tim:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Patrick gerade musiziert, lernt er nicht mit uns.
b. [K2] Wenn Patrick gerade musizieren würde, würde er nicht mit uns
lernen.
(26) Contexts
Helen und Lena sind auf dem Weg zu Melanie, um die Hochzeit einer Fre-
undin vorzubereiten.
a. [UC] Die beiden fragen sich, ob Melanie ihnen bei der Sitzordnung helfen
wird: Melanie hatte sich so sehr darauf gefreut, die Dekoration zu gestal-
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ten. Da werden sie von Melanie per Handy benachrichtigt, dass diese
schon mal ohne sie angefangen habe.
b. [DB] Die beiden fragen sich, ob Melanie ihnen bei der Sitzordnung helfen
wird: Melanie hatte sich so sehr darauf gefreut, die Dekoration zu gestal-
ten. Da werden sie von Melanie per Handy benachrichtigt, dass diese
bereits dabei sei, auszutüfteln, wer mit dem Brautpaar an einem Tisch
sitze.
c. [BL] Die beiden sind entschlossen, zunächst die Sitzordnung festzulegen.
Da werden sie von Melanie per Handy benachrichtigt, dass diese bereits
dabei sei, die Dekoration zu gestalten.
Helen sagt zu Lena:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Melanie gerade bastelt, kümmern wir uns alleine um die
Sitzordnung.
b. [K2] Wenn Melanie gerade basteln würde, würden wir uns alleine um
die Sitzordnung kümmern.
(27) Contexts
Lisa, Max und Jan machen zusammen Urlaub am Meer. Für heute ist
Kitesurfen geplant.
a. [UC] Max und Jan fragen sich, ob Lisa, die sich mehr aufs Skateboarden
gefreut hatte, auch tatsächlich mitkommen wird. Kurz bevor sie zum
Strand loslaufen wollen, sagt Max zu Jan:
b. [DB] Als Jan und Max zum Strand loslaufen wollen, sehen sie, dass Lisa,
die sich mehr aufs Skateboarden gefreut hatte, ihre Kite-Ausrüstung
schon zusammengepackt hat und startklar am gemeinsamen Zelt wartet.
Max sagt zu Jan:
c. [BL] Als Jan und Max jedoch zum Strand loslaufen wollen, sehen sie,
dass Lisa im lokalen Skatepark beeindruckende Kunststücke vollführt.
Max sagt zu Jan:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Lisa gerade skaten ist, geht sie nicht mit uns Kitesurfen.
b. [K2] Wenn Lisa gerade skaten wäre, würde sie nicht mit uns Kitesurfen
gehen.
(28) Contexts
Bob, Julius und Ann-Sophie sind zum Kartenspielen in der Küche verabre-
det.
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a. [UC] Julius und Bob fragen sich, ob Ann-Sophie, die morgen Besuch
bekommt und Ordnung in ihr Zimmer bringen wollte, sich Zeit zum
verabredeten Spiel nehmen wird. Kurz bevor sie anfangen wollen, sagt
Bob zu Julius:
b. [DB] Als Bob und Julius in die Küche kommen, sehen sie, dass Ann-
Sophie, die morgen Besuch bekommt und Ordnung in ihr Zimmer brin-
gen wollte, schon am Tisch sitzt und auf sie wartet. Julius sagt zu
Bob:
c. [BL] Als Bob und Julius die Karten verteilen wollen, sehen sie durch
die offene Tür zu Ann-Sophies Zimmer, dass diese die Papierstapel auf
ihrem Schreibtisch sortiert. Julius sagt zu Bob:
Targets
a. [IND]Wenn Ann-Sophie gerade aufräumt, spielt sie nicht mit uns Karten.
b. [K2] Wenn Ann-Sophie gerade aufräumen würde, würde sie nicht mit
uns Karten spielen.
(29) Contexts
Johanna, Lisa und Matthias hatten geplant, heute indisch essen zu gehen.
a. [UC] Allerdings hatte Lisa den Termin vergessen, und reichlich Gemüse
eingekauft, um ein Rezept auszuprobieren. Matthias und Johanna fra-
gen sich, ob sie dennoch mit essen kommt.
b. [DB] Allerdings hatte Lisa den Termin vergessen, und reichlich Gemüse
eingekauft, um ein Rezept auszuprobieren. Kurz bevor Johanna und
Matthias loswollen, bemerken die beiden, dass Lisa schon ihre Schuhe
angezogen hat und in der Wohnungstür steht.
c. [BL] Doch kurz bevor sie loswollen, bemerken Johanna und Matthias,
dass Lisa in der Küche Gemüse in eine heiße Pfanne gibt.
Matthias sagt zu Johanna:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Lisa gerade kocht, isst sie nicht mit uns beim Inder.
b. [K2] Wenn Lisa gerade kochen würde, würde sie nicht mit uns beim
Inder essen.
(30) Contexts
Stefan, Luise und Emily sind zum Kochen beisammen.
a. [UC] Luise und Emily fragen sich, ob Stefan, der dringend ein neues
Spiel für seine Playstation ausprobieren wollte, mit ihnen kochen wird,
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oder ob er es sich noch einmal anders überlegt.
b. [DB] Kurz bevor sie beginnen wollen, bemerken Luise und Emily, dass
Stefan, der dringend ein neues Spiel für seine Playstation ausprobieren
wollte, in der Küche Zwiebeln schneidet.
c. [BL] Kurz bevor sie beginnen wollen, sehen Luise und Emily durch
die offene Wohnzimmertür, dass Stefan hochkonzentriert mit seinem
Playstation-Controller vor dem Fernseher sitzt.
Emily sagt zu Luise:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Stefan gerade spielt, kocht er nicht mit uns.
b. [K2] Wenn Stefan gerade spielen würde, würde er nicht mit uns kochen.
(31) Contexts
Patrick, David und Paula sind im Kino verabredet.
a. [UC] Auf dem Weg zum Saal fragen sich David und Patrick, ob Paula,
die eben noch geschrieben hatte, sie müsse dringend ihren Hunger stillen,
es noch rechtzeitig schafft.
b. [DB] Auf dem Weg zum Saal bemerken David und Patrick, dass Paula,
die eben noch geschrieben hatte, sie müsse dringend ihren Hunger stillen,
bereits an der Saaltür wartet.
c. [BL] Als sie zum Saal gehen wollen, bemerken David und Patrick, dass
Paula auf der anderen Straßenseite am Imbiss steht und in einen Kebab
beißt.
Patrick sagt zu David:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Paula gerade isst, verpasst sie den Anfang des Filmes.
b. [K2] Wenn Paula gerade essen würde, würde sie den Anfang des Filmes
verpassen.
(32) Contexts
Yusuf, Martin und Nadine sind nach einer Vorlesung in der Cafeteria ve-
rabredet, um einen Kaffee zu trinken. Nadine hatte noch ein paar kritische
Fragen an die Professorin.
a. [UC] Martin und Yusuf fragen sich, ob Nadine dennoch mit ihnen Kaffee
trinken wird. Als sie vor dem Vorlesungssaal stehen, sagt Martin zu
Yusuf:
b. [DB] Doch als Yusuf und Martin den Vorlesungssaal verlassen, sehen sie,
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dass Nadine an der Theke der Cafeteria bereits einen Kaffee in Empfang
nimmt. Martin sagt zu Yusuf:
c. [BL] Als Yusuf und Martin an der Theke stehen, sehen sie in einiger
Entfernung, wie Nadine sich angeregt mit der Professorin unterhält.
Martin sagt zu Yusuf:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Nadine gerade diskutiert, trinkt sie keinen Kaffee mit uns.
b. [K2] Wenn Nadine gerade diskutieren würde, würde sie keinen Kaffee
mit uns trinken.
(33) Contexts
Gökhan, Maria und Stefanie wohnen zusammen und wollen heute ein Brettspiel
spielen.
a. [UC] Gökhan, Maria und Stefanie wohnen zusammen und wollen ein
Brettspiel spielen. Gökhan und Maria fragen sich, ob Stefanie, die unbe-
dingt noch das Bad reinigen wollte, sich Zeit für das Spiel nehmen wird.
Kurz bevor es losgehen soll, sagt Maria zu Gökhan:
b. [DB] Gökhan, Maria und Stefanie wohnen zusammen und wollen ein
Brettspiel spielen. Kurz bevor sie beginnen wollen, merken Gökhan
und Maria, dass Stefanie, die unbedingt noch das Bad putzen wollte,
schon am Tisch sitzt. Gökhan sagt zu Maria:
c. [BL] Gökhan, Maria und Stefanie wohnen zusammen und wollen heute
ein Brettspiel spielen. Als Stefanie auf sich warten lässt, gehen Gökhan
und Maria sie suchen. Durch die offene Badezimmertür erblicken sie
Stefanie, wie sie das Waschbecken reinigt. Gökhan sagt zu Maria:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Stefanie gerade putzt, spielt sie nicht mit uns.
b. [K2] Wenn Stefanie gerade putzen würde, würde sie nicht mit uns spie-
len.
(34) Contexts
Vera, Janek und Simon treffen sich im Freibad, um eine Überraschungsparty
für einen Freund zu planen.
a. [UC] Da Vera auf sich warten lässt, fragen sie sich, ob sie, wie so häufig
der Fall, ein längeres Telefonat führt.
b. [DB] Janek und Simon wollen allmählich mit der Gästeliste beginnen.
Da Vera auf sich warten lässt, fragen sie sich, ob sie, wie so häufig der
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Fall, ein längeres Telefonat führt. Da sehen sie Vera aus dem Schwimm-
becken klettern.
c. [BL] Als Janek und Simon gerade mit der Gästeliste beginnen wollen,
sehen sie Vera am Beckenrand auf- und abschreiten, das Handy am Ohr.
Janek sagt zu Simon:
Janek sagt zu Simon:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Vera gerade telefoniert, hilft sie uns nicht bei der Gästeliste.
b. [K2] Vera gerade telefonieren würde, würde sie uns nicht bei der Gästeliste
helfen.
(35) Contexts
Leonie, Manuel und Lisa sind im Jugendhaus, um den neuen Schichtplan zu
besprechen.
a. [UC] Manuel und Lisa fragen sich, ob Leonie, die immer gerne mit
Gästen an der Theke Gespräche führt, sich dennoch Zeit für den Schicht-
plan nehmen wird. Kurz bevor sie anfangen wollen, sagt Manuel zu
Lisa:
b. [DB] Kurz bevor sie beginnen wollen, merken Lisa und Manuel, dass
Leonie, die immer gerne mit Gästen an der Theke Gespräche führt, im
Büro am neuen Schichtplan sitzt. Manuel sagt zu Lisa:
c. [BL] Kurz bevor sie beginnen wollen, merken Lisa und Manuel, dass
Leonie mit einem Gast an der Theke ein konzentriertes Gespräch führt.
Manuel sagt zu Lisa:
Targets
a. [IND]Wenn Leonie sich gerade unterhält, hilft sie uns nicht beim Schicht-
plan.
b. [K2] Wenn Leonie sich gerade unterhalten würde, würde sie uns nicht
beim Schichtplan helfen.
(36) Contexts
Kira, Tim und Miriam sind Kollegen und wollen heute zusammen zu Mit-
tag essen. Kira hatte im Vorfeld erwähnt, dass sie über die Mittagspause
eventuell ein zeitintensives Telefonat führen müsse.
a. [UC] Tim undMiriam treffen sich wie vereinbart am Eingang des Gebäudes,
Kira ist noch nicht in Sicht.
b. [DB] Kurz bevor sie losgehen wollen, bemerken Tim und Miriam, dass
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Kira schon angezogen in der Tür steht.
c. [BL] Kurz bevor sie losgehen wollen, bemerken Tim und Miriam, dass
Kira aufgebracht am Telefon mit ihrem Chef diskutiert.
Tim sagt zu Miriam:
Targets
a. [IND] Wenn Kira gerade telefoniert, geht sie nicht mit uns essen.
b. [K2] Wenn Kira gerade telefonieren würde, würde sie nicht mit uns essen
gehen.
119

References
Anderson, Alan Ross (1951). “A note on subjunctive and counterfactual condition-
als”. Analysis 12 (2), pp. 35–38.
Armenante, Giuliano & Julia Braun (2020). “Fake past in conditionals and attitude
reports – a crosslinguistic correlation”. Paper to appear in the Proceedings of
Linguistic Evidence 2020, Universität Tübingen.
Bade, Nadine (2016). “Obligatory presupposition triggers in discourse-empirical
foundations of the theories maximize presupposition and obligatory implicatures”.
Tübingen: Universität Tübingen PhD dissertation.
– (2018). “Obligatory Additives in the Antecedent of Conditionals”. Proceedings
of Sinn und Bedeutung 21. Ed. by Robert Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline
Heycock, Brian Raber & Hannah Rohde. 1, pp. 73–88.
Bade, Nadine & Florian Schwarz (2019). “An experimental investigation of an-
tipresuppositions”. University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics
25 (1). Ed. by Ava Creemers & Caitlin Richter, pp. 31–40.
Beaver, David & Brady Clark (2008). Sense and sensitivity: how focus determines
meaning. Wiley-Blackwell.
Beck, Sigrid (2019′). “Wrap-Up”. Class handout, research seminar on presupposi-
tional particles PPP, University of Tübingen, summer 2019.
– (2007). “The grammar of focus interpretation”. Interfaces + recursion = lan-
guage? Ed. by Uli Sauerland & Hans-Martin Gärtner, pp. 255–280.
– (2020). “Readings of scalar particles: noch/still”. Linguistics and Philosophy
43 (1), pp. 1–67.
Beck, Sigrid & Vera Hohaus (2011). “The semantics of tense and modality”. Lecture
Notes, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen.
Beck, Sigrid & Hotze Rullmann (1999). “A flexible approach to exhaustivity in
questions”. Natural Language Semantics 7 (3), pp. 249–298.
Braun, Julia (2019). “If they would listen to their teacher: the acquisition of English
conditionals by German native speakers”. MA thesis, University of Tübingen.
Brody, Michael (1997). “Perfect chains”. Elements of grammar. Ed. by Liliane
Haegeman, pp. 139–167.
Chemla, Emmanuel (2008). “An epistemic step for anti-presuppositions”. Journal
of Semantics 25 (2), pp. 141–173.
Chen, Zhuo (2019). “Keeping dou as a simple distributor”. Proceedings of the 22nd
Amsterdam Colloquium. Ed. by Julian J. Schlöder, Dean McHugh & Floris Roelof-
sen, pp. 71–80.
121
Chierchia, Gennaro (2006). “Broaden your views: implicatures of domain widening
and the “logicality”of language”. Linguistic Inquiry 37 (4), pp. 535–590.
Chomsky, Noam (1995). The Minimalist Program. MIT Press.
Coppock, Elizabeth & David Beaver (2014). “Principles of the exclusive muddle”.
Journal of Semantics 31 (3), pp. 371–432.
Coppock, Elizabeth & Anna Lindahl (2014). “Minimal sufficiency readings in con-
ditionals”. Proceedings of the 15th Texas Linguistic Society. Ed. by Christopher
Brown, Qianping Gu, Cornelia Loos, Jason Mielens & Grace Neveu, pp. 24–38.
Crnič, Luka (2011). “Getting even”. PhD thesis. MIT.
von Fintel, Kai (1994). “Restrictions on quantifier domains”. PhD thesis. University
of Massachusetts at Amherst.
– (1998). “The presupposition of subjunctive conditionals”. The interpretive tract
25, pp. 29–44.
– (1999). “NPI licensing, Strawson entailment, and context dependency”. Journal
of semantics 16 (2), pp. 97–148.
– (2008). “What is presupposition accommodation, again?” Philosophical perspec-
tives 22, pp. 137–170.
– (2011). “Conditionals”. Semantics: an international handbook of natural language
meaning 2. Ed. by Klaus von Heusinger, Claudia Maienborn & Paul Portner,
pp. 1515–1538.
von Fintel, Kai & Irene Heim (2011). “Lecture notes on intensional semantics”. Ms.,
MIT.
von Fintel, Kai & Sabine Iatridou (2007). “Anatomy of a modal construction”.
Linguistic Inquiry 38 (3), pp. 445–483.
– (2008). “How to say ought in foreign: The composition of weak necessity modals”.
Time and modality. Ed. by Jacqueline Guéron & Jacqueline Lecarme. Springer,
pp. 115–141.
– (2017). “Transparent wishes”. Slides presented in Berlin on April 21, 2017. url:
http://web.mit.edu/fintel/fintel-iatridou-2017-x-desires-slides-
ipac.pdf%20[2018/03/04].
– (2020). “Prolegomena to a theory of X-marking”. Ms. under review for Linguistics
and Philosophy.
Fox, Danny (2007). “Free choice and the theory of scalar implicatures”. Presupposi-
tion and implicature in compositional semantics. Ed. by Uli Sauerland & Penka
Stateva. Springer, pp. 71–120.
Fox, Danny & Benjamin Spector (2018). “Economy and embedded exhaustifica-
tion”. Natural Language Semantics 26 (1), pp. 1–50.
122
Grano, Thomas & Milo Phillips-Brown (2020). “(Counter)factual want ascriptions
and conditional belief”. Ms.
Grønn, Atle & Arnim von Stechow (2009). “Temporal interpretation and organisa-
tion of subjunctive conditionals”. Ms. U. Oslo.
Grosz, Patrick Georg (2012). On the grammar of optative constructions. Vol. 193.
John Benjamins Publishing.
Guerzoni, Elena & Dongsik Lim (2007). “Even if, factivity and focus”. Proceedings
of Sinn und Bedeutung 11. Ed. by Louise McNally & Estela Puig-Waldmüller,
pp. 276–290.
Heim, Irene (1991). “Artikel und Definitheit”. Semantik: ein internationales Hand-
buch der zeitgenössischen Forschung. Ed. by Arnim von Stechow & Dieter Wun-
derlich, pp. 487–535.
– (1992). “Presupposition projection and the semantics of attitude verbs”. Journal
of semantics 9 (3), pp. 183–221.
Heim, Irene & Angelika Kratzer (1998). Semantics in generative grammar. Black-
well Oxford.
Hole, Daniel (2004). Focus and background marking in Mandarin Chinese: System
and theory behind cai, jiu, dou and ye. Routledge.
– (2006). “Mapping VPs to restrictors: Anti-Diesing effects in Mandarin Chinese”.
Where semantics meets pragmatics. Ed. by Klaus von Heusinger & Ken P. Turner,
pp. 337–380.
– (2017). “A crosslinguistic syntax of scalar and non-scalar focus particle sentences:
the view from Vietnamese and Chinese”. Journal of East Asian Linguistics 26 (4),
pp. 389–409.
Iatridou, Sabine (1993). “On the contribution of conditional then”. Natural Lan-
guage Semantics 2 (3), pp. 171–199.
– (2000). “The grammatical ingredients of counterfactuality”. Linguistic inquiry
31 (2), pp. 231–270.
Ippolito, Michela (2003). “Presuppositions and implicatures in counterfactuals”.
Natural Language Semantics 11 (2), pp. 145–186.
– (2007). “On the meaning of some focus-sensitive particles”. Natural Language
Semantics 15 (1), pp. 1–34.
Karttunen, Lauri & Stanley Peters (1975). “Conventional Implicature”. Syntax and
Semantics 11.
Kasper, Walter (1992). “Presuppositions, composition, and simple subjunctives”.
Journal of Semantics 9 (4), pp. 307–331.
123
Kauf, Carina & Hedde Zeijlstra (2018). “Towards a New Explanation of Sequence
of Tense”. Proceedings of SALT 28. Ed. by Sireemas Maspong, Brynhildur Ste-
fánsdóttir, Katherine Blake & Forrest Davis, pp. 59–77.
Kaufmann, Magdalena (2017). “What‘may’and‘must’may be in Japanese”.
Proceedings of The 24th Japanese/Korean Linguistics Conference, October. Ed.
by Kenshi Funakoshi, Shigeto Kawahara & Chris Tancredi.
Keshet, Ezra (2010). “Situation economy”. Natural Language Semantics 18 (4),
pp. 385–434.
Kratzer, Angelika (1986). “Conditionals”. Proceedings of CLS 22.
Krifka, Manfred (2000). “Alternatives for aspectual particles: Semantics of still and
already”. Annual meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society 26. 1, pp. 401–412.
Lai, Huei-Ling (1999). “Rejected expectations: the scalar particles cai and jiu in
Mandarin Chinese”. Linguistics 37 (4), pp. 625–661.
Leahy, Brian (2011). “Presuppositions and antipresuppositions in conditionals”.
Proceedings of SALT 21. Ed. by Neil Ashton, Anca Chereches & David Lutz,
pp. 257–274.
– (2018). “Counterfactual antecedent falsity and the epistemic sensitivity of coun-
terfactuals”. Philosophical Studies 175 (1), pp. 45–69.
Lee, Youngjoo (2005). “Exhaustivity as agreement: The case of Korean man ‘only’”.
Natural Language Semantics 13 (2), pp. 169–200.
Liu, Mingming (2016′). “Exclusive and non-exclusive ONLYs in Chinese and En-
glish”. Poster presented at WCCFL 34. url: https : / / mmmarkliu . files .
wordpress.com/2017/02/liuwccfl.pdf%20[2018/12/11].
– (2017). “Varieties of alternatives: Mandarin focus particles”. Linguistics and Phi-
losophy 40 (1), pp. 61–95.
Löbner, Sebastian (1989). “German schon - erst - noch: an integrated analysis”.
Linguistics and Philosophy 12, pp. 167–212.
Matthewson, Lisa & Hubert Truckenbrodt (2018). “Modal flavour/modal force in-
teraction in German: soll, sollte, muss, and müsste”. Linguistische Berichte 255,
pp. 3–48.
Mittwoch, Anita (1993). “The relationship between schon/already and noch/still:
A reply to Löbner”. Natural Language Semantics 2 (1), pp. 71–82.
Ogihara, Toshiyuki (2014). “The semantics of‘-ta’in Japanese future conditionals”.
The art and craft of semantics: a Festschrift for Irene Heim. Ed. by Luka Crnič
& Uli Sauerland. Vol. 2. MITWPL, pp. 1–21.
Panizza, Daniele & Yasutada Sudo (2020). “Minimal sufficiency with covert even”.
To appear in Glossa.
124
Partee, Barbara (1986). “Noun phrase interpretation and type-shifting principles”.
Ed. by Jeroen Groenendijk, Dick de Jongh & Martin Stokhof. Foris, pp. 115–143.
Percus, Orin (2000). “Constraints on some other variables in syntax”. Natural Lan-
guage Semantics 8 (3), pp. 173–229.
Pesetsky, David & Esther Torrego (2007). “The syntax of valuation and the in-
terpretability of features”. Phrasal and clausal architecture: syntactic derivation
and interpretation. Ed. by Simin Karimi, Vida Samiian & Wendy K. Wilkins,
pp. 262–294.
Poole, Ethan (2017). “Movement and the semantic type of traces”. PhD thesis.
UMass Amherst.
Portner, Paul (1992). “Situation theory and the semantics of propositional expres-
sions”. PhD thesis. UMass Amherst.
Quek, Yihui & Aron Hirsch (2016). “Severing focus form and meaning in Standard
and Colloquial Singapore English”. Proceedings of NELS. Ed. by Andrew Lamont
& Katerina Tetzloff, pp. 15–24.
Romero, Maribel (2014). “Fake tense in counterfactuals: A temporal remoteness
approach”. The art and craft of semantics: a Festschrift for Irene Heim. Ed. by
Luka Crnič & Uli Sauerland. Vol. 2. MITWPL, pp. 47–63.
Rouillard, Vincent & Bernhard Schwarz (2018). “Presuppositional implicatures:
quantity or maximize presupposition?” Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 22.
Ed. by Uli Sauerland & Stephanie Solt, pp. 289–306.
Rubinstein, Aynat (2017). “Straddling the line between attitude verbs and necessity
modals”. Modality Across Syntactic Categories. Ed. by Ana Arregui, María Luisa
Rivero & Andrés Salanova, pp. 610–633.
Rullmann, Hotze (1997). “Even, polarity, and scope”. Papers in experimental and
theoretical linguistics 4, pp. 40–64.
Sauerland, Uli (2002). “The present tense is vacuous”. Snippets 6 (11), pp. 12–13.
– (2008a). “Implicated presuppositions”. The discourse potential of underspecified
structures. Ed. by Anita Steube, pp. 581–600.
– (2008b). “On the semantic markedness of ϕ-features”. ϕ-features. Ed. by Daniel
Harbour, David Adger & Susana Béjar. OUP, pp. 57–82.
Schlenker, Philippe (2005). “The lazy Frenchman’s approach to the subjunctive”.
Romance languages and linguistic theory. Ed. by T. Geerts, I. van Ginneken &
H. Jacobs. Benjamins, pp. 269–309.
Schulz, Katrin (2014). “Fake tense in conditional sentences: a modal approach”.
Natural Language Semantics 22 (2), pp. 117–144.
125
Sode, Frank (2017). “Besser and its moody arguments”. Slides presented in Frank-
furt on February 2, 2017.
– (2018). “good as a predicate of worlds”. Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 22.
Ed. by Uli Sauerland & Stephanie Solt, pp. 407–424.
Stalnaker, Robert (1975). “Indicative conditionals”. Philosophia 5, pp. 269–86.
von Stechow, Arnim (2006). “Times as degrees: früh(er) ‘early(er), spät(er) ‘late(r)’,
and phase adverbs”. Ms., Universität Tübingen.
Sun, Yenan (2019). “A bipartite analysis of zhiyou ‘only’ in Mandarin Chinese”.
Ms., University of Chicago.
Tham, Shiao Wei (2005). “Review of Hole (2004)”. The Linguist List. url: https:
//linguistlist.org/issues/16/16-1718.html.
Tomioka, Satoshi (2010). “A scope theory of contrastive topics”. Iberia: an Inter-
national Journal of theoretical linguistics 2 (1).
Tonhauser, Judith, David Beaver, Craige Roberts & Mandy Simons (2013). “Toward
a taxonomy of projective content”. Language 89 (1), pp. 66–109.
Tsai, Cheng-Yu Edwin (2017). “Preverbal number phrases in Mandarin and the
scalar reasoning of jiu”. WCCFL 34. Ed. by Aaron Kaplan, Abby Kaplan, Mi-
randa K. McCarvel & Edward J. Rubin. Cascadilla Proceedings Project, pp. 554–
561.
Villalta, Elisabeth (2008). “Mood and gradability: an investigation of the subjunc-
tive mood in Spanish”. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (4), p. 467.
Wimmer, Alexander (2020′). “Flavors of scalar lowness”. Paper submitted to the
proceedings of IATL 35.
– (2019). “Paradoxical desires: on counterfactual wishing”. Proceedings of CLS 54.
Ed. by Eszter Ronai, Laura Stigliano & Yenan Sun.
– (2020). “Counterfactual wishing as multiple agreement”. Proceedings of Sinn
und Bedeutung 24. Ed. by Michael Franke, Nikola Kompa, Mingya Liu, Jutta
L. Mueller & Juliane Schwab, pp. 455–468.
Zeijlstra, Hedde (2007). “Modal concord”. Proceedings of SALT 17 . Ed. by T. Fried-
man & M. Gibson, pp. 317–332.
– (2012). “There is only one way to agree”. The linguistic review 29 (3), pp. 491–
539.
Zhang, Linmin & Jia Ling (2017). “Mandarin Chinese particle jiù: a current question
restrictor”. Slides presented at TEAL 11. url: http://semanticsarchive.net/
Archive/TlkNmU5N/ZhangLing_2017_TEAL11.pdf%20[2018/03/04].
Zimmermann, Malte (2018). “Wird schon stimmen! A degree operator analysis of
schon”. Journal of Semantics 35 (4), pp. 687–739.
126
